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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Jeffrey Robert Gunn 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Sociology 
 
June 2015 
 
Title: Pipelines of Influence: The Fossil Fuels Industry, Climate Change, 
and the Policy Planning Network 
 
 
This dissertation analyzes the case of organized climate change 
denial in the United States as a manifestation of the power of the policy 
planning and opinion shaping networks in the US. It uses a variety of 
power structure research techniques to put together a topographical study 
of a fossil fuels network sitting at the core of a wider conservative network 
which sits at the core of the policy planning and opinion shaping 
processes. The connections between the core fossil fuels network and 
wider conservative policy network are examined at length. Using climate 
change denial as the case allows for the study of how a distinct industry—
fossil fuels—can organize a faction which can help set the ideological 
agenda of the wider corporate and conservative networks. A power elite 
theoretical approach outlined by Domhoff is used, and the conclusions 
that may be drawn from this case study support the usefulness of that 
approach. I also find that the case at hand illustrates how Domhoff’s 
model may be extended and augmented in light of the strategic and 
tactical innovations employed by those in the climate change denial 
 v 
 
faction. Although elites have often tried—with varying levels of success—to 
employ at least a veneer of populist support in formulating policy, climate 
change denial employs a new level of sophistication in then fossil fuels’ 
faction’s long-term strategic  planning and investment. This faction’s 
ability to wrest ideological control of much of the tea party movement and 
bring that party’s policy aims into line with its own allowed for the 
addition of a powerful populist element to the climate change denial 
tactical repertoire.  Similarly, new secrecy techniques go far beyond those 
used by elites in the past, reflecting a new set of needs on the part of the 
individuals and groups involved in the policy network and necessitating 
the augmentation of the existing network with specialized entities.  
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1 
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Data released by the Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press show that in April, 2006, 77% of Americans agreed that there was 
“solid evidence” that global warming was real, and 43% felt it was a 
serious problem (Pew Research Center 2009). Just three years later, 
those numbers had fallen to 57% and 35%, even though wide scientific 
agreement had been reached during those same years; by 2007, virtually 
every major scientific organization in the world agreed that climate 
change was real, that it was caused mostly by human activity (namely 
CO2 emissions), and that it constituted an impending crisis.1 This major 
shift in the public’s view of the seriousness of climate change is a 
reflection of the efforts made by powerful leaders of the fossil fuels 
industry who have been responsible for the fact that very few actions 
have been taken in the U.S. to address this problem. Corporate interests 
in general dominate the production of policy and policy discourse in the 
United States. What occurred during this period exemplifies the ability of 
an elite faction to use its network position with a wider group of 
                                                          
1 For example, by 2009, most of the leading scientific organizations in the world 
acknowledged human-caused climate change:  American Association for the 
Advancement of Science-2006, American Chemical Society-2004, American Physical 
Society-2007, The Geological Society of America-2006, and strengthened in 2010, U.S. 
National Academy of Sciences-2005, (National Aeronautics and Space Agency 2015). 
2 
conservative constituencies to influence the national conversation 
around a single issue in order to advance its own material interests.  
By 2008 there was substantial movement toward legislation that 
would limit CO2 emissions. Based to some degree on an increasing 
awareness of climate change on the part of Americans, there was broad 
public support. There seemed a general sense among corporate leaders 
that since some sort of regulation seemed inevitable, it would be better to 
forestall the possibility of letting the political situation get out of hand, 
possibly resulting in draconian limitations on emissions and instead 
allow for a less-damaging, market-based solution that would keep 
regulation to a minimum. This alternate approach was commonly known 
as “cap and trade,” and seemed to be the direction in which Congress 
was headed.2 However, the tide soon turned, in part based on the politics 
of climate change denial and declining public support. The terms of the 
discourse around climate change had gone from a growing realization 
that climate change was a real issue with a need for an immediate 
response, in the mid-2000s, to a situation where “experts” questioned 
whether the climate was indeed changing, and if it was, whether that 
change was caused by human activity or was merely normal variability. 
There were also charges that global warming was a hoax, and that 
climate science was a conspiracy with nefarious goals, and that fraud 
                                                          
2 “The cap and trade” legislation was actually a market-based approach favored by 
Republicans, and early in the discussion Republican leaders including George H.W. 
Bush and John McCain supported it (Sherman 2014).  
3 
was rampant in the scientific community. The existence of seemingly 
scientific backing for denial of climate change gave politicians a fig leaf to 
cover their inactivity, gave the public a reason to quit thinking about it, 
and represents a plausible explanation for the death of the cap and trade 
legislation.3 
This dissertation outlines and illuminates the processes and 
networks through which climate change denial is disseminated 
throughout American society, and especially through conservative ranks. 
Although conservative ideology can be viewed as a somewhat coherent 
underlying set of principles applicable to political problems, they also 
represent the direct interests of powerful elites in this country. It is not 
an accident or fluke that climate change is denied by most 
conservatives—these views have been actively grafted on to the pre-
existing conservative narrative underlying a wide spectrum of the 
conservative landscape. Often, elites seem to share certain bedrock level 
ideological beliefs such as “small government” and “free markets,” and 
the degree to which the interests of a specific group or “faction” within 
the elites can graft its needs onto the wider ideology is determined to 
some degree by the extent to which the issue at hand can nest with the 
pre-existing beliefs. In the case of climate change, fossil fuels leaders, 
representing a powerful and rich faction, were able to seamlessly add 
                                                          
3 See Naomi Klein’s article “Capitalism vs. The Climate” in The Nation for a thought-
provoking response to the possibilities for “free market” solutions (Klein 2011). She 
concludes there are none. 
4 
climate change denial to existing conservative belief sets because it was 
framed as a political question whose answers all seemed to involve things 
that were roundly hated by the Right: government regulation of markets, 
taxation, and the kind of “big government” bureaucracy that virtually all 
on the Right found repugnant. In essence the answers made the question 
wrong. In this way, climate change denial was similar to abortion—it met 
certain belief requirements before the fact that not only facilitated their 
adoption and dissemination but perhaps made their adoption and 
dissemination almost inevitable. The fossil fuels faction was able to use 
its network and tactical resources to implement a strategic effort to 
accomplish just this sort of ideological grafting. It was accomplished 
through a careful and relentless domination of the policy planning and 
opinion shaping processes that are such a major component of the 
“power” of the power elite.  
This study uses social network analysis of policy organization 
board interlocks and philanthropic foundation contributions, as well as 
other power structure research methods, to examine how this faction 
was (and is) able to guide public opinion formulation and dominate policy 
making. Even in a period in which finding ways to be sustainable in 
general is on the rise, the power of the fossil fuel industry—working 
through policy and opinion networks conservatives have come to 
dominate—directly impacts policy discourse and the possibilities for 
environmentally responsive politics. Although the House passed its 
5 
version of “cap and trade” in June 2009, the Senate was unable to end 
discussion, and the bill died there the following year (Broder 2010). 
Analysis of the data collected and examined in this study demonstrates 
that the owners and managers of corporations in the fossil fuel 
industries have been successful in directing a “climate change denial 
network,” a powerful and effective network within the wider conservative 
policy network, which protects and extends their material economic 
interests. The dissertation will provide a first in-depth case study of the 
power structure behind climate change denial in the U.S., tracing its 
origins to the fossil fuel industry. The policy planning network, and the 
wider conservative networks around it, have been infiltrated and to a 
great extent dominated by America’s oil and gas corporations for the 
purpose of advancing a specific agenda in this policy area. Elite factions 
are often able to affect policy debates by effectively applying their power 
in the policy planning network to control the debate on issues, both 
against the specific interests of other elites, and over the interests of the 
population large.  
 
Elite Policy Domination  
That factions of the corporate elite have this kind of power in 
setting policy is, of course, no surprise. In the late 1940s, C. Wright Mills 
began to outline the basic workings of elite power. Mills’ 
6 
conceptualization of the power elite represented a radical step toward 
underlining the class nature of power in the face of the pluralist and 
functionalist models popular at the time. His distinctions between what 
he called “sophisticated” conservatives—who were willing to negotiate 
with labor, for example, as opposed to “practical” conservatives who were 
ideologically (and materially) disposed to never compromise on what they 
perceived to be their specific economic concerns (Mills 1948:23-27, Mills 
1956:122, and see Jacobs 1999)—are still useful conceptualizations 
today, roughly analogous to the tags “conservative” and “ultra-
conservative” or “far right” used at times in this study. G. William 
Domhoff initiated a substantial body of research by charting the 
processes used by elites to exert their power.  
Michael Useem’s description of the inner circle illustrated how a 
convergence of views resulted from prolonged and regular interactions 
among the business elite. He argued that while “members of the inner 
circle share with other corporate managers a common commitment to 
enhancing corporate profits, their heightened sensitivity to business 
interests more general than those that look solely to support individual 
company profits also sets them apart” (Useem 1984:61). While the 
marketplace requires no-holds-barred competition between rival 
corporations, these firms also demand a friendly regulatory system 
within which to compete. Bitter competitors have shown themselves fully 
able to cooperate to project their power, as a faction, into government 
7 
regulation of their common business environment (Domhoff 2006). Mark 
Mizruchi suggests four reasons behind business unity: similar material 
interests, direct pressure from outside stakeholders, social pressure to 
conform, and conformity within an industry (1992:59). Michael Dreiling 
(2000) documents the ability of firms to ally themselves closely in times 
of potential opportunity, while Dreiling and Darves (2011), in their study 
of business unity in pursuing trade agreements, note that firms from the 
same industry, those which share direct or indirect board interlocks, and 
those which share policy planning network participation or conservative 
business association membership will be more likely to have similar 
political behaviors (Dreiling and Darves 2011:1529-1530). There are a 
number of ways that corporations cooperate, including the formation of 
policy groups and task forces, concerted political lobbying, contributions 
to politicians, and opinion-shaping through social and political events 
and processes, and through the media and other opinion-shaping 
processes. Domhoff (2006) breaks down elite impact on policy formation 
in the United States into four main areas: the special-interest process, 
the policy-planning process, the candidate-selection process, and the 
opinion-shaping process, the relative importance of each factor being 
dependent on the specific instance. Although corporate elites form the 
backbone of an overarching conservative policy network, the network is 
not homogeneous, and is terrain open for contention; indeed, its primary 
function is to serve as a means of facilitating compromise and consensus 
8 
through essentially political processes. Groups with different material 
interests regularly exert their power over the larger network, using their 
network connections and material resource to try to diffuse their views 
into the underlying ideology and into the actual production of policy. 
This study takes the fossil fuels network as just such a group making 
this kind of effort across the wider conservative landscape. The wider 
network has come to be financed to a great degree by this fossil fuels 
group, includes many of its owners and managers as board members, 
and in the end, often represents that faction’s interests in wider policy 
decisions.   
 
The Fossil Fuels Industry and Government Policy  
The twentieth century was the century of the fossil fuel industry. It 
was the oil industry which spawned the first billionaire, John D. 
Rockefeller, reportedly twice as wealthy as the second richest person in 
the world, Andrew Carnegie. Rockefeller’s company, Standard Oil, was 
one of the largest and most monopolistic companies in our history 
(Juhasz 2009:62). Those who owned and profited from the fossil fuel 
industry have historically had much to protect. Furthermore, they had 
the resources to spend on protecting them. It was the oil industry behind 
one of the biggest scandals in American political history, the Teapot 
Dome scandal, where the Secretary of the Interior was “bought” for six 
9 
figures by oil executives (Werner 1959). And even though those days of 
outright bribery may be past, Robert Engler (1961) argues fossil fuel 
companies still trade money for influence (317). He wrote fifty years ago 
that the power of the oil industry in the modern era has allowed it to 
transcend the government that supposedly controls it: “the regulated 
have become the regulators, and the supplicants the tribunes” (335). 
Perhaps this activity is merely more subtle today. Those in power still 
seem to benefit from the riches of those they regulate, as in the case of 
federal Judge Rudolph Randa, who recently ruled “that outside groups 
may freely coordinate with candidates and campaigns and remain free of 
contribution limits” (Gettys 2014).  Disclosure forms subsequently 
indicated that Randa has received multiple junkets at the expense of the 
Charles G. Koch Foundation. A long history of fossil fuel industry 
domination of national and international politics can be traced, 
specifically in energy policy and more recently, in domestic and 
international environmental policy (see Engler 1961 and Juhasz 2009). 
Engler makes a meaningful comparison between the attention paid by 
legislators to congressional hearings involving Jimmy Hoffa and a few 
thousand dollars to the lack of interest in the low intensity hearings right 
down the hall on bribery and ethics charges against oil companies and 
lobbyists, where billions of dollars of potential gains to the oil industry 
threatened to go out the back door (Engler 1961:414).  
10 
In the late 20th and early 21st centuries, Exxon (subsequently 
ExxonMobil) led the fossil fuels companies in their relationship with 
Washington DC. From the 1950s on, Exxon was one of the biggest 
corporations in the world, always in the Fortune 500 top five, and one of 
the most consistently profitable American corporations. Some see 
Exxon’s scale of influence as dominant: “Exxon’s size and the nature of 
its business model meant that it functioned as a corporate state within 
the American state.” In an era of “corporate of ascendance,” Exxon was 
“the most politically active” oil company (Coll 2012:623-4). 
Leaders of the fossil fuel industry spend large sums of money 
lobbying Congress every year, clearly a profitable arrangement. During 
the period 1998-2006, the three biggest oil companies spent almost $170 
million just on lobbying (opensecrets.org; Juhasz 2009:220). ExxonMobil 
spent about $67 million on lobbying between 1998 and 2005, spending 
about twice as much as the next highest oil company each year. It spent 
over $7 million on lobbying in both 2004 and 2005, but dropped to 
second place, behind Chevron, in 2005.  Other big oil company lobbying 
expenditures came from BP, which spent $2.8 million and Shell with 
$1.4 million (opensecrets.org). 
Oil and gas companies have donated almost $239 million to 
candidates and parties since the 1990 campaigns, most of which has 
gone to Republicans. In 2010-11, the top five companies alone donated 
about $3 million to candidates for national office (opensecrets.org). Just 
11 
as important has been the revolving door between the federal government 
and Big Oil. Antonia Juhasz (2009) writes that there is a “startling 
overlap between the legislative agendas set out by the oil corporations 
and their lobbying bodies and the actions taken by their former and 
soon-to-be employees serving in government” (239).  
As for direct and bundled campaign contributions, for the eighteen 
month period from January 2009 to June 2010, American oil companies 
spent over $216 million, as well as making over $5 million in PAC 
contributions. For this same period, fossil fuels industry groups, as well 
as business groups spent another $289 million in lobbying expenses and 
made $2.8 million in PAC contributions. 
For the period from 1998 – 2014, the top 20 spenders on lobbying 
includes #1 US Chamber of Commerce, spending $1.1 billion, more than 
3 times the next highest spender, as well as #10 ExxonMobil, spending 
$208 million, Business Roundtable spending almost $200 million, 
Edison Electric Institute at $191 million, and Southern Co. at $171 
million (opensecrets.org). For the same period, the top ten industries in 
total lobbying spending included the electric utilities industry, spending 
over $1.95 billion, business associations at $1.74 billion, and the oil and 
gas industry at $1.65 billion. While these lobbying efforts were often 
aimed at short-term legislative goals, influence was constantly being 
applied affecting the debate on climate change. 
12 
The Fossil Fuels Industry and Climate Change Denial  
Climate change presents members of the fossil fuel industry with a 
serious crisis—one that threatens its very existence. According to one 
researcher, “nearly two-thirds of industrial carbon dioxide and methane 
released into the atmosphere from 1854-2010 can be traced to fossil fuel 
and cement production by just 90 entities.” These entities include 
investor-owned companies such as Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, Shell, 
ConocoPhillips, Peabody, and Total, as well as state-owned companies 
operating in the oil and gas industries. Of the top thirty investor-owned  
entities, the thirteen top American corporations alone (Chevron, 
ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Peabody, Consol, Arch, Anadarko, 
Occidental, Marathon, Hess, Massey, Alpha, Devon, and Westmoreland) 
are responsible for over 11% of the total emissions (Heede 2013). 
While some oil company leaders were concerned that climate 
change legislation could literally put them out of business, others, like 
ExxonMobil President Lee Raymond, thought the industry could 
withstand such regulation but worried about the effects on business 
overall. Raymond and the executive leadership at ExxonMobil had 
determined that the global warming scare was a hoax, and “nobody 
inside Exxon dared question that” (Coll 2012:83).   
To defend themselves, the fossil fuels industry, led at first by 
ExxonMobil and the PR firms they employed, have counter-attacked.   
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The existing policy planning and opinion shaping networks were 
used to promote climate change denial and regulation delay. ExxonMobil 
has financially supported more than forty different organizations that 
deny climate change (Juhasz 2009:280). Exxon started supporting 
climate change science denial in the 1980s, but funding began in earnest 
with the foundation of the “Global Climate Coalition” in 1992. At this 
point, there was still substantial uncertainty in the scientific community 
about the extent to which global warming could be blamed on human 
activity, and Exxon and others took advantage of that uncertainty for the 
next fifteen years. Today, “we have a much clearer sense of what the 
modeling warns us about than was available in 1997. And so ExxonMobil 
was able to exploit genuine divisions that were still present in a global 
scientific community [by] fund[ing], often in the early years 
surreptitiously, campaigns to attack the science that were carried out by 
nonscientific groups, often by free-market ideologues” (Frontline 2012a).4 
But Exxon, one of the biggest emitters of CO2 (see Table 1), soon 
gave up on publicly fighting the PR battle over climate change, at least 
partially in answer to demands from the scientific community, by 
agreeing to stop funding denial organization  in 2008 (Sheppard 2011), 
although a public admission that fossil fuels contributed to global 
 
                                                          
4 In fact, the ExxonMobil contributions to climate change science denial organizations 
were of massive proportions. From 1998 to 2012 they totaled at least $27.4 million 
(Greenpeace 2013:10). 
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Table 1.  Cumulative 1854 – 2010 Percentage of Global Emissions –   
 
(Investor-Owned Corporations) 
  
  
2010 Cumulative Percent/Global 
 
Producers MtCO2 MtCO2 Emissions 
1 Chevron, USA 423 51,096 3.52% 
2 ExxonMobil, USA 655 46,672 3.22% 
3 BP, UK 554 35,837 2.47% 
4 Royal Dutch Shell, Neth. 478 30,751 2.12% 
5 ConocoPhillips, USA  359 16,866 1.16% 
6 Peabody Energy, USA 519 12,432 0.86% 
7 Total, France 398 11,911 0.82% 
8 Consol Energy, Inc., USA  160 9,096 0.63% 
9 BHP Billiton, Australia  320 7,606 0.52% 
10 Anglo American, UK 242 7,242 0.50% 
11 RWE, Germany  148 6,843 0.47% 
12 ENI, Italy  258 5,973 0.41% 
13 Rio Tinto, UK 161 5,961 0.41% 
14 Arch Coal, USA 341 5,888 0.41% 
15 Anadarko, USA 96 5,195 0.36% 
16 Occidental, USA  109 5,063 0.35% 
17 Lukoil, Russian Federation 322 3,873 0.27% 
18 Sasol, South Africa 113 3,515 0.24% 
19 Repsol, Spain 126 3,381 0.23% 
20 Marathon, USA 59 2,985 0.21% 
21 Yukos - 2,858 0.20% 
22 Hess, USA 61 2,364 0.16% 
23 Xstrata, Switzerland 214 2,223 0.15% 
24 Massey Energy, USA 91 2,199 0.15% 
25 Alpha Natural Resources, USA 182 2,149 0.15% 
26 Cyprus Amax - 1,748 0.12% 
27 EnCana, Canada 84 1,695 0.12% 
28 Devon Energy, USA 93 1,690 0.12% 
29 BG Group, UK 97 1,543 0.11% 
30 Westmoreland Mining, USA 46 1,530 0.11% 
     
 
Total: 7,628 314,811 21.71% 
     
 
Notes: Table adapted by the author from Heede 2013. Right 
 
column compares each entity’s cumulative emissions to CDIAC’s  
 
global emissions 1751–2010. Excludes British Coal, whose 
 
production and assets have not been attributed to extant companies,  
 
and five of nine nation-states (FSU, China, Poland, Russian Federation, 
 
 and Czechoslovakia, in that order). 14 American companies in italics. 
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warming wouldn’t come from the ExxonMobil CEO until 2012 (Daily 
2012).  However, IRS records show that it has continued funding at least 
28 different entities involved in the organized effort to fight climate 
regulation after that promise (Himler 2012). In 2011, the denialist Global 
Warming Policy Foundation’s website hosted an article titled “900+ Peer-
Reviewed Papers Supporting Skepticism Of ‘Man-Made’ Global Warming 
(AGW) Alarm,” listing more than 900 papers which supposedly refute 
“concern relating to a negative environmental or socio-economic effect of 
AGW, usually exaggerated as catastrophic” (Carbon Brief 2011). They 
found that 
…a preliminary data analysis by the Carbon Brief revealed 
that nine of the ten most prolific authors cited have links to 
organisations funded by ExxonMobil, and the tenth has co-
authored several papers with Exxon-funded contributors. 
The top ten contributors alone were responsible for 186 of 
the papers (over 20%) cited by the Global Warming Policy 
Foundation. (Carbon Brief 2011) 
 
As it turns out, ExxonMobil and other fossil fuels companies and 
entities supported the vast number of authors, including Willie 
Soon and Craig Idso, and other notable deniers. Patrick Michaels 
revealed that he receives “at least 40%” of his funding from fossil 
fuels industry sources, and Sallie Baliunas, was found to have 
connections with nine different entities funded by Exxon (Union of 
Concerned Scientists 2007).  
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 When Exxon scaled back its public financing of the organized 
climate denial effort, other major players in the oil industry were already 
in place to take over. The Koch brothers, in particular, had already been 
deeply involved, and were well situated and personally motivated to 
organize the denial effort. David Koch articulated the brothers’ view on 
the Kochs’ efforts to change the course of the debate: “It’s almost like an 
investor investing in a whole variety of companies” (Center for Public 
Integrity 2004). The Kochs saw that dominating the conservative policy 
network would impact the legislative and regulatory possibilities, both in 
the short and long term, and he therefore sought funding and leadership 
relationships with virtually all of the wider conservative policy network 
organizations. According to Greenpeace, the Kochs have spent over $67 
million from 1997 to 2011 in supporting the key organizations that deny 
climate science (Greenpeace 2014).  
The essence and many of the specifics of the overall strategy for 
the climate change denial campaign is captured in a pair of internal 
industry documents. The first was a 1998 memo from PR executive Joe 
Walker which lays out the possibilities for tactical approaches. Convened 
by the American Petroleum Institute and supported by all the largest oil 
companies, a small group of PR experts wrote the “Global Climate 
Science Communications Plan” in response to increasing public 
awareness of and acceptance of climate science, and, especially, an 
increase of the willingness of politicians to address it through 
17 
regulation—even conservative Republicans. Those involved in developing 
the plan included Walker, an employee of the American Petroleum 
Institute, representatives from Chevron, ExxonMobil, and the Southern 
Company, as well as think tanks including Committee for a Constructive 
Tomorrow, Frontiers of Freedom, Science and Environmental Policy 
Project, the George Marshall Institute, and the Advancement of Sound 
Science Coalition5 (Readfearn 2013, Cushman 1998). 
Even more graphically, and certainly more political in a tactical 
sense, was the 2002 memo and policy guidelines from Frank Luntz, a 
long time conservative analyst and consultant, who is perhaps best 
known for coming up with the concept of the “Contract with America” 
which cemented Newt Gingrich’s power in the Congress, and more 
recently for the phrase “death tax” to describe estate taxes.6 Luntz and 
his team produced a voluminous set of suggestions to the incoming Bush 
administration officials on how to organize their approach to 
environmental concerns (Luntz 2002). The Luntz memo suggests that 
there existed a short window of opportunity to water down public interest 
in climate change legislation or regulation through a strategy based on 
                                                          
5 The Advancement of Sound Science Coalition, led by Steve Milloy, was a major player 
in the tobacco denial campaign-see Chapter IV below. Milloy and TASSC popularized 
the phrase “sound science.” 
 
6 As with the more recent example of “death tax,” Luntz focuses on rhetorical choices 
and framing. He suggests changing the alarming phrase “global warming” to the more 
reasonable sounding “climate change.” In 2010, discussing Israeli efforts to sell its Gaza 
policy, he suggested changing the official line of “The current security regime for Gaza 
will be maintained” with: “The safety and security of the innocent families in the region 
must always be our first priority. No man, woman or child should live in constant fear 
of violence” (Horovitz 2010). 
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obfuscation of the science. Luntz begins by noting that “the science is 
not yet settled,” and that there was a short window to try to influence 
public opinion. Fossil fuels industry leaders and conservative activists 
were able to use the model that Big Tobacco found so effective for so 
long. Ironically, some of the same scientists and think tanks active in the 
climate denial network were also major players in the tobacco effort.  
Organizations in the policy-planning network were quick to put 
forward their own experts to conduct research and review the research of 
others in this contest of shaping opinion through knowledge-shaping 
processes. This “knowledge-shaping” process is an extension of 
Domhoff’s description of the opinion-shaping process suggested by 
recent research (Bonds 2010). According to Bonds, the battle over 
climate change clearly suggests that “environmental science…is not a 
pure reflection of a biophysical world that is separate and distinct from 
environmental politics. Rather, environmental science and environmental 
politics are co-produced” (Bonds 2010, see also Forsyth, 2003). This “co-
production” then takes the place of merely reporting the results of 
scientific work. Bonds suggests four important aspects to what he calls 
the knowledge-shaping process,7 though not all aspects are necessarily 
in play in any specific instance: information suppression, contesting 
knowledge, knowledge production, and knowledge administration.  
                                                          
7 The knowledge-shaping process is an additional, fifth process, proposed by Bonds to 
Domhoff’s model: special-interest, policy-planning, candidate selection, and opinion-
shaping processes (Domhoff 2006). 
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Similar to the findings in Bonds’ examination of the national 
debate over ammonium perchlorate, the main ingredient in rocket fuel, 
the process of knowledge-shaping is clearly indicated in the organized 
climate science denial campaign, and even more brazenly in the tobacco 
denial campaign as well. Specifically, elites have suppressed knowledge 
that is damaging to their cause by White House editing of scientific 
reports, contested knowledge through what many researchers refer to as 
“fake experts”, with perhaps the clearest example being the “Oregon 
Petition,” a public document signed now by over 30,000 “scientists” 
denying climate change. One expert on “fake experts” determined that 
the Oregon petition is 99.9% non-scientists, leaving about thirty actual 
scientists, most of whom are not trained in climate science (Farmer and 
Cook 2013:450). Of course, all that is necessary to sign is self-identifying 
as a “scientist,” with a B.S. degree or higher. A third aspect of Bonds’ 
knowledge-shaping process is found is perhaps the main climate change 
effort which is through the actual production of studies, mostly in think 
tanks, supporting denial. Such production is detailed in the Jacques, 
Dunlap, and Freeman study of who was publishing denial books 
(Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 2008), while a more cynical suggestion 
of this effort might be the bounty offered to scholars willing to present a 
paper at the Heartland Institute conference (Sample 2007). The last of 
Bonds’ four aspects of knowledge-shaping is the administration of 
knowledge, and the effort to disqualify and “disappear” the work of the 
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U.S. Global Change Research Program in producing the National 
Assessment climate change impacts study by invoking the Data Quality 
Act is illustrative (Ebell 2003, DeSmogBlog.com n.d.[b]).  
In the case study presented here, the science itself was contested 
whenever possible. For example, early in the fight, Robert Jastrow, 
William Nierenberg, and Frederick Seitz, of the George C. Marshall 
Institute, published a paper titled “Global Warming: What Does the 
Science Tell Us?” (Jastrow et al. 1991). In that piece, these highly 
acclaimed scientists argued that the sun was responsible for the 
warming that was taking place. They were able to cast doubt simply by 
suggesting the idea of solar influence. They based their conclusions on a 
study conducted by climate change supporters, but the “denier” version 
gives only half the picture—literally. Only the top half of an explanatory 
graph was used, skewing the appearance of the data and steering 
unwary readers toward wrong conclusions. As these particular scientists 
must have known better, this incident can only be interpreted as an 
intentional attack on science (Oreskes and Conway 2010:186-190).  
When the science was unassailable, in some cases individual 
scientists were themselves attacked (Oreskes and Conway 2010; Mann 
2012; Schneider 2010, Browning 2014, Bump 2012). Michael Mann tells 
of receiving death threats to himself and his family (Mann 2012:227). The 
practice of picking off individual scientists to threaten—what Mann calls 
the “Serengeti strategy”—is a reflection of tactics used by tobacco 
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companies at the heights of the battles to recognize the science behind 
the lethality of cigarette smoking, with today’s funders and organizers 
being fossil fuels industry groups (Dietz 2012). The theft and subsequent 
publication of carefully cherry-picked bits and phrases from years of 
email communications between climate scientists was manufactured into 
“Climategate,” a scandal that deniers used to (supposedly) show how 
climate change science was actually a hoax, filled with inaccuracies and 
“tricks”, with data massaged into alarming directions. Although several 
major investigations were conducted, including several by American 
organizations at the outraged behest of officials well-connected to fossil 
fuels interests, no wrongdoing was found. For example, the Office of the 
Inspector General of the US Department of Commerce found did not find 
any evidence that NOAA inappropriately manipulated data or failed to 
adhere to appropriate peer review procedures" (U.S. Department of 
Commerce 2011).  
The conservative media echo chamber—composed of a highly 
interconnected network of conservative news sources such as the Wall 
Street Journal and Fox News, openly partisan news and opinion sources 
(mostly online), conservative bloggers, and conservative talk radio8—was 
so effective in pounding away at single sentences and phrases taken out 
of context in these private emails. Another very important effort was to 
                                                          
8 See Dunlap and McCright 2011 for a more full treatment of the conservative echo 
chamber.  
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force the media to offer “both sides of the controversy” in order to offer 
fair and balanced coverage. The media seemed inclined this way anyway, 
as controversy makes for better news, and gives the indication that a 
reporter is reporting news rather than passing along only one side of the 
story (Boykoff and Boykoff 2004). When climate scientists produce a 
study making a science-based claim, deniers were able to rebut that 
claim in the same article by merely suggesting that the results were not 
based on “sound science,” or by hearkening back to Climategate. The 
facts themselves were often left behind, and Americans were left to 
interpret the potential consequences through ideological lenses.  
Competitive Enterprise Institute’s Frederick Seitz publicly accused 
lead IPCC climate scientist Ben Santer of altering and deleting sections of 
the report to remove hints of the skepticism felt by some of the scientists 
who signed on for the Second Assessment Report in 1996. Several op-ed 
pieces in the Wall Street Journal were unsupported character attacks 
with little substance, and what little substance there was turned out to 
be wrong (Schneider 2010:142). Again, the pattern was to inject 
confusion and to sow doubt.  
One incident may serve to support the knowledge suppression 
tactic. The “Climate Action Report” (US Department of State 2002), a 
national response required by treaty with the UN, was produced by the 
State Department in 2002. When news reports linked the report with a 
new Federal willingness to regard climate change as a real issue, the 
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denial machine fought back. Led by the Competitive Enterprise Institute, 
a group of organizations filed suit under the “Data Quality Act” to have 
any such documents disavowed, and deleted from federal websites. The 
legal argument was that since the DQA required federal documents to be 
based on “sound science,” which specifically requires replicable 
experiments. This report addressed planning questions involving 
potential consequences of climate change. Two different models were 
used to generate probable and possible consequences to the United 
States. As the two models did not agree on all aspects of the simulation, 
and because there were no experiments that were replicable, the lawsuit 
contended that the science behind the reports was unsound. It 
constituted “junk science”, in the words of Patrick Michaels, a phrase 
that has become a favorite of the denial machine (Competitive Enterprise 
Institute 2002, Center for Regulatory Effectiveness 2002; see also 
Mooney 2005). Their use of the phrase “junk science” ends up being 
ironic in that there are no peer reviewed papers which contradict the 
essence of the evidence supporting climate change, and most of the 
critical articles are written by scientists writing outside their fields.  
The overall strategy employed by deniers was straightforward. The 
fossil fuel industry could fight only a rearguard action, where it gave up 
ground only if necessary, fighting to prolong the process:  
1. We can’t be sure that there is actually global warming.  
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2. We can’t be sure that global warming is caused or exacerbated by 
human activity, or what segment of human activity may be 
involved.  
3. We don’t know if global warming will be harmful to the planet or to 
humans, or how harmful, or the timeframe for any potential harm.  
4. There is probably not much we can do about it.  
5. Even if there were viable mitigation or adaptation policies, they 
would be too expensive, especially in light of the current state of 
the global economy.9  
 
And these tactics have indeed confused or given cover to political 
actors and the public, and have therefore delayed meaningful action. In 
this instance, the fossil fuel industry elite—that faction most affected by 
potential climate change action—made use of all the processes available 
to them: lobbying, generating policy analysis in think tanks and 
universities, as well as dominating policy discussion, spreading massive 
campaign contributions to those politicians who played along, and 
shaping public opinion in various ways. An important aspect of the 
opinion-shaping process in this case was a relatively new technique, first 
used effectively by tobacco companies in their fight with regulations 
based on science. This “knowledge-shaping” process directly accounts for 
how scientific knowledge is legitimated (Bond 2010). In this case, 
controlling the knowledge-shaping process meant casting doubt in the 
minds of both policymakers and the public on what had already become 
generally accepted theory among the scientific community. Creating 
doubt in the public’s view of climate change science allowed policy-
                                                          
9 See also Washington and Cook 2011 for another approach. 
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planning networks to “fold in” climate change denial to standard 
conservative ideology. Climate change denial is now “something of a 
litmus test10 for Republican politicians to prove their conservative bona 
fides,” says Riley Dunlap, a sociologist at Oklahoma State University 
(Zaffos 2014). "The new political expediency is to be a global warming 
skeptic," said Marc Morano, executive editor of the skeptic clearinghouse 
Web site ClimateDepot.com and a former aide to outspoken skeptic Sen. 
James Inhofe, a Republican from Oklahoma (Tankersley 2010). As Eric 
Pooley put it, conservatives “loathed the solutions so much that they 
decided there was no problem to be solved” (Pooley 2010:38). This 
allowed them to amass widespread financial support from leaders of 
other elite factions, and turned the question of climate change into an 
almost strictly partisan one. The tactics used to influence the public at 
large served also to stiffen the already strong conservative denial. The 
Pew poll numbers for self-identified “conservative Republicans” went 
down at the same rate as the general public, and “moderate Republicans” 
declined at an even more precipitous rate. Where one stands on climate 
change has become a litmus test issue politically. Of course, it hasn’t 
hurt the efforts of the denial network that one of the biggest liberal 
bogeymen of all time, Al Gore, was at the forefront of the issue, making 
                                                          
10 Media Matters posted an article in 2011 matching denialist writers and websites’ 
reactions to the mild, science-affirming statements issued by “RINOs” such as Newt 
Gingrich, Jon Huntsman, Chris Christie, and eventually Mitt Romney.  The Republican 
candidates were skewered by a host of commentators, including Chris Horner, Doug 
Powers, Marc Morano, Steve Milloy, and James Taylor, representing CEI, 
MichelleMalkin.com, Climate Depot, junkscience.com, and Heartland Institute, 
respectively. (Media Matters 2011)  
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the polarization of opinion quite simple on a surface level. Myron Ebell, 
former director of global warming at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, 
said that if Al Gore wasn’t a leader, those working against climate change 
regulation would have tried to make him out as one (Pooley 2010:121-
22). This was effective since how one felt about Al Gore tended to be an 
ideological litmus test as well.  
 
The 2009-10 Climate Change Denial Network 
The research presented below offers a snapshot of a corporate elite 
network that has successfully come to organize and coordinate larger 
conservative networks in pursuit of its own material goals. Data for this 
network begins with the membership roster of attendees at the 2010 
private meetings sponsored by David and Charles Koch of Koch 
Industries. A substantial proportion of the attendees represented fossil 
fuel interests, mining interests, major conservative billionaires and their 
foundations, and conservative media figures. From this membership 
roster, organizational affiliations were identified among attendees.  
The Koch meetings illustrate how a faction of the American 
corporate elite organizes to achieve policy success. These meetings are 
private and highly exclusive. The themes are highly political and, based 
on the details of the meeting program and the few public comments 
made by attendees, focused on building political power and clarifying the 
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stand on issues. The network of conservative and ultraconservative 
foundations, media, think tanks, and policy groups includes billionaires, 
scholars, political activists, and more. The presence of national, single-
issue, regional, and state think tanks, propaganda organizations like the 
Heartland Institute, and more publicly visible figures, like Glenn Beck, 
indicates a coordinated campaign with extensive resources rooted in the 
political leadership (and material interests) of free market billionaires.  
The structural mapping of attendees and their affiliations illustrate 
that an activist network of fossil fuels interests has successfully 
integrated their material interests into an ideological package that has 
been grafted onto “mainstream” conservative platforms. At the center of 
this network is Koch Industries, a massive, privately owned conglomerate 
with investments in refineries and pipelines, among a host of other 
polluting industries. The fossil fuel and climate change denial network 
spans the boards of oil companies and their foundations, and the think 
tanks and Astroturf organizations that spill into the media echo 
chambers. Empirically, this study expands on and tests the theoretical 
and historical argument advanced by Dunlap and McCright (2011). 
Specifically this study focuses on a coordinating network associated with 
Koch Industries and the Koch brothers, joint owners of the company, 
and its relationships with broader director and funding patterns in the 
conservative policy networks. This research empirically explores those 
networks within a conceptual framework based on the theoretical work of 
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G. William Domhoff (2006) with a series of network analyses centered on 
the political meetings of the Koch brothers and the membership 
networks of participants at these secret meetings, particularly as they 
indicate the organized and ongoing coordination of climate change denial 
efforts. 
The breadth of the effort also reinforces the proposition that a 
coordinated and multifaceted effort has been underway. This is also 
suggested by the fact that the Kochs have held the strategy meetings 
since 2002. Although the main climate denying organizations (as 
identified by Dunlap and McCright (2000, 2011) are the most active in 
carrying out activities that have detectable results, the participation of 
foundations, think tanks and all sorts of organizations from across the 
conservative and libertarian landscape indicates a politically coordinated 
approach. All cultural and political arenas are in play, and all political 
tools are available. Indeed, this inclusionary effort has a self-
strengthening effect, building up to the point where in conservative and 
libertarian circles, denying climate change has become a foundation of 
one’s political identity. The efforts to portray scientists and climate 
science supporting politicians as part of a massive leftwing effort to 
increase the scope and power of the federal (and global!) government has 
been effective both at creating doubt across the spectrum of those on the 
right, and eventually, by 2010, making climate science denial an integral 
part of the conservative platform.  
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This ability to weave climate change denial into the very fabric of 
conservative ideological positions in a wide swath of both opinion making 
elites and rank and file republicans is perhaps the key accomplishment 
of what McCright and Dunlap have called the “denial machine” (2011). 
Similar to how the right-to-life faction (led mainly by religious activists) 
on the Right was successful in making an unbending and aggressive 
stand against abortion rights in the 1970s and 1980s, and how missile 
defense advocates had some traction in making “Star Wars” ballistic 
missile defense systems part of the generally accepted planks in the 
conservative platform, energy interests have successfully inserted climate 
change denial into the conservative worldview. This is especially true of 
politicians, as any on the Right who embrace (or even mention the 
possibility of) climate change at their electoral peril. Ultraconservative 
Super PACs and AstroTurf organizations such as the Americans for 
Prosperity are ready to “primary” Republican lawmakers who do not toe 
the line on climate change. 
The multifaceted approach to waging all-out war against their 
enemies (unions, taxes, regulation, big government, climate change 
legislation, etc.) was embraced by the Koch brothers as early as the 
1980s. As he indicated in an interview while running for Vice President 
on the Libertarian ticket in the 1980 election, David Koch indicated that 
he was in full accord with the advice given by Powell in his 1971 memo to 
colleagues at the Chamber of Commerce. In his memo, Powell outlines 
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the important areas that business interests had ceded to control by 
“leftists”: the judiciary, universities, the media, the legal profession, and 
so on (Washington and Lee University n.d.). Charles Koch describes the 
Koch approach to implementing what even he refers to as a “radical 
philosophy”: “To bring about social change requires a strategy that is 
vertically and horizontally integrated…[spanning] from idea creation to 
policy development to education to grassroots organizations to lobbying 
to litigation to political action” (Doherty 2007:121).  Individuals attending 
the Koch meetings can be viewed as climate denial vectors, taking 
ideologically consistent climate change denial messages and tactical 
approaches back from the Koch meetings to their home organizations.  
The Koch meetings, then, can be viewed as a means of planning, 
directing, funding, solidifying the message, teaching and sharing tactics, 
widening networks even further between think tanks, funders, media and 
cultural personalities, and those with material interests in their common 
efforts in preventing meaningful action in response to climate change. 
The Kochs have been instrumental in helping to create, fund, and 
nurture this network. The present study focuses on both the Koch 
organizational circle that helps direct the climate change denial efforts 
(and other libertarian projects), and the larger conservative networks of 
which it is a part, and at times a driver. 
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CHAPTER II  
THIS STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to outline and illuminate the policy-
planning and opinion-shaping capabilities of the fossil fuel industry, 
using the lens of climate change politics as a specific case study. As part 
of this effort to analyze the power structure, I utilize social network 
analysis and content analysis, tracing the process from the industry’s 
material interest to their collective action, illustrating the ability of an 
elite faction to directly impact policy. Power structure research methods 
offer practical means to suggest answers to the kind of “how” questions 
this study asks. Specifically, the connectedness of the fossil fuel 
industries is examined within an ultraconservative network of climate 
denial actors. After tracing the material interests of fossil fuels industry 
players and examining past political involvement, an organized fossil 
fuels network nested within the broader conservative network of 
foundations and think tanks, donors and policy discussion groups is 
illuminated, exposing a group bent on denying climate change science 
and delaying action to slow climate change processes. These analyses 
enable me to demonstrate the four existing aspects of elite faction power 
in G. William Domhoff’s model (2006). Little sociological work has been 
done to date on the processes involved in the political battle over climate 
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change. This study will serve as both a real-time aid in explaining 
American public opinion and policy development around climate change 
issues specifically, and serve as a case study for how a faction of the 
American corporate elite can mobilize the wider conservative policy and 
opinion networks and fold their people and capabilities into a specific 
strategy organized around the material interests of that faction. It will 
also serve to examine the historical and theoretical claims made by Riley 
and Dunlap (2000, 2011) and, more generally, by Domhoff (2006) in 
regards to the activities and capabilities of elites in developing and 
implementing policy. Evidence supporting a theoretical extension of 
Domhoff’s model by Bonds (2010) is presented. Finally, this study 
suggests two other ways in which the policy planning network has been 
extended structurally and augmented tactically. The network has been 
extended through the addition of further secrecy mechanisms and by 
adding a populist element available to provide the appearance of support 
from everyday citizens, both aimed at taking the public eye off the fossil 
fuels industry, the real source of climate change denial. Tactically, the 
network has added tools and knowledge in maintaining secrecy for elites 
involved directly as actors or funders. This study of the development of 
the climate change denial network advances and supports this 
argument. These network enhancements, like the tactical and network 
advances from the tobacco fight, will be available for use in future 
conservative strategizing in the future.  
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Data and Methods 
For this case study, methods and approaches from several areas of 
social science are employed.  The study is based primarily around several 
social network analyses. Social network analysis is in some ways the 
most sociological of methods. Marin and Wellman argue that “while 
people with similar attributes may behave similarly, explaining these 
similarities by pointing to common attributes misses the reality that 
individuals with common attributes often occupy similar positions in the 
social structure” (Marin and Wellman 2011:13, italics mine). Throughout, 
I employ various techniques and methods from power structure research 
as articulated by G. William Domhoff (2006) and Val Burris (1992, 2005, 
2008). These include online data access, content analysis of documents 
and other materials to ascertain meaning and intent, and use of news 
sources for day to day tactical analysis.  
The first network analysis central to this study is an event-centric 
two-tier analysis of the attendees of a conservative elite political event in 
Aspen, Colorado in June, 2010, sponsored by Koch Industries co-owners 
David and Charles Koch. This event, one in an ongoing series of such 
meetings, was aimed at bringing together key members of the fossil fuel 
industries and other conservative corporate elites with conservative 
media personalities, conservative thinkers, politicians, and funders (and 
potential funders) in order to generate a critical mass that could help 
stop climate change momentum, and to fight liberal policy and 
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politicians more generally. Organization websites, tax and other official 
filings, and archived website pages, along with Lexis-Nexis and other 
public databases and data sources, were used to develop professional 
profiles of attendees and to map their network affiliations. Specifically, 
these sources included Sourcewatch, Rightwing Watch, Greenpeace, 
DeSmog Blog, Exxon Secrets, ALEC Exposed, Muckety, NNDB, Lexis-
nexis, full list of sources listed in Appendix H.  
The second set of social network analyses centers around a wider 
network made up of the top fossil fuel companies, the foundations they 
direct and fund, think tanks and policy groups in the conservative policy-
planning network, particularly those involved in climate change denial. 
To a great degree, this climate change denial network receives its 
financing and many of its key personnel from the fossil fuel corporations. 
Analysis will focus on industry group membership funding relationships 
and on director interlocks. Data consist of tax and other official filings by 
corporations and trade associations, non-profit philanthropic 
foundations, 501c3 and 501c4 non-profit think tank organizations, non-
profit policy groups, and non-profit public interest groups. Director data 
were collected from form 990 filings from these organizations, accessed 
online from Foundations.org, National Center for Charitable Statistics, 
and through Guidestar. All individuals identified as “trustee” or “director” 
were included, as were corporate officers listed in Part VIII of form 990. 
Some 990s were accessed directly from an organization’s website, using 
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the Internet Archive to access data for the appropriate year. Contribution 
data were collected primarily through Parts IX and XV of the 
organization’s 990. Some contribution data in some comparisons were 
obtained from private correspondence between the author and Robert 
Brulle, and from the Conservative Transparency Project.  
In addition, the study also incorporates archival research into the 
documents produced by and the testimony given by various entities such 
as think tanks, foundations, professors and universities, and 
“independent” scholars. Public documents, such as congressional 
testimony, and public filings such as organizational non-profit 
applications and affidavits, were examined to make connections between 
individuals, corporations, and charitable institutions such as think tanks 
and foundations. Annual reports from these entities, tax and other 
official filings, and other company documents were studied. Newspapers 
and magazines, as well as online blogs and news sources were used as 
well. I also made use of the “Legacy tobacco documents.”11 
The third set of analyses focuses on the broader network of 
conservative and ultraconservative think tanks and foundations. This 
involved examining organization websites, tax and other official filings, 
and archived website pages, along with Lexis-Nexis and other public 
                                                          
11A digital library maintained by UCSF, and funded by the tobacco settlement, of 
important documents from the industry. “The Legacy Tobacco Documents Library 
(LTDL) contains more than 14 million documents (80+ million pages) created by major 
tobacco companies related to their advertising, manufacturing, marketing, sales, and 
scientific research activities” (University of California, San Francisco 2015).  
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databases and data sources. Some datasets from other studies were also 
used with permission (Brulle, e.g.), and subjected to my own analysis.  
Data were collected and input to Microsoft Excel and then into The 
UCINET 6 software program (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman 2002), which 
were used to convert the raw data into matrices, and its graphical 
“NetDraw” component (2002), which I used to convert matrix data into 
graphical images. 
 Data were collected for the year 2009 for several reasons. One, 
2009 was the most recent year for which most data were available for all 
entities, most importantly federal 990 tax filings. Also, the period of 
2009-2010 was a pivotal point in the history of climate change politics, 
with the passage of the House “cap and trade” bill and that bill’s eventual 
death in the Senate.  In fact, the upsurge in climate denial spending 
starts in earnest at this point but has truly skyrocketed recently (Brulle 
2014). Finally, the Koch meeting itself was held in June, 2010, which 
would include board members represented in the 2009 filings. 
 As Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman note, “there is no master 
list of ‘climate change science denial organizations,’ researchers are left 
to compile evidence as they can” (Jacques, Dunlap, and Freeman 
2008:358), so for continuity with their efforts, I chose to put together my 
list of climate science denial think tank organizations using their 
method. Using the Heritage Foundation’s online database (Heritage 
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Foundation n.d.), which includes hundreds of conservative organizations 
across the conservative spectrum, the names of all organizations listed 
with stated interests in the “policy issue” of “environment”, 
“environmental policy”, “global warming” and/or “climate change” were 
downloaded. This set of searches was conducted in summer of 2012.  
The search generated a sizeable list, which was used to identify 
candidates for inclusion on the list. I first eliminated all foreign 
organizations. Any entities that were not “stand-alone” organizations 
from, for example, universities, were eliminated. The websites of each 
remaining organization was visited to verify that the organizations were 
indeed interested in these issues, and that the interest was reflected in 
their online activities. The Internet Archive12 was used to check 
webpages from the period of 2009 and 2010. From this process a list of 
35 key denial entities was developed, referred to as the “Denial 35”. This 
is the key group of denial organizations referred to throughout the study. 
I also refer at various times to a group of 14 organizations identified by 
McCright and Dunlap (2003), and refer to them as the “Denial 14.” This 
group overlaps my group almost perfectly.13 
                                                          
12 Some entities are careful about access to past webpages—perhaps because of 
embarrassing posts or changes to official line, and therefore sometimes these searches 
were unsuccessful.  
 
13 The Koch-funded Citizens for a Sound Economy was the forerunner of both 
Americans for Prosperity and FreedomWorks, and their foundations, which accounts for 
the differences in the lists. I simply add both of the successor organizations to come up 
with a “Denial 14+1”. 
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From these processes a topography of the conservative network’s 
denial organizations is developed, consisting of think tanks, policy 
discussion groups, Astroturf groups, trade associations and coalitions, 
which also serve as an organic organizing core of the fossil fuels network. 
First, a thorough review of the climate change denial literature was 
conducted to find which organizations were involved in climate politics 
(Brulle 2014; Dunlap and McCright 2010; McCright and Dunlap 2003). 
Individual actors were traced to the organizations with which they were 
affiliated. The Heritage Foundation website expert and organization lists 
were used to identify conservative organizations. Membership lists of 
voluntary organizations such as the State Policy Network (SPN), the 
American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), and the Philanthropy 
Roundtable (PR) were examined. Donations to DonorsTrust and Donors 
Capital Fund, the “dark money” conduits of choice for so many known 
conservative organizations yielded yet more data, as did examination of 
other meeting attendee lists and reports, such as other Koch meetings 
and from other groups, including the American Enterprise Institute’s 
annual strategy meetings. This list of philanthropic foundations was 
difficult to assemble, and a comprehensive list may perhaps be 
impossible. Several sources were used to track down wealthy 
conservatives and their foundations, including NNDB, Muckety, Google 
searching, annual reports of many of the conservative organizations 
being studied, news accounts, interviews in the popular media, and 
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official biographies on various sites. I also looked at the top contributing 
foundations for each state, and the top contributing organizations for the 
country. I searched using “policy” and variations of “policy” to find 
donors.  
In the end, data were collected for over 250 think tank and policy 
groups and over 400 philanthropic organizations, including private 
foundations, corporate foundations, and community foundations. For 
other purposes Val Burris’s (2008) set of policy groups was used, as a 
representative set of the key policy groups in the United States.   
The data (Koch meeting attendance lists, organization director 
lists, contribution data, and organization lists) were input to matrices. 
For the wider conservative network of foundations and policy 
organizations, the product was a 5079 row by 594 column dichotomous 
tie/no tie relationship matrix of directors attributes, and organizations. 
The contribution data produced a 233 row by 386 column matrix 
containing actual contribution amounts from all philanthropic 
foundations (private, corporate, community) in the sample, and the 
denial 35 group of policy organizations (see Table 2).  
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Table 2.  "Denial 35" policy 
organizations   
   Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty 
 American Council on Health and Science 
 American Legislative Exchange Council 
 American Policy Center 
 Americans for Prosperity 
 Americans for Prosperity Foundation 
 Capital Research Center 
 Center for Public Justice 
 Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow 
 Competitive Enterprise Institute 
 Discovery Institute 
 Foundation for Research on Economics and the    
Environment 
 FreedomWorks Foundation 
 Frontiers of Freedom 
 George C. Marshall Research Foundation 
 Heritage Action for America 
 Hudson Institute 
 Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation 
 Just Facts 
 Mountain States Legal Foundation 
 National Center for Policy Analysis 
 National Center for Public Policy Research 
 Ocean State Policy Research Institute 
 Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy  
 Philanthropy Roundtable 
 Property and Environment Research Center 
 Reason Foundation 
 Rio Grande Foundation 
 Science and Environmental Policy Project 
 State Policy Network 
 Statistical Assessment Service 
 The Heartland Institute 
 The Heritage Foundation 
 The Independent Institute 
 
Washington Policy Center 
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Nodes are generally colored and sized consistently but are 
explained in each graph. Calculations performed in Microsoft Excel 2010 
and UCINET; all graphs were drawn with NETDRAW.  
 
Outline of Chapters 
The dissertation begins with a focus on the fossil fuels network 
centered on the Koch brothers, as organized and funded through their 
regular secret coordinating meetings. Specifically, in the first substantive 
chapter, an analysis is made of the June 2010 Koch meeting, its 
attendees, and their network connections in the broader conservative 
networks. The meetings are shown to be prime locations for organizing, 
strategizing, and strengthening fossil fuels industry interests, and those 
of a broader conservative network. Securing the substantial funding 
necessary for these campaigns is another key function. Relationships are 
traced showing capacity for ideological and tactical diffusion. Funding 
patterns and strategies are examined. Individuals are examined as 
examples of different kinds of activists. The Kochs are identified as key 
brokers for the fossil fuels industries to the wider conservative policy 
network. 
The second chapter expands its focus to this wider network, 
composed of powerful and well-funded think tanks, policy discussion 
groups, single issue and ideological multi-issue advocacy groups, and the 
42 
philanthropic foundations that support them. Demographics of the 
network are discussed. A topography is produced.  The network is 
examined for key nodes and relationships. A key “denial network” is 
identified, centered on Koch Industries and the large fossil fuels 
corporations. An historical parallel is found using a brief historical 
contrast with the ways the conservative network was (and in some case, 
is still being) used by Big Tobacco to fight anti-tobacco legislation and 
regulation.  
The third substantive chapter illuminates two ways in which the 
traditional policy network is extended in the efforts against climate 
change regulation: the production, maintenance, and incorporation of a 
more permanent Astroturf organization feeding on the populist “tea 
party” movement; and, secrecy measures making it easier for elites to 
fund and take part in these often unpopular causes. These “boots on the 
ground” and “dark money” organizations and strategies are crucial in the 
denial network, and are embedded near the core of the wider 
conservative policy network. Although tea party groups such as 
Americans for Prosperity have been studied by others, they have not 
been shown to be tightly incorporated into the policy network, and the 
dark money processes and organizations have gone, until recently, 
virtually unnoticed in the literature to this point. 
The dissertation aims to lay out the processes elites use to 
dominate policy production, tracing those efforts in the current case, 
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with an emphasis on the policy production network and using climate 
change denial as a case study.   
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CHAPTER III 
THE FOSSIL FUELS NETWORK 
 
 
The fossils fuels industry has been a powerful force in American 
politics, and in the development of policy in this country in general. The 
industry has historically negotiated responses to common problems and 
issues through its trade associations, such as the American Petroleum 
Institute and the Edison Electric Institute. 
The American Petroleum Institute (API) was founded just after 
World War I, as the result of a quasi-governmental body developed to 
coordinate industry efforts in the war (American Petroleum Institute 
2015a). The API is tasked to  
speak for the oil and natural gas industry to the public, 
Congress and the Executive Branch, state governments and 
the media. We negotiate with regulatory agencies, represent 
the industry in legal proceedings, participate in coalitions 
and work in partnership with other associations to achieve 
our members’ public policy goals. (American Petroleum 
Institute 2015a)  
 
The API counts more than 500 corporate members and spans the 
industry, including all aspects of the oil and natural gas sectors, and 
covers the whole of oil and natural gas producing areas geographically, 
with a presence in 33 states. The API has played a role in coordinating 
several major industry responses to climate change, including the 
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(ongoing) attempts to “undermine the public’s understanding of climate 
science,” and to use existing entities such as ALEC to respond to state 
regulation efforts (Readfearn 2015). Initially ridiculing the notion that 
fossil fuels use affects the climate, the PI has come to acknowledge now 
that “emissions from their production and use may be helping to warm 
our planet by enhancing the natural greenhouse effect of the 
atmosphere” (American Petroleum Institute 2015b”). 
With a similar historical basis, the American Gas Association (AGA) 
was founded in 1918. It “focuses on advocacy…serves as a voice on 
behalf of the energy utility industry… [and] disseminates data on a timely 
basis to policy makers and the public about energy utilities and the 
natural gas industry” (American Gas Association 2015). The American 
Coal Council, founded in 1982,14 boasts over 170 corporate members 
including “coal suppliers, coal consumers, coal transportation 
companies, coal traders and coal support service firms’” serving as an 
industry resource for “policy makers and public interest groups. The 
Association supports activities and objectives that advance coal supply, 
consumption, transportation and trading” (American Coal Council 2015). 
There are also councils maintained by the White House to advise 
on their areas of expertise. Such entities include the National Petroleum 
Council (NPC), the National Coal Council (NCC), and the Natural Gas 
                                                          
14 Originally founded as the Western Coal Export Council (WCEC), “a private industry 
trade group formed to promote exports of western U.S. coal to the Pacific Rim” 
(American Coal Council 2015). 
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Subcommittee (NGS). The NPC was “established by the Secretary of the 
Interior in 1946 at the request of President Harry S. Truman” (National 
Petroleum Council 2015). Its goal is to offer solid advice to the Secretary 
of Energy, so “special attention is given by the Secretary to assure a well-
balanced representation from all segments of the oil and gas industries, 
all sections of the country, and from large and small companies. The 
Council also has members with interests outside of oil or gas operations, 
including representatives from academic, financial, research, Native 
American, and public interest organizations and institutions (National 
Petroleum Council 2015). Rex Tillerson (CEO of ExxonMobil) currently 
serves as Vice Chair of this group. 
The National Coal Council (NCC) was founded in 1984 and 
“provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of Energy, on 
general policy matters relating to coal and the coal industry” (Energy 
Department 2015). 
Although these organizations have served the industry well up to 
now, climate change offers a truly life or death challenge to the industry, 
and the powerful leaders of some of the largest and most influential 
corporations seem loathe to leave the decision-making to the group. In 
fact, the major trade associations and advisory groups are now unable to 
completely deny climate change science. Public acknowledgement is low 
key. In fact some groups, like the AGA, while seeming to acknowledge 
climate change, have nothing but broken links to the actual documents 
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they refer to on their website. In fact, AGA has not one single working 
link to any of its climate change documents or informational pages, 
including general principles and various letters and testimonies, as well 
as association reports.15  
The fossil fuels industry has impacted the battle against climate 
change regulation in many ways, especially by carefully vetting and 
supporting candidates for state and federal office, and by spending vast 
sums on lobbying officeholders. Of the top 20 House candidates in 2010, 
all were either Republicans or Democrats who votes against Cap and 
Trade. In the Senate, the top recipient of oil campaign dollars, Blanche 
Lincoln, was a Democrat who won, and subsequently attacked the cap 
and trade bill.  
During the 2010 campaign cycle, the oil and gas industry 
contributed almost $24 million to campaigns for Congress.16 Of this, over 
2/3 went to Republicans ($17.6 million), with Republicans being given 
about twice the average size contribution. House Republicans received 
about twice as much as House Democrats, while in the Senate the 
number were much closer: the 50 Senate Democrats received a total of 
just over $2 million while the 36 Republicans receiving donations 
received $2.2 million.  The top contributor to these campaigns was Koch 
                                                          
15 The AGA website was checked several times throughout 2014 and 2015 (last checked 
5-3-15) with no change in the broken link status. 
 
16 Campaign and lobbying numbers from opensecrets.org 
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Industries ($2 million), with Exxon Mobil ($1.4 million) and Chief Oil 
($1.2 million), and Chevron ($1 million) also donating heavily, with most 
of these dollars coming through PACs.  
The list of top twenty 2010 cycle recipients in the Congress was 
dominated by representatives from oil producing states, including six 
from Texas and Oklahoma, and two each from Alaska and Louisiana. 
Just before adjourning for the 4th if July recess, after a nasty 
debate, the House barely passed HR 2454 (the “Cap and Trade” bill) on 
June 26, 2009, by 219-212. Three of the four Democrats in the top 
twenty recipients of oil industry money in that cycle voted “nay” on the 
bill, while other Democrats joining them were mostly from the major oil 
producing states, or from states in the southern part of the US. 
In the Senate, the bill was doomed, as it required enough votes to 
defeat a Republican filibuster (60), and, since all Republicans were 
against the bill, there simply weren’t enough Democrats to push it 
through. Those Democrats who publicly came out against the bill were 
among the biggest recipients of oil industry campaign funds, including 
the top recipient, Blanche Lincoln, as well as Mary Landrieu and Ben 
Nelson.  
Over $7 billion was spent on lobbying activities in the 2010 
election cycle. In 2009, the US Chamber of Commerce spent $144.6 
million, about 5 times the next highest spender. In 2010, the US 
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Chamber of Commerce was again the largest spender, at $132 million on 
lobbying, three times the next highest spender. ConocoPhillips and 
Southern Corporation were represented in the top twenty lobbying 
spenders for that year, spending $19.6 and $13.2 million respectively. 
The oil and gas industry spent a total of $175 million in 2009 (3rd among 
industries) and $148 million in 2010 (5th). The industry employed over 
800 lobbyists over the 2009-2010 cycle. The top ten lobbying spenders 
were responsible for the bulk of the expenditures: in 2009 they 
accounted for about 75% of the total amount spent by the industry on 
lobbying, and about 63% in 2010. The top ten companies included Exxon 
Mobil, ConocoPhillips, Chevron, Koch Industries, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, 
the American Petroleum Institute, Marathon Oil, Anadarko Petroleum, 
and the Williams Companies in both years, in slightly different orders 
and amounts. 
Clearly, the oil industry has spent a large amount of money 
securing influence in the Congress through candidate vetting, campaign 
contributions, and lobbying. Even a Democratic President who had made 
cap and trade legislation a priority, with a Democratic House and a 
Democratic Senate, was unable to jam the bill through. Being a major 
campaign supporter of the key legislators in both houses, and spending 
over $500,000 per member in lobbying of Congress over 2009-2010 
certainly resulted in influencing the outcome of the Cap and Trade bill. 
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But it is the network built by those interested that is the enduring 
defense for the industry. 
 
The Koch Brothers 
The main hub of the fossil fuels network is a mini-network based 
around the “Koch Brothers,” Charles G. Koch and David H. Koch (see 
Figure 1). They are the owners of Koch Industries, one of the largest 
privately held companies in the country and worth about $42 billion 
each, tying for 4th richest Americans according to the 2014 list from 
Forbes (Forbes.com 2014)17. They are two of the four sons of Fred Koch, 
a Kansas oil entrepreneur who built up the foundation of the family 
business and fortune. Fred Koch, as he built up his oil company, became 
increasingly politically active, driven at least partly, perhaps, by his 
extensive business dealings with the Soviet government (Schulman 2014: 
7-8), and by observing the rise of labor unions and the growth of the 
federal government. The elder Koch was one of the original founding 
members of the John Birch Society, and wrote a political tract in 1960 
titled “A Businessman Looks at Communism,” in which he warned of an 
imminent communist takeover (University of Southern Mississippi n.d.). 
David Koch said that his father “was constantly speaking to us children 
about what was wrong with government and government policy. It’s 
                                                          
17 This is up from the $16 billion 2009 personal fortunes reported by Forbes (Forbes 
2009). 
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something I grew up with—a fundamental point of view that big 
government was bad, and imposition of government controls on our lives 
and economic fortunes was not good” (Schulman 2014: 41). But it was 
Charles who was most indoctrinated into Fred’s far right politics. 
 
Figure 1. Sociogram of Charles and David Koch family network core, 
2009 seats on policy group and foundation boards 
 
 
Charles was the eventual CEO and ideological leader of Koch 
Industries. It is through ideologically consistent policy organizations and 
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universities that Charles is networked, through libertarian (“free market”) 
entities such as Mercatus Center and Institute for Humane Studies, both 
housed at George Mason University. He also spends a substantial 
amount of money and time on the various Koch internships and Koch 
fellowship programs offered to college students and graduate students.  
David on the other hand, tends to network through social events 
and through more traditional upper crust arts support philanthropic 
work, such as serving as vice chair of the American Ballet Theatre and as 
a trustee for the American Museum of Natural History, the Lincoln 
Center for the Performing Arts, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 
and the National Geographic Society, as well as being named honorary 
trustee of the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory. He also has sat on the 
governing boards of MIT (his alma mater), Johns Hopkins University, and 
Rockefeller University (Rockefeller University 1996, Koch Industries 
2015).  
Charles developed a business philosophy he ended up calling 
“Market-Based Management,” and even though originally intended for 
application within Koch Industries as a business management model, it 
also was the philosophical foundation for the Kochs’ political and 
ideological efforts (Schulman 2014:250). Based on “the MBM® ten 
guiding principles” (including “integrity, principled entrepreneurship, 
value creation” among others). Koch lobbyists are in for the long haul, 
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rather than for short term gain of the corporation itself.  Contrary to 
normal lobbying behavior,  
Koch’s lobbyists “don’t shift their positions based on the 
political headwinds. According to one Senate Republican 
leadership aide, they won’t be found pressing for subsidies in 
one bill and opposing them in another. “They’re not rent-
seekers,” he said. The overriding factor guiding the 
company’s lobbying agenda is not whether a legislative 
proposal will be good or bad for Koch Industries, but 
whether it is consistent with Charles’s libertarian beliefs. 
(Schulman 2014:255) 
 
Charles, then, in essence “created a free-market society in 
miniature at Koch Industries” and along with his brother is “driven 
by their feeling that the way they run their companies is the way 
the country should be run,” according to a former Koch manager 
(Schulman 2014:255). The Koch brothers are undeniably “true 
believers, whose free-market beliefs are unquestionably self-
interested—but also undeniably sincere” (Schuman 2014:254).  
 
Koch Political Activity 
Considering the influence of their father, it is no surprise that that 
the sons were politically active in far right circles at an early age. Charles 
was involved with “Austrian School” economist Murray Rothbard to try to 
organize a real libertarian movement out of the disorganized spectrum of 
adherents, from sober-minded academics to black-flag-waving 
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anarchists, and from button-downed executives to survivalists…” 
(Schulman 2014:100). With Ed Crane, they formed Cato Institute in 
1977, as a libertarian, non-partisan, answer to Brookings and American 
Enterprise Institute (Cato Institute 2015).    
 After poor showings in recent elections, the Libertarian Party put 
David Koch on the ballot in 1980 as the VP running mate for Ed Clark, 
the Libertarian Presidential nominee. Since campaign finance laws 
allowed those running to spend their own money with no limits, David 
Koch had a practical advantage to offer the party. When the Libertarian 
ticket received less than 1 per cent of the vote, the Kochs decided a new 
means of effecting change was in order (Mayer 2010). The 1980 loss, and 
the resulting feuding and bickering left the libertarian party itself a 
shambles, and the brothers moved on to create new policy organizations 
and put together a core group to organize and fund a coherent, long-term 
effort to influence the political processes.  Once Libertarian Party 
activists  found that Charles Koch “wanted to run the movement like a 
corporation, where orders are given, dissidents are fired, etc.” and the 
party was effectively destroyed (Schulman 2014:113).  
Starting in the Bush administration, the Kochs began organizing 
annual and sometimes semiannual weekend meetings of the rich and 
powerful (Schulman 2014:286). They have been held in various locations 
across the western United States in lavish resort facilities in the western 
half of the US, such as the St. Regis Resort Hotel in Aspen, Hyatt 
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Regency Tamaya Resort in Bernalillo, New Mexico, and the Renaissance 
Esmeralda resort in Indian Wells, California. Meeting invitations, 
attendance lists, and agendas have been kept dark, with planners and 
attendees often going to great lengths to avoid publicity. In fact, the June 
2012 “Path to Freedom” meeting in San Diego was kept so dark that 
journalists, who had prior knowledge that it was happening, had 
difficulty determining where it was actually being held (NBC San Diego 
2012). Every meeting is described as swarming with security. Attendees 
are advised to keep conference materials confidential and not to share 
details on social media or elsewhere. According to one reporter who was 
onsite for the 2012 Indian Wells meeting, “Helicopters, private security, 
and police officers from neighboring cities patrolled the area constantly” 
(Fang 2012). Investigative reporters went to great lengths to identify 
attendees, including tracing private jet ownership for those spotted 
landing at local airports, eventually identifying half a dozen attendees, 
mostly regular attendees and Koch insiders. As soon as this tactic was 
reported, however, private jets began taking steps to make their flight 
plans and ownership details more opaque. The added secrecy was 
apparent even to local reporters, who were “confused about why the 
multi-golf course Esmerelda Renaissance was locked down and why the 
hotel staff couldn’t talk to anyone about what was going on” (Fang 2012). 
These secret meetings in resort settings in the western half of the 
US to bring together wealthy donors, powerful as well as up-and-coming 
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conservative politicians, political activists across the conservative 
spectrum, and rightwing celebrities like George Will and Glenn Beck. The 
purpose at first was to showcase think tanks and other conservative 
organizations that the Kochs thought worthy of the support of the deep-
pocketed donors who attended (Schulman 2014:286), The stated purpose 
of later meetings was to “activate citizens” and to “develop strategies” to 
“stop—and reverse—the internal assault on our founding principles” 
(Americanactionfund.org n.d.). In his invitation letter, Charles Koch 
refers to the importance of his “network of business and philanthropic 
leaders who are dedicated to defending our free society,” and I argue that 
this evolving network also operates as ground zero for the organized 
movement pushing climate science denial. It is through the relationships 
of the actors and organizations represented at the meetings that strategy 
is planned, projects are funded, and leaders and representatives emerge. 
Perhaps even more importantly, these meetings are instrumental in 
continuing the project of making climate science denial a solid plank of 
far right ideology, and furthering its spread to the rank and file of far 
right politicians and activists, as well as to the general public (Domhoff 
2006:78-9).  
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The 2010 Koch Meeting 
The 2010 Aspen meeting is the only one of the secret Koch 
brothers meetings for which we have a complete attendee list (see 
Appendix E). The meeting was held at Aspen’s St. Regis Resort on June 
26-28, 2010, following the intense political and fundraising efforts of the 
Koch network in fighting the 2009 House Cap and Trade Bill and the 
2010 battle in the Senate of that bill. The agenda reflects the seriousness 
with which the Koch network takes the climate change legislation and 
the larger “Obama agenda” that underlies that approach.  
As with past Koch meetings, the agenda was composed of fine 
meals, off-site activities, and opportunities to meet popular rightwing 
journalists and broadcasters, socialize with other wealthy people, and 
attend educational sessions (Americanactionfund.org n.d.). These 
meetings included sessions on the entire spectrum of conservative issues 
and concerns, and the presenters and presentations help form or expand 
a nucleus of ideological agreement. The “Goals & Missions” stated in the 
agenda include: attracting leaders; sharing best practices and 
opportunities; fashioning the message and building educational 
channels; and, building principled and effective institutions” 
(Americanactionfund.org n.d.). The program consisted of 14 sessions 
scheduled over the three days, mixed liberally with cocktails, gondola 
rides, receptions, private dinners, big dinners, breakfasts and other 
activities. Topics covered the range of libertarian concerns, including 
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government (over-) spending, K-12 school reform and charter schools, 
and developing young free market leaders. Practical topics such as 
decision-making in philanthropy were covered, along with several major 
sessions, including the big name speakers (Glenn Beck, Charles 
Krauthammer) on “threats” faced by “America.” The majority of time was 
organized around the elections: how to “understand” and “mobilize” 
voters, how to “frame” issues, how to take advantage of judicial elections, 
and the consequences of losing (Americanactionfund.org n.d.). 
“If not us, who? If not now, when?” These are the questions asked 
rhetorically by Charles Koch, in his letter to prospective participants in 
the meeting held in Rancho Mirage at the end of January 2011 
(Americanactionfund.org n.d.). Koch clearly sees those invited to the 
meetings as the natural leaders of the nation—those who have the most 
to lose, those who have earned their bona fides in business, those who 
have proved themselves through ultraconservative activism, journalism, 
scholarly work, policy production. 
 
2010 Koch Meeting Attendees 
About 21% of the attendees of the 2010 meeting in Aspen were 
from the fossil fuels industry, including major stockholders, CEOs and 
other executive officers, totaling 44 of 206 attendees. The oil business 
was represented by executives of large corporations and the owners of 
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small companies.  About 27 attendees were from the finance sector, 
especially heavily represented by hedge fund managers.  Another 18 
attendees were executives in manufacturing companies. Eight attendees 
each were from retail industry and from real estate. Think tanks, 
lobbyists, political operatives, lawyers, and health executives rounded 
out the industries represented.  
 Racially, this is not a diverse group. To the best of my efforts, there 
appear to be no African American attendees at all, and only a couple who 
do not meet a strict WASP definition. The players are mostly white men,18 
with few exceptions (multimillionaire Susan Gore and a few activists 
come immediately to mind), and almost all very wealthy. The oldest are 
born in the late 1920s and 1930s, with most being born in the 1950s. 
There are at least 38 undergraduate and graduate degrees from Ivy 
League schools, with most coming from Harvard and Yale. Other 
universities represented include a handful from Virginia, the UC 
campuses, MIT, Chicago, George Mason, University of Texas, and a 
smattering of small liberal arts colleges. The state with the largest 
number of residents was Virginia, although Colorado, California, New 
York, and Texas were also well represented.  
 Eleven of the attendees were listed by Forbes as among the 
wealthiest 400 in America (Forbes 2009). Three of those individuals, as 
                                                          
18 As are Koch employees, according to one former manager, who described the typical 
Koch employee “clone” as “young, white, male, and sharp…” (Schulman 2014:247).  
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well as another 6 attendees were represented on Forbes Wealthiest 
Families list (Kroll 2014). However, this is only the billionaires—a high 
percentage of the attendees were multimillionaires.  
 These wealthy individuals and families, along with the leaders of 
the major corporations and the boards and executives of policy 
organizations, form the basis of Domhoff’s power elite, the group of 
individuals most directly tied into power in our country (Domhoff 
2006:105). 
 
2010 Attendees: Fossil Fuels Industry 
The range of industries represented the individuals attending the 
Koch meeting is wide, including banking and finance (and Wall Street in 
particular, especially hedge fund managers), retail, manufacturing, as 
well as various service sectors including real estate and insurance. But 
the meetings in general, and the 2010 meeting specifically, are 
dominated by oil, gas, and coal interests. Though the meetings are 
dominated by attendees from the fossil fuels industry (Figure 2), this 
group is not particularly well connected to the wider conservative 
network. Of the 44 attendees of the 2010 meeting affiliated with the fossil 
fuels industry, only 24 were affiliated with other organizations 
determined to be part of the wider conservative policy network, as 
directors or funders of policy organizations. In fact, if one removes the 
61 
Kochs, family foundation connections, and the trade associations (four, 
three, and six), fossil fuels attendees are almost completely 
disconnected—23 have no connection at all, other than family 
foundation, and , without the Kochs, there are only five connections to 
the wider network. Remaining connections consist primarily of 
billionaires—and, of course, the Kochs themselves. A key 
accomplishment for the Koch meetings, then, is to connect leaders of the  
 
 
Figure 2. Sociogram of Koch meeting attendees from the fossil fuels 
industries and their board seats across the policy network, 2009 
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fossil fuels industry to the wider conservative network. The Koch 
meetings allow for the material interests of the fossil fuels attendees to be 
disseminated throughout these wider networks, and for this relatively 
small faction of the corporate class to use its resources to have an 
outsized impact on the formulation of policy. 
 
2010 Attendees: The Upper Class 
The second leg of the power elite tripod for Domhoff consists of the 
wealthy, what he calls “the social upper class” (Domhoff 2006:105). As 
Domhoff states, such “involvement…instills a class awareness,” and 
because it is a “capitalist class, [its members develop] a capitalist 
mentality and a conservative outlook on issues that relate to the well-
being of the corporate community as a whole” (Domhoff 2006:75). 2010 
Aspen attendees include several billionaires, such as Ken Langone ($2.4 
billion in assets (#242 on the 2009 Forbes list), Stephen Bechtel ($4 
billion, T-#178), Harold Hamm ($18.7 billion, #49), Philip Anschutz 
($11.1 billion, #43), Richard DeVos ($6 billion, #73), Sheldon Adelson 
($32 billion, #12), Ken Griffin ($5.5 billion, #90), Tom Love ($3.3 billion, 
#170), and Steven Schwarzman ($10.6 billion, #41). Other wealthy 
attendees include Kenny Troutt, George Records, Foster Friess, Diane 
Hendricks, Susan Gore, and Richard Gilliam.  
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Fifteen of the attendees (Paul Singer, Charles Koch, Elizabeth 
Koch,  Ken Griffin, Anne Griffin, John Childs, David Koch, Julia Koch, 
Dick DeVos, Betsy DeVos, Diane Hendricks, Julian Robertson, Cliff 
Asness, John Bryan, and Dick Farmer) were listed in the top individual 
contributors for the 2010 federal elections (opensecrets.org n.d. [b]), and 
13 for the 2012 election (opensecrets.org n.d. [c]).  
Several longtime conservative activists brought along their adult 
children to the Koch meeting who have become active as well. Domhoff 
notes that networks of the American upper class always include 
opportunities for “socializing” the younger generations and the few who 
rise from lower social levels. This socializing process allows for the upper 
class to truly be an enduring social phenomenon, as “the names and 
faces may change somewhat over the years, but the social institutions 
that underlie the upper class must persist with only gradual change over 
generations” (Domhoff 2006:6).  On the 2010 attendee list we can start 
with the Kochs themselves: Charles Koch’s two children, son Chase (then 
32), Chase’s new wife Annie, and Charles’s daughter Julia, a Brooklyn-
based writer, both attended, and Chase was responsible for meeting with 
some key donors and potential donors at the 2014 meeting (Kroll 2014, 
Schulman 2014:287). The Fettig family contingent attending the meeting 
was also multi-generational, as were the Andersons, the 
O’Shaughnessys, and the Marshalls (though the “next generation” 
Marshalls were already into their 50s).  
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2010 Attendees: Think Tanks and Policy Organization Connections  
The final of the three overlapping networks forming Domhoff’s 
conceptualization of the power elite is the leadership and experts from 
the policy formulation organizations (Domhoff 2006:105). The breadth of 
rightwing group leadership represented at the meeting is impressive (see 
Appendix A, B, C, and D). National policy organizations represented 
included Cato, Heritage, and the Hoover Institute, among others. 
Attendees of the 2010 Koch meeting represented many active 
organizations from both the mainstream and libertarian sectors of the 
conservative network, as well as trade associations representing 
corporate interests, and the family, corporate, and donor-assisted 
foundations that fund those groups. In all, 56 different think tank and 
policy discussion organizations were represented by their leaders at the 
Koch meeting, many with more than one director. At least 47 national 
think tank organizations and policy discussion organizations were 
represented, ranging from the major conservative think tanks in the US 
today—Hoover Institution, Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, 
Manhattan Institute, and the Foundation for Economic Education as well 
as less well known groups such as Citizens in Charge and Center for 
Excellence in Higher Education, and other smaller or less broad 
organizations. Also included were some of the most important policy 
discussion groups, such as the Bilderberg Group and Aspen Institute.  
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National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), an iinfluential trade 
association was also represented.  
 Some institutions were heavily represented. The Hoover Institution 
had six directors present, and the George Mason University affiliated 
Institute for Humane Studies and Mercatus Center had five and four 
respectively. The Cato Institute, Americans for Prosperity, and the Aspen 
Institute all had three directors each present. Five of the top eight 
traditionally most cited conservative think tanks—Heritage, Cato, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, Hoover Institution, Manhattan 
Institution (Dolny 2005)—were represented at the meeting.  
 
2010 Attendees: State and Regional Organizations 
Nine state and regional groups were represented at the Koch 2010 
meeting, all of which are members of the State Policy Network, which was 
also represented itself. The Goldwater Institute, The John W. Pope 
Civitas Institute, The Mackinac Center for Public Policy, The Buckeye 
Institute for Public Policy Solutions, The Commonwealth Foundation for 
Public Policy Alternatives, The Oklahoma Council of Public Affairs, The 
Kansas Policy Institute, The Wyoming Liberty Group, and The John K. 
MacIver Institute for Public Policy all sent a member of their board of 
directors to the 2010 Koch meeting. At least 27 national organizations 
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which are affiliated members of the SPN, including Cato, Heritage, 
Capital Research, and Philanthropy Roundtable had leaders attending.  
 
2010 Attendees: Philanthropic Foundations 
There were family and individual philanthropic organizations 
represented at the 2010 meeting, including some of the biggest and most 
actively involved in conservative politics (see Table 3). One expert in the 
area of grantmaking and philanthropy claims that “sets of funding 
decisions constitute intellectual policies” (Katz 1983:2, italics mine). 
Bradley Foundation’s funding decisions, then, represent a determined 
effort to enact an anti-government, corporate-dominated agenda. The 
Bradley Foundation, one of the most important conservative 
philanthropic foundations, was represented, as were several other major 
contributors, including at least sixteen foundations donating $500,000 
or more to conservative organizations (see Table 5). These donations 
totaled over $46 million. The Bradley Foundation is one of the “Four 
Sisters,” (see Chapter III) the key conservative foundations which have 
funded the resurgence in conservative efforts to win the war of ideas. In 
fact, the Foundation notes that the brothers believed “the consequences 
of ideas were more decisive than the force of political or economic 
movements” (Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation 2010:6). 
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Table 3. Top Policy Network Foundation 
Contributors to Conservative Organizations  
Who Attended the 2010 Koch Meeting    
   Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation          $11,466,000  
Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation        $3,849,343  
Chase Foundation of Virginia                 $586,000  
Richard and Helen DeVos Foundation    $4,115,000  
Claude R. Lambe Charitable Foundation    $2,710,296  
Randolph Foundation       $1,811,000  
Searle Freedom Trust       $7,392,900  
John William Pope Foundation     $4,971,692  
J.P. Humphreys Foundation         $622,500  
E.L. Craig Foundation       $1,085,000  
J M Foundation           $505,000  
Lovett and Ruth Peters Foundation        $830,000  
Anschutz Foundation       $1,192,000  
Marcus Foundation          $919,500  
M.J. Murdock Charitable Trust     $3,313,500  
Rose-Marie and Jack R. Anderson Foundation      $765,000  
Total               $46,134,731  
 Note: Data compiled from 2009 IRS 990 filings  
 
 
 
With 2009 assets of $622,913,819 (with a 150% increase in assets in 
2013, to $922,303,709), and donating $44 million in 2009, $42 million 
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in 2010, and between $34-35 million each year in 2011, 2012 and 2013, 
Bradley exerts a serious financial influence on policy. Paul Ryan, quoted 
in the Foundation’s 2009 Annual Report, seems to sum up the Bradley 
Foundation’s view of the world: 
The struggle between market freedom and a European 
welfare state socialism is a moral struggle. My friends in this 
room, our only real problem is getting the people to hear the 
facts and explaining the consequences. You and I must 
engage ourselves in the saving of Western civilization, the 
principles of human individuality and greatness. It falls to 
the honor of the American people to make this decision for 
mankind: either recover human freedom or sink into 
centuries of darkness only made worse by the pretensions of 
progress.  (Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation 2010:36) 
 
 The Bradley Foundation’s focus and wide network connections, 
however, have made it even more powerful, as other conservative 
philanthropists look to it and the other big donors as indicators of which 
are effective organizations in which to invest.  
In total, 43 philanthropic foundations in the wider conservative 
network were represented at the Koch meeting (see Table 4). This does 
not count the dozens of foundations headed by attendees which did not 
as of that meeting donate, or who donate through less visible 
mechanisms.  
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Table 4.  Foundations in the 
Conservative Policy Network with 
Directors 
Attending the 2010 Koch Meeting 
  
 Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Holman Foundation 
Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation J.P. Humphreys Foundation 
David H. Koch Charitable Foundation Jack Miller Family Foundation 
J M Foundation     Knowledge and Progress Fund 
Claude R. Lambe Charitable Foundation Malek Family Foundation 
A. Gary Anderson Family Foundation Marcus Foundation 
Rose-Marie and Jack R. Anderson   M.J. Murdock Charitable  
Foundation       Trust 
Anschutz Foundation    Moeller Foundation 
Bachman Foundation    Samuel Roberts Noble  
Brown Foundation     Foundation   
Chase Foundation of Virginia   I.A. O'Shaughnessy  
E.L. Craig Foundation    Pope Foundation   
Dick and Betty DeVos Foundation  Peters Foundation    
Richard and Helen DeVos Foundation  Stephen Bechtel Fund 
Donors Capital Fund    Schiff Foundation 
Randolph Foundation     S.D. Bechtel Jr. Foundation 
Dixon and Carol Doll Family Foundation Searle Freedom Trust 
Donors Trust     Shenandoah Foundation 
Duke Endowment     Von Ehr Foundation 
Jerry and Nanette Finger Foundation Woodford Foundation 
Fred C. and Mary R. Koch Foundation  
Lynn and Foster Friess Foundation   
Richard and Leslie Gilliam Foundation  
Robert A. and Marie Hansen Foundation  
  
Note: Data compiled from 2009 IRS 990 filings  
 
 
These funding organizations represent a crucial nucleus of activist 
members of the elite who consistently fund the organizations that reflect 
their conservative ideologies. 
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2010 Attendees: Media 
A variety of attendees have direct connections to the media. Several 
are owners of various media outlets, while others are writers and 
“content providers,” and still others have become media celebrities. One 
of the biggest of these is Glenn Beck, who was the keynote speaker. 
Beck’s address was on “America’s Road to Serfdom,” echoing the title of 
Austrian economist von Hayek’s seminal book. 
 Media ownership has continued to concentrate into fewer and 
fewer hands, such as those of attendee Phillip Anschutz. The 37th 
richest American in 2009, with $6 billion, Anschutz owns Clarity Media 
Group which includes The Oklahoman, the largest newspaper in 
Oklahoma City and Oklahoma, The San Francisco Examiner, the 
Washington Examiner, The Baltimore Examiner, and Examiner.com, a 
locally focused web portal where “citizen journalists” write on local and 
national topics, from “news” to stories written more as blogs. He also 
owns the Weekly Standard, which featured a passionate defense of the 
Koch brothers (“The Paranoid Style in Liberal Politics”) in March, 2011 
(Continetti 2011). Anschutz’s Weekly Standard has also been an active 
promoter of the so-called “climategate” scandal. The magazine has served 
as a platform for numerous articles by prominent career deniers such as 
Kenneth Green of Reason Foundation and Steven Hayward of the 
American Enterprise Institute (AEI). Anschutz also owns NRC 
broadcasting, which operates a string of radio stations in Colorado. 
71 
 Foster Friess, another 2010 attendee, was one of the original 
founding investors of the Daily Caller, an increasingly influential 
conservative online news and commentary site. Although Tucker 
Carlson, chief editor at the DC claims that Friess has “no say” over 
editorial policy or content, Friess has stepped in multiple times to defend 
DC, such as when Carlson’s brother, an occasional contributor, “replied 
all” on an email concerning MNYC Mayor Bill DeBlasio aide Karen 
Spitalnick, in which Carlson used foul, sexual language to refer to her 
but was defended by DC (Wemple 2013). It is no surprise then that DC 
regularly defends the Kochs as well, specifically attacking the uproar over 
the Kochs considering buying the Tribune Company (Gibson 2013).  
Stanley Hubbard, as owner of Hubbard Broadcasting, owns a 
variety of TV and radio stations in Minnesota, Wisconsin, New Mexico 
and New York. Through a $505 million purchase of 17 radio stations 
from Bonneville International, Hubbard is significantly expanding its 
radio presence in the District of Columbia, Chicago, Cincinnati, and St. 
Louis. This purchase includes WTOP, a major Washington, DC news 
station with the nation’s second highest 2010 radio station revenue, as 
well as WFED, which appeals primarily to federal employees and 
contractors (Farhi 2011). 
Several influential writers attended as well, although they did not 
subsequently write about the event. One national writer who attended 
the meeting was Charles Krauthammer, opinion writer for the 
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Washington Post. Krauthammer wrote as recently as last year that 
climate science is still not settled (Krauthammer 2014), and that climate 
science was more of a “superstition”, “like a rain dance of Native 
Americans” than science (Thompson 2014). 
 Steve Moore, then editorial board member and senior economics 
writer for the Wall Street Journal, also attended. The Wall Street 
Journal’s opinion section has served for decades as a podium for 
prominent skeptics with ties to the Kochs, such as Bjorn Lomborg, 
Richard Lindzen and Patrick Michaels. Michaels used the Wall Street 
Journal’s opinion section to continue pushing “climategate” as some sort 
of a smoking gun proving that climate science was full of fraud and 
deceit even after scientists were exonerated by formal investigations. 
Moore is a frequent guest on talk shows, where in 2009 he claimed there 
was no solid science behind global warming, and that efforts to say so 
were “Stalinistic.”  He also claimed that climate change should be 
phrased as “climate improvement” (Johnson 2009a). Also in 2009, Moore 
declared that “I happen to believe that global warming is the biggest 
scam of the last two decades” (Powell 2009:149). Moore has served in a 
variety of leadership and board positions for conservative organizations, 
including at Cato Institute and Club for Growth, and now serves as a 
Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Heritage Foundation (Heritage 
Foundation n.d.[b]).  
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 Joining Krauthammer and Moore in Aspen was National Review’s 
Ramesh Ponnuru, who generally does not deny climate science outright, 
but instead argues that whatever approach being proposed won’t work. 
He was against the cap and trade bill (Ponnuru 2014a) and has regularly 
attacked EPA’s attempts to regulate carbon (Ponnuru 2014b).  
 In some ways, the most important “media connection” attending 
the 2010 Koch meeting was Eric O’Keefe, who, since that meeting, has 
been instrumental in building a media start-up into a national media 
power. Franklin Center for Government and Public Integrity, from 
penniless and inauspicious birth in North Dakota in 2009, has 
blossomed into a multi-million dollar enterprise that has come to 
dominate statehouse news in many states across the country (Franklin 
Center 2015).  According to its website, Franklin supports “an in-house 
team of state-based reporters and acts as a capacity-building service 
provider for organizations that sponsor investigative journalism (Franklin 
Center 2015). The Franklin Center coordinates news coverage from the 
states on its own websites, though state organizations that it either owns 
or with which it cooperates, to provide its take on state events (Pew 
Research Center 2014).  
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2010 Attendees: Other Important Coordinating and Funding Organizations 
There were also directors of influential conservative funding and 
planning groups, including Philanthropy Roundtable, Donors Trust and 
Donors Capital, and the State Policy Network. Also, several attendees 
have ties to ALEC, the national organization aimed at manufacturing 
model bills for passage in states (see Chapter IV).   
 The Philanthropy Roundtable was technically founded in 1991 but 
actually traces its roots to the 1970s, when conservative activism was in 
the process of being reignited, with the help of ideologically committed 
corporate members of the upper class, and corporate leaders. Starting as 
a small informal network of philanthropists under the wing of the 
Institute for Educational Affairs, the PR soon gained its own non-profit 
status, and built a headquarters in Indianapolis (but later moved to 
Washington, D.C.). Kim Dennis was the first executive director, and 
served in that capacity until 1996, when she accepted the position as 
President and CEO of the Searle Freedom Trust (George Mason 
University 2015). Starting in 2001, the PR began an ambitious effort to 
provide a wide variety of services to conservative philanthropists, mainly 
focusing on “opportunities for strategic coordination.”  The Roundtable 
has an annual budget of nearly $7 million, and has a membership of 650 
philanthropic organizations and individuals (Philanthropy Roundtable 
2015b). 
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 The five main services offered by the Roundtable are all aimed at 
“strategic coordination”: annual meetings, regional meetings, 
Philanthropy monthly magazine, thematic informational guidebooks, and 
the Alliance for Charitable Reform, which works to protect “philanthropic 
freedom”  through educating legislators and policymakers about the 
central role of philanthropy in in American life” (Philanthropy Roundtable 
2015a). 
 
Figure 3. Sociogram of Philanthropy Roundtable network 
connections to 2010 Koch meeting attendees 
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The board members of Philanthropy Roundtable are well-connected 
within both the Koch network and the wider conservative policy network 
(see Figure 3). Connections resulting from director interlocks include 
some of the largest conservative philanthropic foundations (Bradley, 
Searle, Randolph), the key “dark money” conduit DonorsTrust, and 
influential policy organizations such as the Hoover Institution (see Figure 
3). 
 
Top Linked Attendees 
The rich, the famous, the widely read and listened to, the 
politically connected, and especially those who are well integrated into 
the organizations of the policy planning network. In Figure 4, the top 20 
connected individuals at this meeting can be seen as individually 
connected into different areas of the network. There is little overlap and 
no high concentration at all. But, a wide range of organizations is 
represented, with a high potential for ideological diffusion. 
Political insiders like Edwin Meese attended who have some star 
power of their own as far as mixing at such events, but more importantly 
sit on multiple boards. Meese, in spite of having to resign in disgrace 
from his job as Ronald Reagan’s Attorney General after an independent 
prosecutor issued a report blasting him for a number of ethical abuses. 
These offenses included “influence peddling, selling federal jobs,  
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Figure 4. Sociogram of Koch meeting attendees with at least three 
affiliations across the conservative network 
 
cronyism, financial finagling and the manipulation of federal 
investigations” (SunSentinel 1988). The 1988 scandal and subsequent 
resignation have not hurt Meese in conservative circles. He has been a 
founder, adviser or officer in about thirty conservative organizations in 
the past thirty years, dealing with issues ranging from foreign policy to 
education policy to promoting Christian social and political values. He 
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also was an integral part of the “Emergency Committee to Defeat Al Gore” 
and the “Emergency Committee to Stop Hilary Rodham Clinton.”  
In 2009, Meese sat on the boards of seven conservative 
organizations (see Figure 5): Landmark Legal Foundation, American Civil 
Rights Union (ACRU), Mercatus Institute, Center for the Study of the 
Presidency, Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment 
(FREE), Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI), Capital Research Center 
(CRC), Trinity Forum, and American Council of Trustees and Alumni 
(ACTA). Meese’s case is particularly interesting to this case study focused 
on climate, as none of the entities on whose boards he sits is outwardly a 
major climate change denial player. His importance to the climate denial 
and delay network is to serve as a vector in the effort to make climate 
science denial a deeply entrenched part of conservative ideology. Meese 
has no scientific background at all but has made public his disbelief in 
climate change and his distrust of climate science and scientists.  
A strong and well-liked figure in conservative circles (Haun 2012), 
and one who has always been able to toe the party line, Meese, through 
these wide-ranging network connections, had the capability to influence 
countless numbers of people. One colleague described Meese as a 
consummate organizer and facilitator, as having “great management 
skills: he listens carefully, considers all points of view, and thereby gets 
everyone invested…” (Haun 2012). Through sitting on the board of FREE, 
Meese spent time with Professors Jonathan Adler and John Baden, both 
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anti-climate free marketers. Adler, also a lawyer, was identified in a 2007 
study as the most cited legal academic in environmental law under age 
40 (Case Western Reserve University School of Law 2015), and is listed 
as a climate expert by Heartland Institute (Heartland Institute n.d.), 
Competitive Enterprise Institute (Competitive Enterprise Institute n.d.), 
the Federalist Society (Federalist Society n.d.), and the Foundation for 
Economic Education (Foundation for Economic Education n.d.) even 
though he lacks any scientific training at all, much less specific  
  
Figure 5. Sociogram of Edwin Meese policy network organization 
2009 board seats 
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knowledge in climate science. As early as 1997, Adler was writing an 
anti-climate change science book (The Costs of Kyoto: Climate Change 
Policy and Its Implications [1997]), articles such as “Global Warming: Hot 
Problem or Hot Air?” (Adler 1998), and opposing regulations dealing with 
climate change on John Stossel’s Fox show (PERC 2014).  In addition, 
John Von Kannon, a longtime Goldwater Republican, also sat on that 
board, as well as being the longtime Vice President and main fundraiser 
for the Heritage Foundation. Von Kannon also sat on the boards of 
Donors Capital Fund, Holman Foundation, Marion Wells Foundation, 
and two other grant making philanthropic foundations. (Heritage 
Foundation. N.d.[c]).  
On the board of the Capital Research Center (CRC), Meese joined 
several ultraconservative activists. Heritage director Marion G. Wells, for 
example, in addition to her board position with CRC, sat on the boards of 
the Intercollegiate Studies Institute (ISI) and chaired her own small 
philanthropic foundation, the Marion G. Wells Foundation with $701,274 
in 2009 assets and which gave $41,540 in contributions in 2009 to 
conservative causes. Thomas Winter also sat on the board of CRC, as 
well as being a director of the American Conservative Union (ACU), 
perhaps the largest and most influential of the social conservative wing of 
the Republican political scene. On the board of the American Council of 
Trustees and Alumni (ACTA), Meese joined Steve Balch, conservative 
scholar and founding president of the conservative think tank National 
81 
Association of Scholars, who also sat on the board of The Alexander 
Hamilton Institute for the Study of Western Civilization. Balch has 
received awards from the American Conservative Union and from the 
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation (National Association of Scholars 
n.d.). 
Another Meese board role was directing Landmark Legal 
Foundation, which has played a role fighting against climate legislation. 
Its latest effort was filing an amicus brief challenging EPA’s authority to 
regulate greenhouse gases (Landmark Legal Foundation n.d.).  In 2007, 
Landmark nominated Rush Limbaugh for the Nobel Peace Prize, calling 
him the “foremost advocate for freedom and democracy in the world 
today” (PR Newswire 2007). Landmark, joined by other conservative legal 
organizations, was responsible for a several year effort to troll for 
damaging information by looking through the emails and academic 
records of Michael Mann. FOIA and records lawsuits were the tactic of 
choice, harassing Mann, Penn State University and other universities 
where Mann had worked (Mann 2012:229).  On Landmark’s board, 
Meese was joined by Mark R. Levin, lawyer and constitutional scholar 
who has become a popular ultraconservative radio host. Levin frequently 
collaborates with Sean Hannity. In 2009 Levin wrote Liberty and 
Tyranny, a bestselling book, seeking to redefine progressives or liberals 
as “statists.” He has been a longtime denier, and as recently as May 
2014, wrote that “There’s no convincing evidence that the release of CO2 
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by humans is causing the alleged change of the Earth” (Mark Levin Show 
2014).  
On the board of Christian group Trinity Forum, an organization 
“that works to cultivate networks of leaders whose integrity and vision 
will renew culture and promote human freedom and flourishing” (Trinity 
Forum n.d.), Meese is joined by Fonda Huizenga, wife of billionaire Waste 
Management (and former NFL Dolphins owner) owner Wayne Huizenga, 
Jr. The Huizengas were estimated to hold $2.1 billion in wealth, putting 
them at 154th on the 2009 Forbes list, and up to $2.6 billion in 2014 
(Forbes.com 2009, 2014), and, through the Huizenga Family Foundation, 
are active in donating to conservative and Christian charities such as the 
Heritage Foundation, Trinity Forum, and between $250,000 and a $1 
million a year to the US Chamber of Commerce.  
As a director of the Mercatus Institute, Meese joined directly with 
the Kochs and their allies. Charles Koch and his chief lieutenant (and 
Mercatus founder) economist Richard Fink19 were both on the board, and 
                                                          
19 “Richard Fink is a member of the Mercatus Center's Board of Directors. Mr. Fink is 
an executive vice president and member of the board of directors of Koch Industries, 
Inc. He is also chairman and CEO of Koch Companies Public Sector, LLC; which 
provides legal and government and public affairs services to Koch Industries, Inc. and 
its affiliates. Mr. Fink also serves on the boards of Georgia-Pacific Equity Holdings, LLC 
and Flint Hills Resources, LLC, subsidiaries of Koch Industries, Inc. Before joining Koch 
in 1990, Mr. Fink was an economics professor and executive vice president of 
advancement and planning at George Mason University. He also served on the 
University’s Board of Visitors for eight years” (Mercatus Center 2015). 
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Tyler Cowen, a former Mercatus student and a major climate denier20 in 
2009, too.  
Besides having been a major scholar at George Mason and at 
Mercatus (before moving to Chapman University), the Nobel-winning 
economist Vernon Smith also sat on the board of Property and 
Environment Research Center (PERC), which was “the nation’s first and 
largest institute dedicated to improving environmental quality through 
property rights and markets” (Property and Environment Research 
Center 2015). PERC champions a philosophy it calls “free market 
environmentalism,” which, in a recent posting on its website, seems to 
revolve around replacing EPA and other federal regulatory processes with 
voluntary corporate efforts, and a reliance on private property rights 
(Property and Environment Research Center 2014b). Smith was also an 
active director of Reason Institute, whose “nonpartisan public policy 
research promotes choice, competition, and a dynamic market economy 
as the foundation for human dignity and progress” (Reason 2015).  
Reason’s take on climate change was expressed in 2004: ““What we can 
say is that climate change has been a natural phenomenon throughout 
the course of time. What impact do man’s activities have on the Earth’s 
natural climate cycles? That is still open to debate. Some would say none 
at all while others will say that it is dramatic” (ExxonSecrets.org. n.d.). 
                                                          
20 Though long a denier his views have evolved somewhat since. 
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And Reason scholar Ronald Bailey wrote in 2004, “So is dangerous 
rapid global warming merely the new conventional wisdom—or a credible 
forecast of our climatic future? There's plenty of evidence for both 
positions, and I’ll keep reporting the data and the controversy”21 (Bailey 
2004). Smith also sat on the board of International Foundation for 
Research in Experimental Economics (IFREE). In addition, Smith has 
long been affiliated with English think tank Institute of Economic Affairs, 
which has a longstanding presence in climate change denial (Monbiot 
2013) in Europe and he’s affiliated with free market groups here 
including the Association for Private Enterprise Education, and the 
Intercollegiate Studies Institute. Smith is also listed as an adjunct 
scholar and expert at Cato Institute, and serves on the Cato Journal 
editorial board. Thomas W. Smith (no relation to Vernon Smith) also sits 
on that board. Thomas W. Smith is a regular attendee of Koch meetings, 
although he did not attend in 2009. He did attend the 2014 meeting, as 
well as being an attendee at a similar strategy meeting held by American 
Enterprise Institute in 2014. Smith also sits on the board of the 
Manhattan institute, which has a history of denying climate science, and 
is deeply entrenched in conservative circles. Smith’s foundation, TWS 
Foundation, no longer complies with IRS policy in naming recipients, 
                                                          
21 Bailey, too, relented from steadfast denier to non-committal. While seeming to accept 
basic climate science, he is still quick to accept the validity of anything skeptical and 
slow to accept consensus. While writing a mea culpa of sorts in 2006, a tongue in cheek 
self-reference as an Alleged ExxonMobil Whore” (Bailey 2006), he writes as recently as 
January 2015 (Bailey 2015) complaining that the models are still wrong, and that 
trends are not being predicted accurately (presumably meaning that action taken on the 
basis of them would be foolish. 
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merely stating that details are “available upon written request,” but 2008 
and earlier returns show that he is a supporter of Cato, the Competitive 
Enterprise Institute, Institute for Justice, Federalist Society, 
Interscholastic Studies Institute, and other conservative policy network 
organizations and causes. Retired George Mason economist Manuel 
“Manley” Johnson had occupied the “Koch Chair in International 
Economics,” and also sits on the Mercatus board. He is also an attendee 
of Koch meetings. His family foundation, The Manuel and Mary Johnson 
Foundation, donates to Americans for Prosperity and a few other 
conservative organizations.  
Lastly, Meese is joined on the board of the American Civil Rights 
Union (ACRU) by Morton Blackwell. Blackwell is founder and president of 
the Leadership Institute, established in 1979. He served as Barry 
Goldwater’s youngest elected delegate to the 1964 Republican Party 
convention. The Leadership Institute “prepares conservatives for success 
in politics, government and the news media” (Leadership Institute. N.d.) 
Over the years the Leadership Institute has trained more than 155,000 
students. Blackwell also has been involved in several major far right 
organizations, including the Council for National Policy, the American 
Conservative Union, and the Free Congress Foundation. He is an active 
donor to political candidates, including to Mitt Romney and to the 
Conservative Leadership PAC. The Institute doesn’t teach policy, it 
teaches tactics; its website explains that it teaches conservative 
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Americans how to influence policy through direct participation, activism, 
and leadership” (Leadership Institute 2015). In spite of the official 
disclaimer about not instilling rightwing ideological stances into its 
students, the website had this to say in its blog: “For the leftist activists, 
COP 15 and the protest was about changing the system (aka ending 
capitalism). Climate change is merely an excuse to collapse capitalism 
and switch to socialists economic systems” (Campusreform.org  2009). 
According to one source, the Leadership has had a hand in training some 
of the foremost conservative leaders of our time, including Karl Rove, 
Grover Norquist, Ralph Reed, Joe Wilson, Mitch McConnell as well as 
several other US and state legislators, governors and organization leaders 
(DeSmogBlog.com n.d.). Blackwell and the Leadership Institute have 
supported the Heartland Institute’s “International Conferences” on 
climate change, including as a “Gold Sponsor” in 2012 and “co-sponsor” 
in 2010.  Leadership’s spin-off group “Campus Reform Project” attempted 
to organize college students to fight climate change legislation by 
highlighting “ridiculous claims” made by climate scientists 
(Campusreform.org n.d.). One Campus Reform blogger refers to “Rule 44 
of Morton Blackwell’s Laws of Public Policy Process” in which “moral 
outrage is the most powerful motivating tool in politics. Wise student 
activists can put this rule to use to bring about real change on their 
campuses" (Thomas 2010).   
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In 2002 Blackwell signed the letter to President George W. Bush, 
urging him to retract the 2002 Climate Action Report produced by the US 
Global Change Research Program as required by UN agreement, and to 
require its rewriting and subsequent work in climate change to be 
products of “sound science” (Smith 2002).22 Several network connections 
can be seen at work in the relationships between Meese and his fellow 
board members. For example, many were involved in Young Republicans 
or Young Americans for Freedom. Many are corporate CEOs and have 
met through Business Roundtable, Chamber of Commerce, or other 
industry associations or groups. Some share board memberships on 
cultural or more traditional types of philanthropic organizations like 
cancer research or art museums. David Koch, for example, sits or has 
sat on the boards of the Economic Club of New York, The Institute of 
Human Origins, the National Geographic Society, the Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, the American Museum of Natural History, the 
Corporation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the New York-
Presbyterian Hospital, the boards of Deerfield Academy and  Johns 
Hopkins, WGBH, American Ballet Theatre, and numerous other 
charitable organizations, where he has joined dozens of other influential 
                                                          
22   Other signers of the letter include Fred Smith and Myron Ebell (CEI), Paul Beckner 
(Citizens for a Sound Economy, the predecessor organization to Americans for 
Prosperity), Kenneth Green (Reason Institute), David Rothbard (CFACT), Thomas Schatz 
(CAGW), Grover Norquist (ATR), Tom DeWeese (APC), Steve Hayward (Pacific Research 
Institute), George C. Landrith (Frontiers of Freedom), Patrick Michaels (Cato), Fred 
Singer (Science and Environmental Policy Project), Lori Waters (Eagle Forum), Paul 
Weyrich (Free Congress Foundation), John Berthoud (National Taxpayers Union), as 
well as a dozen other rightwing, business, and Christian organization leaders. 
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members of the upper class and corporate leaders. Some were also 
officials in the Nixon White House. Also, Meese’s Ivy League education 
(Yale) allowed him familiarity with many of the Koch meetings 
attendees—a group of over 200 who, between them, hold at least 37 Ivy 
League degrees. Virtually everyone is connected to everyone in the six 
degrees of Edwin Meese—at least everyone on the ultraconservative side 
of politics. 
Another type of influential attendee is the wealthy activist. Well 
over half the attendees at the 2010 Koch meeting are multimillionaires, 
and some have crossed over from merely “voting conservative” and 
donating to conservative politicians to becoming activists themselves. 
Donating large amounts year after year in an organized campaign with 
specific ends, bringing in friends and business associates, attending 
strategy and tactics meetings, and sitting on boards of policy 
organizations shows a hands-on involvement that was unusual in past 
generations. Members of the ruling economic elite now feel almost 
compelled to fight directly for their principles and material interests.  
One example of this multimillionaire activism through 
philanthropy is the Lovett and Ruth Peters Foundation, founded by 
oilman Lovett “Pete” Peters and his wife after he “made a fair chunk” in 
the oil exploration business (Heritage Foundation 2009). Now headed by 
their son Daniel S. Peters, the foundation focuses on education reform. 
In 2009, the foundation, with assets of $3,932,494, donated a total of 
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$1,624,000 to 31 different organizations, many of them related to 
education. But, in addition to a few legitimate scholarship and reform 
organizations is a long list of donations to the general funds of an array 
of ultraconservative organizations, including: the American Enterprise 
Institute, Americans for Tax Reform, Heritage Foundation, Institute for 
Humane Studies, James Madison Institute, Landmark Legal Foundation, 
Mackinac Center, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation, 
Pacific Research Institute, Pioneer Institute, Reason Foundation, and the 
State Policy Network. Donations to these organizations totaled $550,000. 
There was also an unidentified donation of $225,000 to DonorsTrust, the 
dark money organization of choice for the Koch network (see Chapter V), 
which means that about half of the “philanthropic” efforts of the Peters 
family have gone to organizations that deny climate change, in addition 
to supporting lower taxes for wealthy individuals, lowering regulations for 
corporations, and pushing for legislation that increases and makes 
permanent class differences in our country. In fact, of the remaining 
$800,000 in donations, it appears that very little could really be called 
“charity” in the generally accepted sense of the word, as the grants seem 
to support charter schools and school choice organizations in several 
states, an issue broadly interwoven with class issues in the United 
States. 
Another example is Ethelmae Humphreys, owner of Tamko 
Building Materials. Humphreys, described as a top power player in 
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Missouri politics (St. Louis Beacon 2014), appears to be a regular 
attendee at the Koch meetings. In addition to sitting on the boards of two 
activist conservative philanthropic foundations (see Figure 6), she is also 
on the boards  
 
Figure 6.  Sociogram of 2009 Donations to conservative 
organization made by foundations controlled by Ethelmae 
Humphreys 
 
of three policy organizations: she has long been on the board at Cato, 
and also sits on the boards of the Foundation for Economic Education 
(FEE) and the National Right to Work Legal Defense Fund. The 
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foundations she directs—the J.P. Humphreys Foundation and the E.L. 
Craig Foundation—donate to a wide spectrum of mainstream 
conservative and far right organizations. Between the two foundations, 
19 conservative policy organizations are supported, including Cato, 
Heartland, State Policy Network, Mercatus Institute and Institute of 
Humane Studies, Reason Foundation, Americans for Prosperity, and 
Competitive Enterprise Institute. Both foundations also give large 
donations to unknown recipients through DonorsTrust (see Chapter V). 
In 2009, donations to right wing causes from these two entities totaled 
$1,707,500, of which $250,000 (or about 15%) was laundered through 
DonorsTrust. 
Ken Langone is the billionaire founding partner of Home Depot. He 
is said to be a regular attendee at Koch meetings; he attended in 2009 
and 2011, and several other years as well (Fang 2011). Forbes estimated 
his personal wealth at $2.4 billion (Forbes.com 2009), making him the 
242nd wealthiest person in the country in 2009.  He sits on the boards of 
two conservative policy organizations and controls an active 
philanthropic foundation, the Marcus Foundation. In 2009, the Marcus 
Foundation spread about $1,000,000 to 14 different conservative 
organizations, including the American Enterprise Institute, Institute for 
Humane Studies, the Property & Environment Research Center, and the 
Philanthropy Roundtable.  
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Figure 7 shows the Koch meeting attendees who are part of the 
fossil fuels industry. This group includes oil processors, drillers, 
suppliers, retail and wholesale companies, pipeline companies, and allied 
industries. Also included are members of the boards of any fossil fuels 
related company, even if their main income could not be verified to come 
from fossil fuels. Those who have benefitted from large inherited wealth  
 
Figure 7. Representatives from the fossil fuels industry attending 
2010 Koch meeting, and their 2009 network connections. 
 
from fossil fuels fortunes have also been included, and those who sit on 
philanthropic boards based on fortunes generated in the fossil fuels 
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industries. I have also included any allied industry that depends to a 
great extent on the health of the fossil fuels industry, with the best 
example being those who specialize in finance within the oil industry. 
Using this definition, 44 individuals attending the Koch meeting were 
members of the fossil fuels industries. Of these individuals, four were 
members of the board of the American Petroleum Institute, and seven 
were directors of the National Petroleum Council. Besides these, fossil 
fuels attendees had only 16 other network connections in the wider 
network, most of them through the Kochs themselves. The National Coal 
Council and Natural Gas Council were also each represented by two 
directors.  
An example of a wealthy fossil fuels industry activist is Corbin 
Robertson, Jr. After starring on the University of Texas football team in 
the 1960s, Robertson took over his grandfather’s company. He is CEO of 
Quintana Petroleum, and even though his family had traditionally 
invested in and made massive profits from oil, he divested and instead 
went heavily into coal. His company-- Natural Resource Partners—
operates in mountaintop removal mining, and one estimate puts his 
NRP’s reserves as the largest in the nation, with only the federal 
government holding more in reserve. Robertson and his firm are closely 
affiliated with the Coalition for Responsible Regulation, which seeks to 
challenge EPA greenhouse gas regulations (Bannerjee 2010). He has 
donated large amounts to conservative and ultraconservative politicians 
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over the years including the last three election cycles, and is listed as a 
top 100 political donor (openscrets.org n.d. [b]). He is also active in 
climate policy himself. According to IRS documents filed by the 
organizations, Robertson is a director of two groups promoting climate 
denial, “Plants Need CO2” (a 501c3) and “CO2 is Green” (a 501c4).  
Robertson, among others, was acknowledged at the Koch meeting 
in June 2011 in Vail, Colorado for donating at least $1 million to Koch-
related causes (Aronsen 2011). He sits on the boards of family 
philanthropic foundations that dispense tens of millions of dollars per 
year. Also acknowledged at the 2011 meeting were 2010 attendees John 
W. Childs, Dean Cortopassi, Joe Craft, Rich and Helen DeVos, Dick 
Farmer, Foster Friess, Richard Gilliam, Dick Haworth, Diane Hendricks, 
Ethelmae Humphreys, Kenneth Levy and Frayda Levin, The Marshalls, 
Art Pope, and Karen Wright and Tom Rastin. Other regular attendees 
honored for $1 million dollar donations include Charles Schwab, Paul 
Singer, and John “Jack” Templeton, and others (Aronsen 2011). 
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CHAPTER IV  
THE CONSERVATIVE POLICY NETWORK 
 
When power elite theorists argue that the corporate class rules 
America, they do not say it is through the backroom edicts of a few 
shadowy villains as is sometimes portrayed in conspiracy theory 
sketches. In the United States, members of the power elite rule through 
their ability to generate policies that favor their class positions. One way 
they do this is through their positions as board members and funders of 
the highly interlocked organizations in the policy planning network (see 
Figure 7). They produce and constantly reproduce a basic worldview that 
helps protect and extend their material interests, and their various 
networks work to solidify and do battle for such class interests. Domhoff, 
while stressing the fact that these networks are always in flux, with 
families rising and falling, corporations booming or busting, and 
organizations changing personnel, notes the importance of the 
“innumerable face to face small groups that are constantly changing in 
their composition as people move from one social setting to another” 
(Domhoff 2006:75). The identities of the individual members of the 
network are less important than the fact that the network relationships 
exist, that they represent class interests, and that they exert power to 
advance those interests. These networks serve as the producers of a 
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consistent worldview from which specific policies spring as much as they 
do to produce the specific policies themselves.  
 The corporate elite lies at the heart of the policy network, for it is 
here that class-wide interests are developed through political and social 
processes, “in corporate boardrooms, social clubs, and informal 
discussions” (Domhoff 2006:79). Problems and interests are identified, 
disagreements and misunderstandings become clarified, and factions of 
the elite can use their power to try to direct the overall network to do its 
bidding, through the actions (and in the case of climate change denial, 
inaction) of government. Between the informal discussions that identify 
issues and the action of government lie the organizations of the policy 
network, composed of three main components: philanthropic foundations 
(mainly family foundations but increasingly including corporate 
foundations and “laundering” organizations), think tanks, and policy 
discussion groups. These organizations are highly interlocked (see Figure 
8). 
 
Think Tanks 
The term “think tank” enjoys a loose definition that several 
scholars have attempted to better conceptualize (see Pautz 2011, Plehwe 
2008, 2014, and Kelstrup n.d.).  These debates are beyond the scope of 
this research, but it is important to stake out a working definition for the 
97 
practical purposes of the research. In this study, “think tanks” will 
consist of organizations that fall in between universities (which generally 
claim autonomy from public policy battles and claim little interest in 
participating in them), and political organizations that do openly act as 
lobbying or pressure groups (Plehwe 2008). 
 
Blue = national think tanks   Green = state think tanks 
Red = philanthropic foundations        Yellow = discussion groups 
 
 
Figure 8. Sociogram of 2009 Director Interlocks of the Conservative 
Policy Network 
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Policy is developed through a network of these policy organizations 
that conduct research and develop suggestions. Policy proposals then go 
through a discussion phase where the opinions of the individuals in the 
wider conservative network can have the opportunity to coalesce around 
key legislative approaches. Ideological pressure is exerted on these 
organizations primarily through funding, as philanthropic foundations 
make decisions each year about which of these organizations to fund, 
and to what extent.  
The oldest of these think tank organizations is American 
Enterprise Institute, originally named the American Enterprise 
Association. AEI was founded in 1943 by Lewis H. Brown, president of 
the Johns-Manville Corporation. It served corporate interests, but 
represented those interests as being best for the country as a whole. 
While attempts were made to nudge labor towards adopting corporate 
ideology as in its best interests, Brown and the AEI realized that the 
corporate relationship with government was another key. The first 
organized bastion of free market corporate conservatism, AEI sought to 
stamp national policy discussions with the economics of Hayek and von 
Mises (Smith 1991:7). Just as today’s organizations do, AEI’s board 
included activist corporate leaders of the day, who, by the 1970s, were 
bent on pushing both the dominant corporate worldview and the more 
“mainstream conservative” politicians rightward, though they did not see 
themselves as a political organization per se (Rich 2004:54). Finding little 
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success through its initial “lawyerly approach”, AEI soon looked to 
academia as their model, bringing free market scholars such as Milton 
Friedman into the fold, and having policy analysis written in the 
“language of the policy community” (Smith 1991:175). By 1973, it wasn’t 
outlandish for President Richard Nixon, hardly a lock-step conservative, 
to remark that “we can’t fight the marketplace” (Jacobs 2008:199).  
If AEI was the foundation upon which 1970s Republican activists 
sought to build a comprehensive network of conservative think tanks, it 
took a rebirth of activist spirit on the part of the wealthy and corporate 
class to make real change. Lewis Powell called for this kind of activism in 
his 1971 memo to his friend Eugene Sydor was then President of the 
Chamber of Commerce. Powell describes American business as being 
under “broad attack” from liberal enemies, and claims that is the 
“responsibility of business executives to recognize that the ultimate issue 
may be the survival…of America and the freedom of her people” Powell 
1971). Powell saw the need not just for action, but for concerted action: 
But independent and uncoordinated activity by individual 
corporations, as important as this is, will not be sufficient. 
Strength lies in organization, in careful long-range planning 
and implementation, in consistency of action over an 
indefinite period of years, in the scale of financing available 
only through joint effort, and in the political power available 
only through united action and national organizations. 
(Powell 1971) 
 
 
Powell goes on to detail from where the counterattack must come, 
including in churches, campuses, intellectual and popular press, the arts 
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and sciences, and in politics. It was up to the “good citizens,” argued 
Powell, to fight against the left. But Powell was not alone in feeling that 
the Right was a beleaguered and disorganized whipping boy for all of 
America’s problems. Some of the richest men in America were starting to 
become aware as well.  
William Simon, in his book A Time for Truth (1978, co-authored 
with Clare Booth Luce), may have been among the most important and 
influential from the corporate wealthy class to help this process along. In  
Issuing a prominent call for counterpublicity, William Simon 
participated in an orchestrated movement initiated by public 
officials and private executives in the early 1970s to 
overcome the perceived marginalization of conservative policy 
ideas. Despite the election of Richard Nixon as president, 
influential social actors believed that conservatism continued 
to suffer from a marginalization effected through the 
formation of the New Deal policymaking coalition in the 
1930s. (Simon and Luce 1978:65) 
 
 
The event that truly signaled the era of the dominant conservative 
policy network was the conception and birth of the Heritage Foundation. 
Founded in 1973, the Heritage Foundation “is a research and 
educational institution whose mission is to formulate and promote 
conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise, 
limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values, and 
a strong national defense” (Heritage 2015). 
Heritage was born from the desire of Colorado beer baron Joseph 
Coors to find an organization that would unflinchingly defend free 
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market capitalism, but he and conservative political activist Paul Weyrich 
couldn’t find one. Weyrich was reduced to saying “I don’t understand 
why people who are free-market-oriented stop being free-market-oriented 
when there’s competition that encroaches on their activities” (Phillips-
Fein 2009:172). Coors and Weyrich, with a few other conservative 
activists simply started their own organization. One of the earliest of its 
opinion pieces was titled “The Government Versus the Entrepreneur,” 
contributed by Amway founders Jay Van Andel and Richard M. DeVos 
(Phillips-Fein 2009:169-72). Although Heritage was oriented as an 
intellectual non-partisan knowledge producer, it is clear that, though the 
“New Right in the 1970s might have a new style, it still drew its money 
and its personnel from the old cadres of the business right” (Phillips-Fein 
2009:173). The power of Heritage’s model of knowledge production for 
practical purposes was proven when the newly elected Ronald Reagan 
incorporated virtually en masse the approach contained in Heritage’s 
massive Mandate for Leadership (Heatherly 1981). The purpose of the 
project was to organize conservative thought around key principles and 
practical approaches to “revitalize our economy, strengthen our national 
security and halt the centralization of power in the federal government 
Heatherly 1981:vii). The paperback version, condensed to 1000 pages, 
was a Washington bestseller, and contained over “2000 ideas—60% of 
which had been implemented within his first year (Ball 2013). Indeed, 
when President Reagan, deeply tied in to corporate networks of power 
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and contributions, visited the Heritage Foundation in 1986 to give a 
speech, he felt that he “was among old friends” (Smith 1991:19).  
Besides its new model of policy analysis as the foundation of actual 
governance, the Heritage Foundation also was crucial in the development 
of today’s policy network for its funding model. Starting off with large 
donations from a few key corporate activist multi-millionaires, the 
foundation soon received contributions from a wide swath of the 
conservatively oriented philanthropic foundations. This core network of 
the Heritage Foundation and the major philanthropic foundations—
including most of the “Diligent Dozen” (see below) are the early core 
around which was constructed the policy network of dozens of national 
multi-issue conservative and ultraconservative think tanks, dozens of 
state and regionally oriented multi-issue think tanks, and hundreds of 
philanthropic foundations funded by the wealthy leaders of corporate 
America today (Schulman and Zelizer 2008:154-6). Basic consistency is 
assured through the hiring process. For example, Cato is clear that its 
analysts will not be suggesting any potential policy proposals that 
involved adding to government. Free market ideological guidelines, 
usually funneled through the theoretical work of Austrian economists 
Hayek and von Mises, are already internalized and then are strengthened 
within organizations. 
 These major national think tanks offer a wide variety of policy 
suggestions and research on a spectrum of issues. Some think tanks 
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develop a niche in the constellation of issues, such as fighting against 
unions or for K-12 school reform. Others are regional or state-oriented in 
their concerns. Some organizations are oriented towards infrastructure of 
the policy network itself, especially starting in the 1990s. One study 
notes that  
Nonprofit infrastructure organizations received $8,547,119 
from foundations in order to help strengthen the 
organizations working on conservative public policy issues. 
These organizations, such as the State Policy Network and 
Philanthropy Roundtable, are primarily membership 
organizations that provide a range of services from technical 
assistance to organizing conferences and gatherings where 
new funders can be identified and new ideas generated to 
further the work of the conservative movement. The 
nonprofit infrastructure organizations also serve as a type of 
outreach mechanism to conservative funders to help them 
find new grantees that share their conservative values and 
ideals. (Krehely, House, and Kernan 2004:29) 
 
In addition to those mentioned by Krehely, House and Kernan, there are 
several other entities worth mentioning here. The Leadership Institute, 
which focuses on training and preparing young students to be 
conservative activists, both inside the government and from business 
ranks. Atlas Foundation helps new organizations grow and develop, 
offering training to administrators, financing, help with fundraising, as 
well as coordinating an international organization of organizations.  
Though any of these organizations may differ on individual issues, 
part of the function of the network itself is to lay these ideas out to the 
policy public to allow for consensus and compromise to be reached. 
“Despite the ideological differences of the Heritage Foundation, AEI and 
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the Cato Institute, they have been successful in advancing the 
conservative movement” (Krehely, House and Kernan 2004:20). And 
since the 1980s, all the careful work and massive spending have paid off, 
as “one successful campaign followed another: official English, 
immigration reform, welfare revisionism, limits on affirmative action, 
rollbacks in women’s procreative rights…” (Stefancic and 
Delgado1996:4).  Even liberal scholars who “have little admiration for the 
substance of the right’s social agenda [remark on the] dedication, 
economy of effort, and sheer ingenuity of much of the conservative 
machine” (Stefancic and Delgado 1996:5). This is accomplished partly 
through the coordinating relationships that directors of these 
organizations have with each other and through the meetings and events 
which are held between them.  
Some of the key policy organizations are worth singling out, as 
they have been central to the wider conservative policy network for 
decades. Val Burris uses a group of policy organizations in his study on 
the rightward turn of those organizations, tracing this rightward shift 
using network analysis. This group includes the CED, CFR, Conference 
Board, Business Roundtable, BC, National Association of Manufacturers, 
Chamber of Commerce, Trilateral Commission, American Enterprise 
Institute, Hoover Institute, Heritage Foundation, and Brookings 
Institution. In Figure 9 below, the wide network connections of those 
organizations can be seen. These 12 policy organizations are related to a 
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total of 104 other foundations, national and state think tanks, 
coordinating bodies and discussion groups, as well as advocacy groups, 
white house advisory boards, and trade associations in the network.  
 
Figure 9. Sociogram of Interlocks of 2009 Directors of Burris 12 
Influential Policy Organizations 
 
 
 
 
Philanthropic Foundations 
Philanthropic foundations are specially designed entities given 
special organization and tax status through carefully crafted IRS 
regulations. These organizations can be family foundations, corporate 
106 
foundations, community foundations, or “pass-through” donor-advised 
funds. In order to earn tax-free status, the foundations must disclose 
and post their annual reports, including the recipients of their 
contributions. Recipients must be identified as charitable organizations 
under the tax code, theoretically leaving out overtly political entities 
associated directly with campaigns and candidates.  
 In 2009 there were 76,545 philanthropic foundations registered in 
the United States. Of these, 4,567 were operating organizations oriented 
towards funding a specific entity, and so are left out of this analysis. The 
remaining 71,978 of these organizations held a total of more than $590 
billion in assets, and received about $40 billion in gifts during 2009. 
These organizations gave out almost $46 billion in gifts during the year 
2009. Most of these foundations were “independent foundations,” 
meaning they were controlled by individuals or families, or groups of 
private individuals, and these foundations hold the bulk of assets, with 
$482 billion. Of the remainder, 2,733 were corporate philanthropic 
foundations with almost $20 billion and 737 were community 
foundations with about $50 billion (Foundation Center 2015a). Of the 50 
largest giving independent foundations in the country in 2009, 25 are 
found in the conservative policy network, including eight of the top ten, 
and 16 of the top 25 (Foundation Center 2015b).  
 Of the key 2001 conservative funding organizations studied by 
Krehely, House and Kernan (2004), 60 of the 78 are still found in the 
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conservative policy network, so once these funding mechanisms are set 
up they tend to last for some considerable time. Leadership is passed 
from generation to generation, and outside directors are replaced as they 
retire, because relationships with others holding key ideological beliefs 
serve to reinforce those beliefs with new members.  
They have done so because conservative foundation boards 
often hold the same beliefs as those of their grantees and are 
looking to build the conservative movement. Progressives 
have not experienced this same type of dedication to their 
movement because foundation boards tend to be composed 
of individuals who represent wealthy and corporate interests 
and are, therefore, not willing to support controversial 
research and advocacy that may threaten their place in 
society. (Krehely, House and Kernan 2004:21) 
 
Although there are many instances of these conservative foundations 
donating large amounts of money to what could be perceived as “liberal” 
causes and organizations (Domhoff gives the example of The Ford 
Foundation and environmental organizations in the early 1960s 
[Domhoff 2006:83]), and even a quick glance through the IRS filings of 
the foundations in this study show that environmental groups, K-12 
school support and improvement, college scholarships and grants, and 
other examples), there is no doubt in the end where the interests of most 
of these organizations lie. Although money may be spent on these issues, 
there is little “bend on the key issues, such as shown by the foundations’ 
support for opposition to unionization” (Domhoff 2006: 87).  
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The four sisters and the diligent dozen 
In conservative circles, the four most traditionally important 
philanthropic foundations are a group called the “Four Sisters,” 
consisting of the John M. Olin Foundation, the Lynde and Harry Bradley 
Foundation, the Smith Richardson Foundation, and the Scaife 
Foundations (see Figure 10). While their conservative fortunes were 
dwarfed by larger foundations such as Ford and Rockefeller, the “four 
sisters” and other allied foundations targeted their money to ensure an 
outsized impact on national politics” (Meagher 2012:472). 
 
Figure 10. Sociogram of 2009 Interlocks of the “Four Sisters” Group 
of Conservative Philanthropic Foundations.  
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They are ideologically driven and focused, tending to support 
specific organizations rather than individual projects. This allows for 
stability and growth. In Table 5, a network can be discerned through 
director interlocks between the Four Sisters. Smith Richardson is 
isolated from the network, and only Bradley was represented at the 2010 
Koch meeting, but the degree to which the Four Sisters are embedded in  
 
 
 
Table 5. 2009 Assets and Contributions 
from the "Four Sisters" Conservative 
Philanthropic Foundations 
  
 
Four Sisters -  2009   
   
Foundation       Assets  Contributions 
Bradley   $622,913,819   $44,367,300  
Olin       $1,121,088     $1,280,748  
Scaife Foundations   
     Sarah Scaife  $243,990,427   $14,099,500  
     Scaife Family    $70,966,750     $2,644,684  
     Carthage    $24,309,711        $600,000  
Smith-Richardson $441,100,393    $21,741,648  
   
Totals   $1,404,402,188   $84,733,880  
Note: Data compiled from 2009 IRS 990 filings 
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the network, and are related to each other and to important nodes in the 
network through multiple director interlocks is easily visible. The 
“Diligent Dozen” refers to a slightly larger collection of philanthropic 
foundations especially dedicated to building and securing a permanent 
conservative topography of organizations in the ongoing war of ideas. In 
the words of one scholar who studies conservative philanthropy, “The 
philanthropic funding of an ideology -- its articulation and dissemination 
-- is rare, perhaps unprecedented in American politics. To have 
sustained the effort over decades must be unique. It was a brilliant 
strategy brilliantly executed…” (Behan 2003). This group includes The 
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, the Carthage Foundation, the 
Earhart Foundation, the Charles G. Koch, David H. Koch and Claude R. 
Lambe Charitable Foundations, the Phillip M. McKenna Foundation, the 
JM Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation23, the Henry Salvatori 
Foundation, the Sarah Scaife Foundation, and the Smith Richardson 
Foundation (see Figure 11). These organizations, as some of the largest of 
the ideologically and long-term strategically motivated foundations, “have 
been consistently bent on developing an agenda for the nation,” 
according to one researcher (Dowie 2001:XXII).  
                                                          
23 After 2005, the Diligent Dozen really became the Diligent Eleven. The John M. Olin 
Foundation, established in 1953 by John M. Olin with money he made in the chemical 
and defense industries, was closed. According to the Philanthropy Roundtable’s 
“Philanthropy Hall of Fame” article on John Olin, “Before he died in 1982, he instructed 
his foundation to spend itself out of existence within a generation of his passing” in 
order to avoid “wandering goals and a disconnection from the donor’s intent.” (Miller 
2006) it spent its assets over the next few years. 
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Figure 11. Sociogram of 2009 Interlocks of the “The Diligent Dozen” 
Group of Conservative Philanthropic Foundations   
 
 
 
The 2009 assets of this group total over $1.8 billion (see Table 6). Total 
2009 giving was over $107 million in 2009, led by Bradley at $44 million 
and Smith-Richardson at $21 million.  
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Table 6. 2009 Assets and Contributions 
from the "Diligent Dozen" Conservative 
Philanthropic Foundations 
  
Foundation Assets Contributions 
   
Bradley     $622,913,819  $44,367,300  
   
Olin          $1,121,088    $1,280,748  
   
Scaife Foundations   
     Sarah Scaife          $243,990,427  $14,099,500  
     Scaife Family      $70,966,750    $2,644,684  
     Carthage      $24,309,711       $600,000  
   
Smith-Richardson   $441,100,393  $21,741,648  
   
Henry Salvatori      $0         $0  
   
Phillip McKenna      $13,213,435       $461,650  
   
Koch Foundations  
     David H. Koch      $95,264,998         $0  
     Charles G. Koch   $206,497,763  $12,157,638  
     Lambe           $7,349,000    $2,713,796  
     Knowledge and Progress    $22,746,656           $0  
     Fred C. Koch      $31,850,374    $1,485,923  
   
JM Foundation      $22,314,527       $807,045  
   
Earhart Foundation     $35,165,196    $5,049,476  
   
Totals        $1,838,804,137    $107,409,408  
        
                          Note: Data compiled from 2009 IRS 990 filings  
 
 
Foundations are clearly a crucial component of this policy network, but 
not simply as funders. These organizations, as extensions of the 
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corporate community carry with them the corporate ideological stand on 
key issues; “they are not merely donors of money for charity and value-
free research…they are also program initiators” (Domhoff 2006:87).  
 
Other Major Ideological Funders 
In addition to the previously identified Four Sisters and Diligent 
Dozen, there are several philanthropic foundations worthy of mention in 
this network. The Searle Freedom Trust, founded by Daniel C. Searle in 
1998 to “foster research and education on public policy issues that affect 
individual freedom and economic liberty. Through its grant-making, the 
foundation seeks to develop solutions to the country’s most important 
and challenging domestic policy issues” (Searle Freedom Trust 2015). 
One of its main focuses is environmental policy, although like many 
funding organizations in the conservative policy network, the basic 
worldview drives funding towards small government and a focus on 
individual economic freedom governed almost exclusively by the market 
(Dennis n.d.). Guided for several years by Dan Searle himself, the Searle 
Freedom Trust has given millions to a broad range of conservative 
organizations (see Figure 12). In 2009, Searle Freedom Trust contributed 
over $7 million, including $1.5 million to the American Enterprise 
Institute, and six figure contributions to American Council for Capital 
Formation, American Council of Trustees and Alumni, American 
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Legislative Exchange Council, Buckeye Institute for Public Policy 
Solutions, Cato Institute, Center for Competitive Politics, Competitive 
Enterprise Institute, Galen Institute, Heartland Institute, Institute for 
Humane Studies, Institute for Justice, Manhattan Institute for  Policy 
Research, Mercatus Center, Pacific Research Institute, Property & 
Environment Research Center, Reason Foundation, State Policy Network, 
Tax Foundation, The Federalist Society, and The Heritage Foundation. 
Approximately a dozen other organizations received contributions 
between $10,000 and $99,000. The public received a rare view into the 
processes of funding the projects proposed within the conservative policy 
network when the 2013 “Searle Tax and Budget Grant Proposals” 
document become public (State Policy Network 2013). Ed Pilkington and 
Suzanne Goldenberg reported in the Guardian in 2013 that the Searle 
projects reflected a “coordinated assault against public sector rights and 
services in the key areas of education, healthcare, income tax, workers' 
compensation and the environment…” (Pilkington and Goldenberg 2013).  
Among other proposals was a request from the Beacon Hill Institute 
which requested $38,825 from Searle: 
to weaken or roll back a five-year effort by states in the 
region to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The institute 
said it would carry out research into the economic impact of 
the cap-and-trade system operating in nine states known as 
the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative. BHI appeared to 
have already arrived at its conclusions in advance, admitting 
from the outset that the aim of the research was to arm 
opponents of cap-and-trade with data for their arguments, 
and to weaken or destroy the initiative. "Success will take 
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the form of media recognition, dissemination to 
stakeholders, and legislative activity that will pare back or 
repeal RGGI," the funding proposal says. (Pilkington and 
Goldenberg 2013) 
 
These foundations provide a steady flow of dollars, donated for general 
purposes rather than for specific projects, usually, allowing think tanks 
to compete with each other based on results and potential for results and 
ideological alignment.  
 
 
Figure 12. Sociogram of Searle Freedom Trust 2009 Donations to 
Conservative Policy Organizations 
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Policy Discussion Groups 
Policy discussion groups include the organizations most often 
associated with corporate power in the US, such as the US Chamber of 
Commerce (CoC) and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), 
and less well-known organizations such as the Business Roundtable 
(BR), which all unapologetically fight for corporate interests. These 
entities are tied directly in to governmental decision-making through 
advisory groups, as well as through the advocacy and lobbying arms of 
their member companies and individuals (see Figure 13). Others are 
thought of as more scholarly bodies, such as Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR) or the Committee for Economic Development (CED). 
These organizations portray themselves as non-partisan, though their 
interests align closely with corporate needs and wants, and therefore 
with the conservative political groups who are for the most part corporate 
and foundation funded. Interlocks provide communication patterns and 
relationships that facilitate ideological agreement (Burris 2008). 
According to Val Burris, we should expect interlocks in these 
organizations because,  
to the extent that ideological criteria are operative in the 
selection of directors, we would also expect ideologically 
similar organizations to draw from a common pool of 
potential directors, thereby increasing the likelihood of board 
overlaps…dependence on common sources of funding may 
also bring with it a shared interest or obligation to appoint 
some of the same individuals to directorships (Burris 
2008:12).  
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Figure 13. Sociogram of 2009 Interlocks among Burris 12 Influential 
Policy Organizations  
 
 
These organizations share leadership, both with each other and 
with corporate America, as well as the social upper class (see Figure 14). 
This results in ideological consistency going in both directions—directors 
being influenced by each other and taking on those views to their other 
organizations and groups, as well as bringing their own ideological views 
with them to their boards and sharing them with their fellow directors.  
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Figure 14. Sociogram of 2009 Board Interlocks of the Directors of 8 
Key Discussion Groups (Aspen, CED, BC, CB, Bild, CFR, Trilateral, 
BR) 
 
As the express purpose of discussion groups is to generate 
consensus, it should be no surprise that they are so embedded into the 
network. In Figure 14, it is apparent that the eight major policy 
discussion groups are not only related to each other, sharing common 
leadership amongst themselves, but also interfacing directly with a large 
number of other types of organizations. First of all, some of the key 
philanthropic foundations are represented, including the Rockefeller 
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foundations, the Gates Foundation, David Koch, as well as a new 
generation of wealthy corporate interests, including Henry Kravis, Steve 
Bechtel and the Pritzker Family Foundation. In all, 28 foundations form 
the wider conservative policy network are networked in. Key think tanks 
are also well-represented, including American Enterprise Institute, 
Hudson Institute, Hoover, Brookings Institute, Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Cato, as well as smaller organizations from the 
libertarian, “free market” sector, such as the Reason Foundation, 
American Council for Capital Formation, and Citizens Against 
Government Waste.  
The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) was founded in 1921. 
Though it nominally takes no institutional positions on policy and is a 
non-partisan organization, CFR is not neutral. It describes itself as 
an independent, nonpartisan membership organization, 
think tank, and publisher dedicated to being a resource for 
its members, government officials, business executives, 
journalists, educators and students, civic and religious 
leaders, and other interested citizens in order to help them 
better understand the world and the foreign policy choices 
facing the United States and other countries. (Council on 
Foreign Relations 2015) 
 
The CFR, as one of the oldest organizations of its type, has become 
deeply entrenched with corporate interests, and is highly embedded 
within the wider conservative policy network (see Figure 14). It shares 
leadership not only with similar discussion groups, such as Trilateral 
Commission and the Bilderberg Group, but also with key philanthropic 
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foundations, think tanks, and the most influential business advocacy 
groups, such as Business Roundtable and Business Coalition (see Figure 
15). 
 
Figure 15. Sociogram of 2009 Board Interlocks in the Policy 
Network of the Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations  
 
 
 
In the 20th century, the CFR was an important core of the conservative 
network, especially concerning foreign policy matters. In fact, one think 
tank scholar describes CFR as playing “a significant role in defining 
consensus in the US” (Smith 1991:283). As both a research center and a 
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membership organization, it is well-positioned to bring people together, 
developing consensus ideologically and practically, with developed policy 
proposals based on its own research (Smith 1991:283).  
The Aspen Institute is an educational, and policy studies, and 
discussion organization based in Washington, D.C., seeking to “foster 
leadership based on enduring values and to provide a nonpartisan venue 
for dealing with critical issues” (Aspen Foundation 2015). Chicago 
businessman Walter Paepcke (1896-1960), chairman of the Container 
Corporation of America, created what is now the Aspen Institute (Aspen 
Foundation 2015a). A special mission of the Institute is to put on focused 
seminars aimed at helping participants “reflect on what they think 
makes a good society, thereby deepening knowledge, broadening 
perspectives and enhancing their capacity to solve the problems leaders 
face” (Aspen Foundation 2015b). It also sponsored semi-autonomous 
policy programs “which serve as nonpartisan forums for analysis, 
consensus building, and problem solving on a wide variety of issues 
(Aspen Foundation 2015b).  Since its founding, the Institute has 
“preserved its synthesis of elite leadership, commerce, politics, and the 
arts that emerged from the big ideas and open markets of the mid-
century University of Chicago” (Moser 2012), and this blend of upper 
class, corporate class and policy elites (with some additional members 
form the arts) can be seen in the board of directors of the organization. 
Besides David Koch, with network connections to eight other 
122 
organizations in the wider conservative network, there are 20 directors 
with at least one network tie, including former congressman Vin Weber 
(director of Council on Foreign relations, American Action Network, ITT 
Education, Seed Foundation, and NPR, among several other prestigious 
current and former connections) with six, political insider Fred Malek 
(Founder of American Action Network, present or former director of 
Northwest Air, US Military Academy, DuPont, Council on Foreign 
Relations, Marriott, and several other major organizations) with five, 
financier and political insider Stephen Friedman (director of Council on 
Foreign Relations, and present or former director of Fannie Mae, 
Walmart, Goldman Sachs, and many other influential corporations and 
organizations) with three, and Sidney Harman (died in 2011 at age 92, 
but who had been owner of Harman Media, and although Forbes 
featured a headline reading “Sidney Harman Ain’t No Billionaire” in 
2010, it also noted that his $500 million fortune was not “chump 
change” [Barrett 2010]) also with three connections (also, see Figure 16). 
These entities—think tanks, policy discussion groups, and 
philanthropic foundations—make up a discernible network through 
director interlocks (Burris 2008:3). The directors of these organizations 
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Figure 16. Sociogram of Board Interlocks in the Policy Network of 
2009 Directors of Aspen Institute 
 
 
share a variety of attributes. Highly educated, wealthy, participants in a 
common pool of charitable and recreational activities, members of the 
same clubs and attending the same meetings, these directors make up 
what C. Wright Mills called the “power elite.” Although directors often 
change from year to year, continuity is kept through a solid interlock of 
many organizations, even though specific relationships between 
organizations may change. Directors retire or die, and are replaced by a 
new generation.   
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Meetings are important coordinating tools, allowing for face to face 
discussion and problem solving both on practical matters of tactics and 
funding, as well as generating ideological compromises and, ultimately, 
some degree of consistency. If those who wield power in the public 
sphere can come together to iron out difficulties and discuss 
disagreements at face to face meetings, it, (in the words of former 
Director-General of the World Trade Organization Pascal Lamy),  
removes the political dimension from government…Governance 
[becomes] a decision-making process that through consultation, 
dialogue, exchange and mutual respect, seeks to ensure coexistence and 
in some cases coherence between different and sometimes divergent 
points of view. This involves seeking some common ground and 
extending it to the point where joint action can be envisaged. (World 
Trade Organization 2006) 
 
Actual meeting events, where members of the elite can mix and talk, 
generate the possibilities for building and strengthening consensus, as 
well as providing opportunities for funding and coordinating strategy and 
tactics. 
 
Heartland Meetings 
A participant list of the 2009 Heartland meeting, as has been the 
case throughout the history of the event, serves as a “who’s who” of 
climate science denial (see Figure 17). The conference is primarily 
national but also includes representatives from international groups, as  
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Blue = sponsor     Red = presenters   Green = both sponsor and presenter       
 
 
Figure 17. Sociogram of Sponsors and Presenters of 2009 Heartland 
NIPCC Meeting (SourceWatch 2015c) 
 
well as prominent climate science deniers from Australia and Canada, 
among other nations. The programs and agendas from the meetings 
indicate a steady stream of presentations attacking climate science from 
almost every possible angle. According to the New York Times, over 600 
“skeptics” attended the 2009 meeting, ranging from astronauts to 
international politicians, to film makers, but there was a scarcity of 
actual climate scientists present (Revkin 2009). Revkin also notes that, 
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according to organizers, the meeting was intended to “synchronize” the 
arguments and tactics used to fight climate action. Richard S. Lindzen, a 
prominent skeptic and one of the few who is actually a climate scientist, 
argued that skeptics needed to jettison arguments that weren’t based on 
sound science, saying that is “asking for trouble.” In addition, 
S. Fred Singer, a physicist often referred to by critics and 
supporters alike as the dean of climate contrarians, said that 
he would be running public and private sessions on Monday 
aimed at focusing participants on which skeptical arguments 
were supported by science and which were not. (Revkin 
2009) 
 
 
2010 speakers included evangelical Christian Calvin Beisner, who 
has spoken at several of the conferences. Beisner’s argument is that poor 
people in developing countries will be hurt by switching the world’s 
economies from fossil fuels, making the fight against global warming a 
fight against the poor around the world.  This has become one strand in 
the denial repertoire, one used emotionally by Lord Monckton as he 
delivered the final presentation of the 2010 meeting. Lord Monckton 
closed his speech by making two points: one, that “science and 
economics cannot be divorced from politics,” seems to be true though not 
perhaps exactly in the way he meant it, and secondly, that efforts to fight 
global warming through limiting carbon emissions is “nothing less than 
an attempt by the rich and powerful to take away the chance for the little 
guy to face up to the big guy” (Thorner 2010).  
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This 2010 meeting included an unrelenting attack on science 
and scientists. One attendee listed the points that speakers made:  
Weather stations can no longer be trusted…The billions of 
dollars spent by government and others to fund science just 
perpetuates problems rather than solving them…The public 
is susceptible to scare tactics: Silent Spring, by Rachel 
Carson, published in September of 1962, helped to start the 
environmental movement…Computer models are not 
reliable…Peer review is a way of screening out opposing 
views…Science education is in a general decline. Students 
are taught that science is based on evidence, and yet all they 
are presented are inaccurate models. (Thorner 2010)   
 
So doubting the science is clearly a mainstay tactic of climate 
denial as expressed at the Heartland meetings.  
 
The Upper Class 
The upper class is a central part of Domhoff’s conception of the 
policy planning network (Domhoff 2006:105). Members of the upper class 
have material reasons for holding conservative ideological views; the 
system has treated them well, and the continuation of the status quo 
should generally suit their interests well. This does not mean that they 
always agree with each other about every bit of regulation or legislation, 
in fact it is inevitable that they will disagree about some things. But the 
clubs, boards, and corporate activities that these upper class individuals 
participate in serve the purpose (in addition to the manifest purpose of 
those activities) of integrating their individual behavior into class 
behavior. It is the networks in which they play a part that allows for class 
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unity. The upper class is already fairly well-connected but events such as 
the Koch meetings increase that connectivity in important ways.  
For example, in the figure above (Figure 17) the networks 
relationships around billionaire attendees of the 2010 Koch meeting and 
the interlocking nature of the boards on which they sit is clear. In fact, 
only three billionaires are unconnected in this small network, but a 
serious increase in the connectivity can be clearly seen when the 2010 
event is added to the network below (see Figure 18). 
 
Figure 18. Sociogram of Board Interlocks of 2009 Directors of 
Billionaire Koch Meeting Attendee Foundations 
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Fossil Fuels Industry 
As mentioned above, the fossil fuels industry is powerful and rich. 
It is well organized within itself and is tied into the political landscape, 
especially at the national level. Through key hubs, especially the Kochs 
as documented in this study, the fossil fuels network is connected to the 
wider conservative networks, and is able to stake its denial position as 
part of the basic conservative ideological stance shared to a great extent 
by all the sectors of the Right. Even using a very broad description of 
“fossil fuels industry,”24 oil and gas industry leaders are not well-
connected; if the Kochs and the Rockefeller foundations are removed, 
there remain few connections. Hoover, Cato, Brookings, Business 
Roundtable are all connected to the main advisory and trade associations 
affiliated with the fossil fuels industry, but most of the conservative think 
tanks are outside this network, as are the “Diligent Dozen” foundations, 
and the majority of billionaire directed foundations (see Figure 19). In 
fact—ironically—the fossil fuels industry is not connected to the “Denial 
35” organizations except through the Kochs and the Koch network. 
                                                          
24 For Figure 18, I included individuals from any entity in the fossil fuels industry, or 
affiliated with a philanthropic foundation whose wealth was based on the fossil fuels 
industry. This is helpful for possible connections but also suggests ideological positions 
that may not be present. A clear example would be the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 
which recently announced its decision to divest from fossil fuels investments 
(Rockefeller Brothers Fund 2014). 
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Figure 19. Sociogram of Board Interlocks of 2009 Directors of Fossil 
Fuels Industry-Affiliated Trade Associations and Advisory 
Committees 
 
 
 
Conservative Ideology Brokers 
William Domhoff (2006) shows how the “opinion-shaping process”, 
involving the media, PR firms, public affairs departments of major 
corporations, and middle-class voluntary associations of various types, 
helps diffuse and strengthen public opinion on important ideological 
tenets. There is a well-connected network of such ideology-strengthening 
organizations knitted into the wider policy planning network. Domhoff 
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defines “ideology” as a “complex set of rationales and rationalizations 
through which a group, class, or nation interprets the world and justifies 
its actions” (Domhoff 2006:113). Perhaps the most important success 
scored by the climate change science denial network to date has been its 
ability to make climate change denial an integral part of a conservative 
mindset. Climate change denial has become an even more pervasive 
litmus test issue among conservative politicians, cadre, and rank and file 
Republican Party members than even anti-abortionism, creationism, or 
school choice, causing conservative politicians who wish to avoid being 
“primaried” to backpedal (Dunlap and McCright 2011:154).  
This is the result of a complex and somewhat chaotic set of 
processes, but it is still possible to trace the influence of the efforts of the 
network in several ways. First of all, politicians often need an ideological 
support for these kinds of public stands. Americans—including 
Republicans—can be suspicious of politicians taking stands on issues 
that seem to favor campaign contributors or big industry in general. 
Climate change denial fits well within existing conservative ideological 
stances, and is particularly likely to be attractive to conservatives in light 
of the positioning of Al Gore as climate change’s champion and public 
face, and Gore’s status as one of the biggest bogeymen in contemporary 
American politics. As the problem of climate change is so comprehensive, 
it is easier to simply deny the problem than to entertain the ideologically 
unacceptable policy alternatives: “a bigger government”, “increased 
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government regulation of industry”, “redistribution of corporate profits”, 
and other ultraconservative “no-nos.” so, not only does the denial of 
climate science fit the needs of the fossil fuels industry, at the core of the 
network (along with finance, banking, “mainstream corporate America”, 
etc.), but it also dovetails nicely with corporate ideological needs as well. 
Think tanks give politicians this cover, by financing and arranging for the 
writing, publishing, and distribution of a wide range of climate science 
denial literature. This spectrum of materials ranges from references in 
the popular press and on TV, in movies and literature, in magazines and 
popular journals, elite journals and policy periodicals, and in formal 
scholarly articles and policy pieces.  
As far as the diffusion of this ideological plank in the 
ultraconservative platform goes, the embeddedness of climate science 
deniers in the wider conservative network of think tanks, foundations, 
and policy discussion organizations is clearly traceable (see Figures 22 
and 23). The many weak ties of members of the network reflect a wide 
spread of ideological constructs. Roelofs (2007) discusses key national 
and international organizations that are prime conduits for the diffusion 
of ideology: specifically, these include the Bilderberg Group,25 the 
Trilateral Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, Center for 
                                                          
25 It is also sometimes referred to as the Bilderberg meetings, Bilderberg Conference, or 
Bilderberg Club. 
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Strategic and International Studies, and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.  
There is a widespread network of conservative organizations spread 
across the spectrum of issues of the day and across the expanse of the 
50 states. Power elite theorists have found that the essence of class 
remains material interests, but that a common set of values that are 
often shared through shared institutions, activities, and memberships 
helps create a more or less all-encompassing ideological worldview. An 
ideal example might include all the planks of recent libertarian-
dominated campaign planks, including blind faith in the free market, 
and focusing on values such as self-reliance, small government, and an 
anti-regulatory, pro-business laisse faire approach to corporations and 
their products and services. Social issues such as abortion and religious 
freedom remain viable but optional as components of this ideology, while 
the new, bedrock component has become non-belief in climate science. 
Conservative organizations, including philanthropic foundations, 
think tanks and policy discussion groups are prime vectors for the 
diffusion of this ideological touchstone. These organizations are 
intimately networked with a host of individuals and organizations 
reflecting a material interest in denying climate science. For example, in 
Figure 20, a spectrum of organizations are clearly networked with the 
two main oil trade associations, the National Petroleum Council and the 
American Petroleum Institute. Included in this network are key 
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philanthropic foundations, powerful think tanks, and several of the most 
important policy discussion and commercial associations in the country. 
Although the organizations themselves are deeply embedded amongst 
themselves, they also maintain a vast array of ties extending outside the 
network, resulting in the possibility of widespread diffusion of climate 
science denial.  
 
Figure 20. Sociogram of Board Interlocks in the Policy Network of 
2009 Directors of “Ideology Broker” Discussion Groups (Bilderberg, 
Trilateral, CFR, CSIS) 
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Similarly, a look at the 24 most highly connected individuals in the 
policy planning network shows that the individuals themselves are highly 
embedded in a wide conservative network, but with very few overlaps (see 
Figure 22). These 24 individuals, then, constitute a highly connected core 
group, helping solidify conservative acceptance of climate science denial, 
among other ideological positions, as bedrock principle. As shown in 
Figure 21, the 90 board membership positions include the most powerful 
“boots on the ground” organization in conservative circles (Americans for 
Prosperity – see Chapter V), some of the most important philanthropic 
foundations in the movement (SFT, the Koch foundations, Scaife, 
Randolph, Humphreys, Pope, Olin, Chase), the key “dark money” 
organizations (DCF, DT, CPPR), the most respected think tanks (Hoover, 
Institute for Humane Studies, Aspen Institute, CSIS) and discussion 
groups (CFR, BC, BR, Bilderberg), the most radical think tanks (or “do-
tanks”: CRC, ACTA, NRW, ACCF), and key trade associations (CoC, 
NatPet, IIE, API). Powerful ultraconservative organizations such as the 
Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute, Club for Growth, and the John 
Locke Society are represented, as are key organizing entities such as the 
Philanthropy Roundtable and State Policy Network. Although there may 
be an underlying rift between libertarian or 
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Figure 21. Sociogram of the 16 Most Connected Individuals in the 
Wider Policy Network and Their Board Interlocks  
 
ultraconservative groups and old school “social values” groups, powerful 
forces from the old religious right are still embedded in this network, 
including Trinity Forum, American Civil Rights Union, Parents in Charge, 
as well as groups for women (Independent Women’s Forum) and for 
legalizing marijuana (MPP). Lastly, several regional or state groups, 
affiliated with the State Policy Network, are also directly represented in 
this group, including Freedom Minnesota and Pope Civitas.  
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Climate Denial Network 
The network of corporations and individuals materially interested 
in delaying and preventing legislative action on climate change funds and 
leads a network of policy organizations that includes groups with a wide 
variety of skill sets and focuses (see Figure 23). It also includes a media 
component composed of rightwing journalists trained and funded by 
several entities in the network, offering their on-the-scene reporting 
coverage to newspapers and media outlets. The key is to have all the 
resources necessary within the network. “The publicly and politically 
effective generation and peddling of knowledge relies on the ability to 
successfully combine expert, consulting, and lobbying/advocacy 
capacities” (Plehwe 2014:106), and this is what the Koch network puts 
together—a complete support system for the entities that can actually do 
the work, including training, funding, coordination, ideological 
consistency, books, movies and other materials, and mailing lists. About 
half the organizations I describe as part of the denial network are directly 
related through board director interlocks or through organizing meeting 
event attendance. Through 2009 funding, there is an even stronger sense 
that this group constitutes an organized core that works out the strategic 
directions carries out the bulk of the tactical work.  
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Figure 22. Sociogram of Board Interlocks of the Directors of the 
“Denial 35” 
 
 
Conservative policy network philanthropic foundations contributed 
over $54 million to the 35 denial network organizations in 2009, 
including $247,000 from ExxonMobil. Corporate and trade associations 
contributed $1.3 million, while donor-advised funds contributed almost 
$18 million, of which $11.5 million was funneled through Donors Trust 
and Donors Capital Fund, and another $2.25 million through Center for 
the Protection of Patient Rights (a little known Koch entity).  
 There are 345 family philanthropic foundations in the 2009 
conservative policy network, of which 219 contributed to at least one of 
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the organizations. These 219 foundations accounted for over $35.5 
million in contributions to the denial network. Of this, almost $15 million 
came from the top ten donors to these groups, with contributions 
ranging from $815,000 to $2,688,500.  These top donors consisted of 
Bradley, Searle Freedom Trust, Sarah Scaife, Dunn, Lambe, R & H 
DeVos, MJ Murdock, Howard, Templeton, and Simon. Of these top ten, 
half were represented at the 2010 Koch meeting. The next ninety highest 
donors accounted for another $17.4 million. Finally, of the $37 million 
coming from family philanthropic foundations, 12.8 million came from 
organizations represented at the 2010 Koch meeting. 
The Denial network is highly embedded within the wider 
conservative policy network (see Figure 24). Fully 80% of these 
organizations are directly tied to at least one other organization in the 
wider conservative networks, with only seven of the 35 completely 
unconnected to the wider network through board interlocks, and, of 
those, five receive substantial funding from philanthropic foundations in 
the network. The remaining two entities are quite small—the SAS and 
Just Facts are basically one person shops.  
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Figure 23. Sociogram of “Denial 35” Organizations Situated Within 
the Policy Network 
 
The fossil fuels and ideological activists in the network have 
worked out details for what they want to do and how they will fund it, 
but, as Dieter Plehwe notes, to “achieve such ends” they must “be 
employing appropriate organizations, such as consulting companies, 
foundations, or think tanks” (Plehwe 2014:107). Three organizations 
from this group can serve as examples of what kind of work gets done by 
the members of the denial network: the State Policy Network (SPN), the 
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American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), and Cascade Policy 
Institute.  
 
State Policy Network 
One of the most visible and important arms of the fossil fuels 
industries’ efforts to combat legislative action in the US is composed of 
state and regional organizations and their organizing and funding arms. 
Founded in 1992 by Republican activist Thomas Roe, a longtime director 
of the Heritage Foundation, the State Policy Network focuses on 
coordinating state think tank efforts to mirror the efforts on the national 
level by the major conservative think tanks, especially the Heritage 
Foundation. Today, SPN includes 59 state think tank members, with at 
least one organization in all 50 states. SPN lists more than 100 regular 
and associate member organizations which are “dedicated to advancing 
market-oriented public policy solutions” It describes its mission as a 
“capacity building service organization,” consisting of helping state-
oriented activists generate the capital, connections, and general know-
how to establish a “mini-Heritage Foundation” in their states (State 
Policy Network 2015). Roe was an early director of Heritage, and had 
founded the South Carolina Policy Center in 1986.  Roe was an early 
supporter of Ronald Reagan, and when Reagan’s “New Federalism” 
policies started rolling out, he realized that the states were as ill-
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equipped to enact meaningful reform as the federal government. When 
raising this issue with Reagan in 1992, Reagan reportedly told him to set 
up a mini-Heritage Foundation in each state (Sourcewatch 2013).   
Roe had made a fortune in lumber and then in 
telecommunications, and his charitable foundation, The Roe Foundation, 
has been one of the most consistent donors to a wide range of 
conservative causes, including regular six figure support for the State 
Policy Network. In 2009, The Roe Foundation, with assets held 
approaching $30 million, donated $1.3 million to 78 organizations in the 
conservative policy network, averaging over $17,000 per grant.  In 2013, 
the Foundation held assets of over $33 million, and gave out over $1.8 
million to a similar range of organizations. Clearly, when telling fellow 
wealthy conservative donor and Heritage Foundation trustee Robert 
Krieble "You capture the Soviet Union -- I'm going to capture the states," 
he was willing to put his money and his time and effort into doing just 
that (Wilce 2013). 
In 2009, SPN reported revenue of $4,480,000, mostly from grants, 
which it then turned around and used to help fund the state entities 
which it is comprised of. Its individual grant amounts ranged from $1000 
up to a high of $260,000 for a grant to the Idaho Freedom Foundation. 
SPN provides practical support to its members, who meet each year at 
SPN conferences and are required to disseminate all of their publications 
to other member groups SPN holds training sessions "to teach these 
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people how to run these things like franchises," according to one liberal 
admirer (Woods 2008). 
The SPN, by fostering a nationwide consortium of state-oriented 
think tanks, has developed an army of activists, tied in via a strong 
communications net, as well as interlocked through shared leadership 
(see Figure 24). SPN members pledge to uphold the organizations core 
principles of private property rights, competition and markets, personal 
responsibility, and limited government (State Policy Network 2015). 
Recent policy initiatives reflect the usual range of conservative positions, 
including rolling back unions, fighting healthcare reform (including 
anything remotely connected to or similar to Obamacare), cutting health 
and welfare benefits to the poor, fighting for vouchers and charter 
schools, and slashing state spending. The latter has taken the form of 
attempting to amend state constitutions (Kroll 2011, FCIR 2013). Climate 
change is also high on the list of issues addressed. 
The states have become a significant battleground for conservative 
efforts to fight climate change specifically, but also for many issues. Don 
E. Eberley, president of SPN's Pennsylvania affiliate, the Commonwealth 
Foundation for Public Policy Alternatives, tellingly said "We simply will 
not have power on the national level until we declare war on state 
legislatures” (Wilce 2013). Coordination between national efforts, state 
efforts, and those whose interests are at stake, and those who fund the 
efforts are therefore crucial. The SPN is highly connected with the wider  
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Figure 24. Sociogram of Board Interlocks of the 2009 Directors of 
the State Policy Network and State Organizations in the Policy 
Network 
 
network through director interlocks, and in addition to state think tanks 
as full members, the SPN also invites other organizations to participate 
as associate members. This list reads as a list of who’s who in 
conservative organizations, including Heritage, Cato, American 
Enterprise Institute, Americans for Prosperity, FreedomWorks, and 
funding organizations, such as Donors Trust, Philanthropy Roundtable, 
and Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation, and nearly every important 
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climate change denial organization, including Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, Heartland Institute, the American Tradition Institute (recently 
renamed the Energy & Environment Legal Institute), and Foundation for 
Research on Economics & the Environment (State Policy Network 2015a). 
It is not insignificant that three members of congress were past 
presidents of state organizations which were part of the State Policy 
Network: U.S. Representative Jeff Flake of Arizona, former president of 
the Goldwater Institute; U.S. Representative Mike Pence of Indiana, 
former head of the Indiana Policy Review Foundation, and Former U.S. 
Representative Tom Tancredo of Colorado, president of the Independence 
Institute during the 1990s. 
2009 director interlocks situate the State Policy Network within the 
wider conservative policy network (see Figure 25). It is linked with five 
national organizations, three state and regional organizations (who are 
also members), and nine funding entities, including DonorsTrust and 
Donors Capital, who provided $2.6 million (out of a total of $4.4 million 
in contributions received, or 60%) for the SPN itself, as well as 
substantial percentages—sometimes 90% or more—for the state entities.  
The SPN receives the bulk of its donations from anonymous 
donors. In 2009 it reported a total of about $4.2 million in contributions 
with over $3.3 million of that coming from organizations in the 
conservative network. Of that $2.5 million in 2009, $2.5 came from 
DonorsTrust and Donors Capital Fund. A couple dozen philanthropic  
146 
 
Blue = national policy organizations  
Green = state and regional organizations 
Red = philanthropic foundations 
Yellow = 2010 Koch coordinating meeting 
 
 
Figure 25. Sociogram of Board Interlocks of the 2009 Directors of 
the State Policy Network Director Interlocks with the Policy 
Network 
 
foundations combined for about $800,000 in contributions, including the 
Roe, Chase, Bradley, JM, Pope, Hume, the Coors foundations, and the 
Searle Freedom Trust.  
Sometimes the smaller state organizations can be quicker to jump 
on political opportunities. For example, when Al Gore received an Oscar 
for An Inconvenient Truth, members of the Tennessee Policy Center for 
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Policy Research immediately obtained access to Gore’s home electricity 
bills which showed that the mansion used more electricity in one month 
than the average Tennessee home used in a year. The resulting echoing 
of the story in the rightwing chamber of talk radio, blogs and even in 
think tank communications, has resounded to this day. It certainly 
robbed Gore of his “victory lap” (Miller 2009).   
Like many of the organizations involved in denying climate science, 
the SPN has deeply intertwined roots with the tobacco industry. As one 
investigative journalist noted: 
Though [already] backed by some of the largest Republican 
donors in the country, including the Coors family and 
Richard Mellon Scaife, SPN also thrived in the 1990s by 
assisting the tobacco industry in packaging its resistance to 
tobacco taxes and health regulations as part of a "freedom 
agenda" for conservatives. (Fang 2013)  
 
 
An examination of the inadvertently published records of donors to the 
Texas Public Policy Foundation in 2012 reveals several interesting 
insights into the processes behind these organizations.26 First of all, as 
the TPPF’s website explained at the time, large donors are able to attend 
and contribute to Foundation board meetings, and to meet one-on-one 
with the Foundation’s leadership to discuss issues (Wilder 2012). So, 
according to the donor list, Koch Industries, State Policy Network, and 
                                                          
26 Through a clerical error, the spreadsheet listing all 2012 donors was published online 
by Guidestar. Although quickly removed, it was downloaded and made available on the 
internet (Wilder 2012). 
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the Pew Charitable Trusts were allowed access to the board and  to the 
Foundation President. The 129 included many of the most important 
energy companies of the region, including Koch, ExxonMobil, 
ConocoPhillips, Chevron, Devon Energy and many other, while individual 
donors included a dozen of the richest men in Texas. TPPF policies reflect 
donor needs—energy companies are fighting for less regulation (along 
with insurance companies, telecommunications firms, and other large 
corporate interests), private prison corporations seek contracts and 
stricter laws including more prison time, and TPPF fights for just those 
kinds of issues (Wilder 2012). It is not surprising to find that Altria and 
RJ Reynolds both also fund the TPPF, as the tobacco industry has a long 
history of working with the state Policy Network, and the state 
organizations themselves.  
 Analysis of recent tax filings, and work published by investigative 
journalists, indicates that there is a strong relationship between the 
State Policy Network, its affiliated state organizations, and the American 
Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC). The Center for Media and 
Democracy’s “SourceWatch” project has traced connections between the 
SPN and  ALEC, and between ALEC and 31 of the affiliated state 
organization (SourceWatch 2015b). Although Tracie Sharp, the longtime 
president of SPN likes to claim that the state organizations are “fiercely 
independent,” the truth is that behind closed doors she describes the 
SPN model as akin to IKEA. She compares the resources available 
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through the SPN as a shopping list of projects available to state 
organizations, from which they could pick and choose.  She also 
indicated that these issues were handpicked by the big donors behind 
both the SPN and ALEC (Mayer 2013).  
 
American Legislative Exchange Council 
The American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) was founded in 
1973, out of a meeting including behind-the-scenes conservative activist 
Paul Weyrich, Lou Barnett, a former campaign official for Ronald Reagan 
in his recent Presidential campaign, and a group of state  legislators 
including Illinois state Representative Henry Hyde (Shelden 2011:3). 
Those involved in the formative years included future governors or 
members of congress such as Robert Kasten, Tommy Thompson, John 
Engler, Terry Branstad, and John Kasich, as well as John Buckley, Jesse 
Helms, Phil Crane, and Jack Kemp, all conservative activist politicians 
(American Legislative Exchange Council 2015). The early focus was on 
Reagan’s initiatives devolving authority to the states and away from the 
federal government. Although early efforts reflected ALEC’s status as a 
“clearinghouse” for ideas, it became more activist as time went on. It now 
refers to itself as a “freestanding think tank” centered around policy task 
forces composed of both private members (consisting of representatives 
from interested corporate members) and legislative representatives, 
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generally from states heavily involved in the issues involved. ALEC 
describes on its website its “long-time philosophy that the private sector 
should be an ally rather than an adversary in developing sound public 
policy” (American Legislative Exchange Council 2015a).  
ALEC is governed by a board of directors composed of politicians 
from the various states (American Legislative Exchange Council 2015c). 
For example, the current National Chair is Representative Phil King from 
Texas, and Representative Linda Upmeyer from Iowa is Immediate Past 
Chair. The organization also includes a “Private Enterprise Advisory 
Council” composed of representatives from the corporate world. 
Currently represented on this Board are the trade associations such as 
the American Bail Coalition, the pharmaceutical association “Phrma”, 
and the National Federation of Independent Business, as well as large 
individual corporations such as ExxonMobil, Pfizer, ATT, Koch, Altria, 
UPS, and national insurance companies (American Legislative Exchange 
Council 2015b). Past board members have also included representatives 
from ExxonMobil and Koch Industries and its subsidiaries, as well as 
several coal and energy companies, including Peabody. The energy task 
force includes several representatives from the fossil fuels industries, 
including its chair, from the American Gas Association.  Other ALEC 
members include: Chevron, BP America. While governance is shared, 
funding is almost 100% corporate (SourceWatch 2015b). 
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ALEC is aggressively re-writing the laws on the books in the states. 
It estimates that it has “considered, written and approved hundreds of 
model policies on a wide range of issues, model policy that will frame the 
debate today and far into the future. Each year, close to 1,000 bills, 
based at least in part on ALEC Model Legislation, are introduced in the 
states. Of these, an average of 20 percent become law” (American 
Legislative Exchange Council 2015a). 
ALEC is a central member of the conservative network, receiving 
massive support every year for decades from a wide range of members. 
Early supporters included the Edison Electric Institute, Proctor & 
Gamble, Eli Lilly, Coors, and ARCO Petroleum. Donald Rumsfeld was a 
1980s eras Chairman of the ALEC Business Policy board (SourceWatch 
2015b). in 2009, it reported $82,891 in legislative dues27 from politician 
members, and $6.1 million in corporate dues. ALEC receives substantial 
funding from fossil fuels interests specifically. It collected at least 
$600,000 from Koch Industries and affiliated organizations between 
1997 and 2009, as well as $1.4 million from ExxonMobil since 1998.  
ALEC gives corporate interests a semi-independent voice to 
trumpet its policies and values. We have already seen how ALEC works 
with the State Policy Network to effect legislation. It is also able to push 
legislation directly from corporate interests to state capitols buildings all 
                                                          
27 ALEC wrote off more in bad debt in 2009 ($100,000) than it received in legislative 
dues (SourceWatch 2015b). 
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over the country. Since its inception, ALEC has been a major weapon at 
the state level in corporate efforts to push their agenda. ALEC has fought 
against the Kyoto Treaty and against regional greenhouse gas 
agreements in the US. But is has been even more effective in gaining the 
small victories that make a meaningful response to climate change 
virtually impossible at the state level. ALEC has spent a great amount of 
its time and resources on promoting off-shore drilling, legislation 
protecting and mystifying the fracking process, opening new lands to 
drilling and prospecting, as well as fighting against fuel standards and 
operating almost as an energy association PR organ in fighting virtually 
every piece of legislation attempting to regulate fossil fuels corporations. 
For example, 29 states have now established targeted minimums 
for the generation of electricity from renewable sources. ALEC is leading 
the charge against these laws, in conjunction with national groups like 
Americans for Prosperity and state groups as coordinated through State 
Policy Network. Its Energy Task Force, in conjunction with the Heartland 
Institute, generated a model bill (the “Electricity Freedom Act”) in 2012 
that would eliminate these standards. According to ALEC, 31 bills based 
on the Electricity Freedom Act model have been submitted, and the first 
was passed, in the state of Ohio. The Ohio bill was introduced by Bill 
Seitz who sits on the ALEC national board (Surgey 2014). ALEC rolled 
out members to fight back against solar energy for homeowners as well. 
It produced model bills, and tactical session aimed at blocking and 
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rolling back state efforts to jumpstart solar units for homeowners and 
small businesses. Its latest effort is a model bill to increase the costs to 
homeowners of installing solar units.  
On December 7, 2009, President Obama’s EPA made a crucial 
finding—that the “current and projected concentrations of the six key 
well-mixed greenhouse gases -- carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), 
nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons 
(PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) -- in the atmosphere threaten the 
public health and welfare of current and future generations” 
(Environmental Protection Agency 2009). This finding then required EPA 
to regulate the emission of those gases. It didn’t take ALEC long 
formulate a response. In 2010, it sponsored a policy convention on the 
“coming regulatory train wreck.” Sessions included criticism of the EPA’s 
right to regulate these gases, as well as proposals for legislation that 
would fight it. On a website it hosts called “regulatorytrainwreck.com” it 
provides “legislation to consider, including bills that would defund EPA if 
necessary, to stop it from regulating greenhouse gases, would impose a 
two year moratorium on any regulatory legislation that would address 
anything to do with air quality, as well as delaying tactics such as 
requiring the government to conduct a “complete” study of EPA and its 
effect on competitiveness, jobs, and on the economy writ large. In 2011, 
Indiana become the first state to pass one of these bills—a resolution 
addressing EPA’s ability to regulate greenhouse gases, and defunding 
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EPA if necessary (American Legislative Exchange Council 2011). In 2011, 
several other states passed resolutions similar to the Indiana resolution 
(Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North 
Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming). Several 
more had resolutions introduced that have not yet passed (Alaska, 
Florida Illinois, Minnesota, Ohio and Oklahoma) (American Legislative 
Exchange Council 2011). 
Although the climate denial network was successful in its effort to 
prevent US entry into the Kyoto accords, states and regions have been 
entering into voluntary agreements with each other in the years since 
then. ALEC has provided the model bills for climate deniers to fight back. 
Even as efforts such as the Northeast/Atlantic states regional agreement 
and the Western regional Initiative become solidified, efforts were 
underway to defund or legislate them out of existence. ALEC’s model 
resolution urged governors to withdraw their states from these 
agreements, scoring a key victory with Governor Jan Brewer’s withdrawal 
of Arizona from the Western Initiative in 2010. Brewer had been a 
member of ALEC as a legislator herself. 
ALEC teamed up with the Tea Party group FreedomWorks to point 
to “grassroots” support for a bill delaying enactment of any EPA 
regulations involving greenhouse gasses. The bill, H.R. 2401 “The 
Transparency in Regulatory Analysis Impacts on the Nation Act of 2011”, 
was passed in the House in September 2011 with the help of 
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FreedomWorks efforts, including legislator phone calls (FreedomWorks 
2012).  
Even though the ALEC model is one of cooperation and 
collaboration between legislators and corporate interests, in practice the 
relationship seems much more like straightforward influence peddling. 
For example, at a recent conference, one third of the sponsors were 
energy companies (Johnson 2013), and at another recent ALEC 
convention, it cost corporate-funded think tanks a substantial amount to 
host break-out sessions. In the 2013 meetings, Committee For a 
Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT), a notorious denialist organization, paid 
$40,000 to host a session called “How to Think and Talk About Climate 
and Energy Issues” (Johnson 2013). At that same convention’s Energy, 
Environment and Agriculture task force meeting, the Heartland 
Institute’s President Joe Bast briefed legislators on the (supposed) lies of 
climate scientists. The 2011 meeting featured a session titled “Warming 
Up to Climate Change: The Many Benefits of Increased Atmospheric 
CO2” (Johnson 2013).  
 
Cascade Policy Institute 
Cascade Policy Institute, formed in 1991 in Oregon, is a good 
example of the state policy institute’s role in the climate denial network. 
Funded by some of the same philanthropic foundations as the major 
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think tanks, these small, state and regionally oriented institutes are able 
to take the lead on more questionable projects, where the major players 
can bankroll and help produce, but giving themselves deniability. 
Cascade has a history of battling for free markets solutions through 
artfully framed opinion pieces, talk show appearances by Institute staff, 
and policy development and criticism. Although nominally non-partisan, 
Cascade supports limited government, personal responsibility, free 
markets, and privatization efforts similar to other organizations in the 
network. It produces policy papers, writes and distributes a quarterly 
report to legislators, and its members provide commentary on a variety of 
media on a wide spectrum of topics, including education, transportation, 
fiscal policy, health care, social services and of course, the environment. 
The Institute also hosts and attends regional and national meetings, 
often overwhelmingly attended by other members of the network, as well 
as organizing community educational events. It is a member of the State 
Policy network.  
Though non-partisan, as almost every member of the network 
claims it to be, it is composed of conservative activists who come from 
and go on to work for far right candidates and for other far right 
organizations. Former vice president and environmental editor Todd 
Wynn is a good example. Joining Cascade as an analyst in 2008, Wynn 
holds a master’s degree in economics. He moved up to environmental 
editor and vice president of Cascade in 2010, but left to work for ALEC in 
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2011. He spoke at the Heartland Institute’s 7th International Conference 
on Climate Change in 2012, and on climate change to the Annual 
Meeting for State Policy Network in 2014 (State Policy Network 2014). 
During this time, he was also listed as a “research fellow” at the 
American Tradition Institute. In 2013, he joined the Edison Electric 
Institute, the power generating industry trade association (Wynn 2015, 
Cascade Policy Institute 2015).  
Although Cascade describes its funding coming from a 
combination of “Generous contributions from individuals, businesses, 
and foundations” (Cascade Policy Institute 2015), the reality is a bit more 
one-sided: out of a reported total of $886,000 in contributions for 2009, 
$423,000 (almost half) came through Donors Capital Fund. Hume, Roe, 
Chase, and a couple other philanthropic foundations in the conservative 
network together contributed another $200,000, making up about 75% 
of its 2009 funding. 
Sensing that climate change and the 2009 battle over cap and 
trade would take center stage in the free market landscape, Cascade 
promoted research analyst Todd Wynn to Vice President and helped put 
together a consortium of climate denial organizations to produce a video 
titled “Climate Chains” (Cascade Policy Institute 2015c). The short (22 
minutes) film includes commentary and appearances from some of the 
major climate deniers in the US, including Marlo Lewis, Chris Horner, 
and Patrick Michaels. The organizations involved in the production of the 
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film include the Heritage Foundation, The Competitive Enterprise 
Institute, the American Enterprise Institute, and the Evergreen Freedom 
Foundation.  
One youtube channel, hosted by rightwing pastor Dave Flang, 
includes the video, uploaded on October 17, 2009, and shows over 
16,000 views as of September 29, 2014 (Flang 2015). The trailer, 
uploaded August 22, 2009 to the official “Climate Chains” youtube 
channel, has been viewed over 21,000 times. 
The film was the product of the Cascade Policy Institute directly, 
but at least ten other organizations involved in the climate change denial 
network had a hand in its making (see Figure 26). Philanthropic 
foundations including the Hume, Chase, M.J. Murdock, and Roe 
Foundations, as well as Donors Trust and Donors Capital Fund 
contributed towards Cascade’s budget that year. The State Policy 
Network and some of the biggest members of the network were also 
directly involved, including Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise 
Institute, and Competitive Enterprise Institute, as well as the Evergreen 
Freedom Foundation, a state-oriented think tank in the state of 
Washington. Most of these organizations are interlocked by sharing 
common directors, and eight of these organizations had board members 
attending the 2010 Koch strategy and fund raising meeting in Aspen, 
including the Hume, Murdock, Chase, and Roe Foundations, Donors 
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Trust/DCF, and the three major think tanks (Heritage, AEI, CEI). (See 
Figure 26 below) 
 
Figure 26. Sociogram of Personnel and Financial Contributions from 
Koch Meeting Attendees to Cascade Institute’s Climate Chains 
Video  
 
 
Many of the organizations and individuals in the Climate Chains film 
were also players in the tobacco regulation battle. The conservative policy 
network seems to incorporate an institutional memory. Corporate 
interests learn lessons from past regularity and legislative battles and 
incorporate those lessons into future strategic planning. Public opinion 
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studies in the US have indicated a rise and subsequent dip in popular 
belief in climate change as a major problem. This can be traced to 
collective efforts on the parts of the think tanks, policy groups and fossil 
fuels industry leaders which mirror those of the think tanks, policy 
groups and tobacco industry leaders a couple decades before. 
 
Big Tobacco 
In many ways, the problem of global climate change mirrors the 
problem of smoking as a public health issue, so it should perhaps be 
little surprise that the tactics are similar. What is surprising is that 
many of the main players, both think tanks and individual scientists, 
economists, and flacks, are the same as well.  
It has become clear, through research on the internal tobacco 
documents freed by the “Tobacco Deal” of 1998 performed by many 
scholars over the past decades, the tobacco industry colluded to use 
every means necessary to delay the consequences of producing and 
selling their product, as each year of delay in a significant drop in 
smoking, or in paying product liability suits, resulted in massive 
corporate profits, huge salaries and stock option cash-ins on the part of 
tobacco execs, and the stability of the industry for all employed in it.  
Tobacco industry scientists and execs knew early in this process 
that the science was against them. Enough work had been done by the 
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industry itself by the 1960s to show that smoking was a direct cancer-
causing agent. Furthermore, second hand smoke, referred to in research 
as “environmental tobacco smoke (ETS)” was quickly being touted as a 
major health issue. Big Tobacco saw the science around ETS as an 
opportunity for the delay tactic. Looking at Philip Morris alone, over a 
short period, think tanks were funded in areas as diverse as the Heritage 
Foundation and the Progress and Freedom Foundation. Philip Morris 
executives joined the boards of friendly think tanks, worked directly and 
publicly with others, and worked behind the scenes furnishing research, 
money, and tactical advice to still others, including working with 
“independent” journalists (Dreyfuss 2001).28 
Allan Brandt describes how the typical relationship between 
commercial interests and science changed after the tobacco strategy: “the 
steps the industry took as it fashioned a relationship with the scientific 
enterprise have become a powerful and influential model for the exertion 
of commercial interests within science and medicine since that time” 
(Brandt 2012:63). This model, reflecting the industry’s perception that it 
had reached what Brandt describes as “crisis mode” by the 1950s, 
banked on the fact that the debate on the possible harms of tobacco 
would eventually shift from a scientific one to a political one, and with 
their tremendous financial resources, ongoing long-term lobbying, and 
                                                          
28 These tactics are used in England as well, where documents showed large donations 
to the Adam Smith Institute and the Institute for Economic Affairs, both vigorous 
fighters for tobacco rights (Doward 2013). 
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longstanding relationships with powerful Washington insiders, tobacco 
companies were well placed to fight in the political arena. Even though 
the battles would revolve around scientific issues, the battles themselves 
would be fought in Washington DC, amongst politicians and lobbyists, as 
well as in the arena of public opinion (Brandt 2012:69). After a ten year 
period of this PR-organized campaign, the tobacco industry was even 
better off financially than before. More cigarettes sold, more new smokers 
and total smokers over all, and high profit rates, even as the science 
behind the health effects of their product became more and m more 
solidified. Hill and Knowlton, the PR giant behind the tobacco campaign, 
had “turned “tobacco science into yet one more political controversy on 
which people could differ” (Brandt 2012:69).  
In its extensive research on tobacco industry efforts to delay 
inevitable regulations, The University of Bath’s “Tobacco Tactics” website 
outlines key policy process tactics. These tactics include building 
alliances, hiring scientists, funding outside scientists, and funding and 
operating front groups and Astroturf groups. The climate denial network 
has made use of all these techniques (Tobaccotactics.org 2014). Tobacco 
documents show the breadth of efforts taken by the tobacco delay 
network to find allies in public and private spaces to further a wide 
spectrum of counterattacks. A 100 page internal 1990 PM document 
outlines efforts across the states to counter various anti-tobacco 
legislative efforts. Tobacco executives list dozens of approaches, from the 
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protection of individual smokers’ rights to protecting advertising 
revenues to watering down indoor air regulations. Each state’s priorities 
are listed with a “pro-active agenda” spelled out for each individual item. 
These agendas include allies and potential allies for each specific tactic 
(Legacy Tobacco Documents Library n.d.). 
First of all, the diversity of the organization involved, and the 
breadth of the effort by Philip Morris is very similar to the network 
around climate change. In the internal Philip Morris 1995 report on 
think tank funding, we find almost every player in climate change denial, 
major or minor, actively denying or playing a supporting role. In 1995, 
PM donated to about 125 think tank organizations, with a special 
emphasis on fighting excise taxes, whether they operated as a sin tax or 
as a funding mechanism for health care reform. Only four of the “Denial 
Fourteen” group of think tanks were not recipients of PM money that 
year. Two of those—Reason Foundation and NCPPR—were each targeted 
by PM exec Roy Marden as players in tax and regulatory efforts, and 
Marden gives a report on progress made with them.  
 AEI, Heritage, Heartland, CEI, Pacific Research, NCPA, CSE, 
Hoover, Claremont Institute, and Cato all received contributions from PM 
in 1995. Marden describes efforts on the part of think tanks in a candid 
internal memo. Although they are “highly bureaucratic and rather slow”, 
Marden wrote of AEI, he argued that PM should sponsor conferences and 
panel discussions that can “expose” unpalatable aspects of policy. Cato 
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was working on an anti-regulatory series of programs based on the work 
of Gary Huber at Harvard, called “Smoke and Mirrors: The EPA’s Flawed 
Study of ETS” (Legacy Tobacco Documents Library 1993), and Marden 
reports that it was likely that “a forum would be provided” for PM’s policy 
alternatives.  He refers to a major funding a grassroots initiative through 
Citizens for a Sound Economy, the predecessor to tea party groups 
Americans for Prosperity and FreedomWorks. The Claremont Institute 
was good for bringing Institute spokesmen on board for a media blitz, 
including influential California politician Bruce Herschensohn. Marden 
was on the board of the Heartland Institute, and a main effort was on 
“coalescing of state-based free market policy groups to unify” their 
approaches (Legacy Tobacco Documents Library. N.d.[b]). Marden worked 
with the Heritage Foundation and Hoover Institute to produce op-ed 
pieces and several major policy papers. Marden “worked closely with 
[NCPA] president John Goodman and the rest of the NCPA staff on 
developing policy alternatives” (Legacy Tobacco Documents Library. 
N.d.[b]). Finally, as a board member of the Pacific Research Institute, 
Marden was able to “work closely with PRI in the development of policy 
pieces and op-eds, particularly for Western markets…in support of free 
market alternatives. At his request, PRI was convening a major meeting 
of think tanks to generate a consensus on tactics on the issue, “including 
the use of mass mobilization technology in individual districts to educate 
and persuade legislators, policymakers, media, and the general public on 
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the debate…consistent with the interests of PM” (Legacy Tobacco 
Documents Library. N.d.[b], emphasis mine). 
The tobacco industry executives determined that the softest 
science, the research most open to attack was that studying ETS. They 
suggested that “passive smoking [be] the focal point [because] of all the 
health issues surrounding smoking… the one that the tobacco industry 
has the most chance of winning [is to argue] that the evidence 
proclaimed by [anti-smoking groups] is flawed… It is highly desirable for 
us to control the focus of the debate.” Concluding that only science could 
fight science, the study recommends that tobacco companies fund efforts 
to attack the credibility of the science on the other side, and to try to hire 
doctors and scientists to support their side” (Legacy Tobacco Documents 
Library N.d.[c]). 
"The EPA and the Science of Environmental Tobacco Smoke" is the 
first of many attempts to undermine the efforts to generate a foundation 
of sound science for the Federal government's environmental regulatory 
decisions. Since the costs of environmental regulation on individuals, 
businesses, and state and local governments continue to grow, it is 
crucial that scientists help the public become more aware of the potential 
health and ecological risks, based on science. The public had so far 
proven willing to pay a little more in order to feel that they were 
protecting public health or the condition of the environemnt. 
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The final report entitled "Science and Environmentalism" evaluates 
“the science behind several of the most current environmental 
questions…The goal of the report is to provide policy-makers, the media, 
and the general public with information that will help improve and 
rationalize environmental policy decisions” (Legacy Tobacco Documents 
Library N.d.[d]).  
Kent and Singer conclude, “In particular, EPA has gone far beyond 
its authority in making ETS an "environmental" issue within its 
regulatory jurisdiction. In the process, it has engaged in both scientific 
overreach and regulatory overreach” (Legacy Tobacco Documents Library 
N.d.[d]). 
The report was written by Jeffrey Kent, and the principal reviewer 
was Fred Singer, and the report was issued under the non-partisan 
Alexis de Tocqueville Institute imprimatur, with the support of several 
other think tanks. But as Dr. John Graham of the Harvard Center on 
Risk Analysis noted, "While it may seem obvious that EPA should use 
good science, students of the Agency have documented that the Agency's 
leadership, when preoccupied with public fears and legal pressures, has 
sometimes allowed good science to be neglected." One powerful politician 
may have captured the truth, saying, “Truth be told, I suspect that 
environmental decisions have been based more on feelings than on 
facts." (Legacy Tobacco Documents Library N.d.[e]). The Reason Foundation 
and other think tank members of the tobacco delay network used Dr. 
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Huber’s research over the years to these ends, and his work on the 
relationship between chest health and tobacco were a central part of the 
report. Huber referred to EPA’s “lies, damned lies, and statistics” and 
suggested that the public's job was to separate the "liars from the 
statisticians." He then went on to highlight shortcomings in the EPA 
report, often using EPA's own charts. He ended with recommendations 
calling for scientific objectivity, independent review. 
Dr. Huber, who received payments and kickbacks from tobacco 
industry in the hundreds of thousands of dollars, later came to question 
his own participation. When asked about whether the goal of tobacco 
research was delay in regulation and doubt on scientific consensus, on 
the news show Frontline in 1998, Huber said that the delay the industry 
received (at least partially from his own research), was “extraordinary.” 
He went on: “They bought ten or fifteen years of scientific—arrested ten 
or fifteen years of scientific progress, by funding research in such a way 
that, uh, disinformation was generated and that confusion and 
controversy were developed and perpetuated. [They] bought time” 
(Frontline 1998). When asked whether delay was the only goal, Huber 
concluded that scientific controversy—a muddying of the waters—was 
the other crucial piece:  
Well, I think worse than that. Not just deny. I think create 
disinformation. They could go on one hand to Congress and 
say "look, we're funding research, we're trying to get 
answers." They could go to the public and say, you know, 
"we don't know, we're trying to find answers." But they were 
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really, I think, funding research in different ways, the 
outcome of which would create confusion and 
disinformation. Unequivocally.” (Frontline 1998)  
 
Science-for-sale has become an industry in its own right, it seems. 
In this model, science becomes a sub-section of public relations, with its 
scientific or academic specialists available for a price, willing to perform 
any number of services, from organizing scholars to write ‘independent’ 
letters-to-the editor, to designing biased research protocols that return 
results that at worst prove nothing, or that demand further research. 
This network of science-for-sale includes a spectrum of 
philanthropic foundations, advocacy groups and think-tanks, and 
discussion groups, and the media. These institutions exist only because 
of the largesse of corporate America, and as their basic ideological al 
stances are similar, it is easy for them to make common cause in 
exchange for continued—and ever-increasing—financial support.  These 
organizations have a range of techniques available to them, and, in the 
US, they are generally afforded a tax-free status by the IRS, provided 
they claim in their articles of association that they are ‘non-partisan, 
though few of them are, or even attempt to pretend. 
These might be Astroturf organizations, foundations, or academic 
operations which can provide "experts" or “resident scholars” willing and 
able to produce the kinds of scholarly(-looking) work that criticizes 
anything that threatens the corporate worldview of small government, 
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anti-tax and anti-regulatory, free-market policies. Regulatory become 
easy targets, and a wide range of tactics are used: lawsuits filed by 
“education” of judges offered by legal associations, protests by Asroturf 
groups, and op-eds and Rotary club talks from those with talking points 
provided by think tank scholar, all of which receive news attention and 
are echoed by the rightwing echo chamber composed of talk radio hosts 
such as Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck, and conservative blogs and 
websites.   
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CHAPTER V  
EXTENDING THE POLICY NETWORK 
 
Those with vital material interests—like the tobacco industry and 
the fossil fuels industry—to protect do not rely on simply producing 
position papers and influencing the Washington elites, but rather seek to 
use all means necessary. In the fight against climate change regulation, 
fossil fuels interests have successfully extended the traditional policy 
network in two main ways: adding a populist, “boots on the ground” 
component through tea party groups, and adding an extra buffer 
between funding entities and climate science denying organizations 
through donor-advised funds. 
Many leaders on the right have a newfound respect for what have 
always been tactics used by the left. We find conservative websites 
advising activists on how to use Saul Alinsky’s Rules for Radicals 
“against liberals” (Hawkins 2012) and Matt Kibbe, President of 
FreedomWorks, a major Tea Party organization, recently saying “We read 
the same literature Obama did…Saul Alinsky, Gandhi, Martin  Luther 
King. We learned we needed boots on the ground...” (Mayer 2010). This 
kind of thinking has always been at the heart of conservative efforts to 
harness the Tea Party movement: how conservative policymakers can 
take advantage of “legitimate” (pre-existing) populist angst by putting it 
to work on the issues most important to the power elite. a component 
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adding the ability to influence events through social movement activity, 
either in large settings such as on the Mall in Washington, D.C., 
coordinated national tours addressing climate change legislation or 
issues, and through action in state and regional legislative events. 
 
Americans for Prosperity 
By far the largest, best funded, and most immediately recognizable 
of these groups is Americans for Prosperity (AfP). This political group has 
proven itself a solid partner in several issues dear to the principal 
members of the climate change denial network, including union busting, 
education reform, and fighting healthcare reform. But it has played a 
central role in fighting climate legislation both nationally and in 
individual states. AfP can put thousands of citizens in the streets or the 
state capitol building to protest climate change legislation. It bills itself 
as a populist, grassroots expression of boiling anger on the part of real 
Americans. But it doesn’t take long to trace direct ties to the Kochs, to 
the fossils fuels industry in general, and to the wealthy member of the 
corporate class (see Figure 28). One researcher says, “First is the fact 
that the tea party is a creation of enterprising political and public 
relations professionals, constructed to accomplish a political purpose” 
(Coleman 2013). 
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AfP was formed in 2003 out of the debris from the dissolution of 
the Koch founded organization Citizens for a Sound Economy, which the 
Kochs had been instrumental in founding in 1984. The Kochs provided 
over 80% of the donations received by CSE from 1986 to 2002, totaling 
$12.3 million. CSE was active in much the same way that AfP is, 
representing corporate interests as grassroots issues, and turning PR 
events into grassroots protests. When CSE splintered apart into 
FreedomWorks on the one hand and Americans for Prosperity on the 
other, several of the senior staff came with AfP, including Nancy 
Pfotenhauer, who was behind the CSE effort to derail President Clinton’s 
healthcare reform. Before her work with CSE, AfP and eventually heading 
the Independent Women’s Forum (yet another Koch entity), Pfotenhauer 
headed the Washington office of a Koch Industries subsidiary. 
But before the CSE became the precursor to the tea party 
movement (see Figure 27), it had national significance as a tobacco 
denial organization. A tobacco executive said that “In about the third 
year [of the RJR smokers’ rights groups], there was an emphasis on 
coalition building—anti-tax groups were a natural. You didn’t have to 
defend your position on tobacco because a tax is a tax is a tax to these 
guys” (Gup 1996). One PR executive hired by the tobacco industry 
proposed an all-out effort to fight tobacco taxes: he envisioned, in 1992, 
a group that was 
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Grounded in the theme of “The New American Tax 
Revolution” or “The New Boston Tea Party”, the campaign 
activity should take the form of citizens representing the 
widest constituency base mobilised with signage and other 
attention-drawing accoutrements such as lapel buttons, 
handouts, petitions and even costumes.  (Auxier 1992)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Relationship Chart Showing Historical Links Between 
Corporations, Moneyed Interests and the Modern Tea Party (Fallin, 
Grana and Glantz 2013) 
 
 
 
The Americans for Prosperity, chaired by David Koch, helped give 
birth to the Tea Party movement. Their early coordinating help, which 
consisted of website hosting and activist training for volunteers, helped 
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channel the organizations goals and tactics to fit within the Kochs’ 
greater vision. Bruce Bartlett, former economist at the National Center 
for Policy Analysis (a Koch-funded conservative think tank) described the 
role of the AfP as finding and organizing the efforts on the ground:  
The problem with the whole libertarian movement is that it’s 
been all chiefs and no Indians. There haven’t been any 
actual people, like voters, who give a crap about it. So the 
problem for the Kochs has been trying to create a 
movement…Everyone suddenly sees that for the first time 
there are Indians out there—people who can provide real 
ideological power.” The Kochs are “trying to shape and 
control and channel the populist uprising into their own 
policies” (Mayer 2010). 
 
AfP attacks on Van Jones illustrate the techniques used to further 
oil industry interests. Jones was newly elected President Obama’s 
appointee as a lower level administration to oversee “green jobs” 
production. Described by tea party forces led by AfP’s Vice President Phil 
Kerpen as a “watermelon, green on the outside but Communist red to the 
core,” Jones  “urged adoption of a carbon cap-and-trade program, 
renewable electricity mandates, including Al Gore’s outlandish and 
impossible goal of eliminating fossil fuel use by 2018, large taxpayer-
funded green jobs programs, a so-called smart grid for electricity, more 
mass-transit subsidies, higher fuel efficiency standards for automobiles, 
federal funding for organic farms, a ban on new coal plants, expanded 
ethanol mandates, and even a spirited, multiple-page pitch for a cash-
for-clunkers program -- he called it "Hoopties for Hybrids" (Kerpen 2009).  
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If the tactics were exemplary of Koch efforts both before and after, 
the overall strategic theme was also consistent. The strategy is simple: 
exacerbate the worst fears of working class people to get them to organize 
against their own interests. Jones was eventually the casualty of a 
sustained effort involving tea party activists, rightwing radio hosts Glenn 
Beck and Rush Limbaugh, and the full force of Fox News. The rightwing 
blogosphere and rightwing radio echo chamber helped Channel working 
class fears into political action favoring the policies of oil billionaires. Five 
hundred people attended the summit, which The New Yorker said served, 
in part, as a training session for Tea Party activists in Texas. An 
advertisement cast the event as a populist uprising against vested 
corporate power: “Today, the voices of average Americans are being 
drowned out by lobbyists and special interests. But you can do 
something about it.” The summit did not advertise the support of oil 
company owners, or other big business interest contributions.  
Perhaps its most visible effort has been the annual hot air balloon 
tour, where a specially designed balloon festooned with denialist 
propaganda. A carnival like air is produced at these hot air events by 
providing kiddie rides, free t-shorts and other goodies, and offering food 
and entertainment. In 2009, more than 75 hot air events were held 
across the country (Heritage Foundation 2010). These events also provide 
opportunities for other organizations to cross-pollinate on other issues, 
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usually centering on the mandatory and ubiquitous hatred for President 
Obama. 
In 2008, AfP put out a press release attacking the EPA on its “job-
killing regulations,” and spent millions on ads (Americans for Prosperity 
2008). Public filings show that AfP spends tens of millions of dollars each 
election cycle on political ads. They spent $1.2 million on radio spots and 
television in 42 congressional districts and television commercials in key 
states during the 2010 cycle, with all but two specifically targeting 
Democrats. The others were Republicans deemed to be “RINOs” who were 
being “primaried” for being too cozy with the Administration 
(opensecrets.org n.d. [d]).  These efforts also included rallies, mass 
mailings, phone banks and other seemingly coordinated events with 
candidates and campaigns.29  
AfP ran a national (and eventually international) effort to have 
politicians take the “No Climate Tax” Pledge. Described as the “Grover 
Norquist of Climate change” because of his pledge efforts, AfP President 
Tim Phillips wrote a pledge similar to Norquist’s Americans for Tax 
Reform promise to not raise taxes. Over 450 American politicians have 
signed the AfP pledge, according to AfP, including more than 25 US 
Senators and over a hundred members of Congress. State and local 
politicians ranging from State governors (Scott Walker, in Wisconsin) to 
                                                          
29 These activities often seem to go well beyond the legal restrictions on political and 
lobbying activities allowed by law for charitable organizations. 
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three members of the Texas Railroad Commission (Americans for 
Prosperity n.d.). 
The pledge was unveiled in 2008, and progress was slow. The first 
Senator (Pat Roberts, R-Kansas) signed in July, just after the first cap 
and trade bill failed to pass. 76 of the 85 new Republican members of the 
House signed the Pledge, and 57 of those signees received campaign 
contributions from the Koch Industries PAC. This invasion of Koch and 
AfP supported tea party candidates helped make the anti-science behind 
the pledge the new established rightwing position. Not signing the Pledge 
now amounted to siding with Al Gore. (Holmberg and Campbell 2013). 
Anyone can look up their representatives to see if they have signed the 
pledge at the “NoClimateTax” website, hosted on the AfP site.  
At its “Defending the Dream” summit in October 2008, AfP 
Foundation Chairman David Koch awarded denier Senator Jim Inhofe 
the “Washington Award” for his actions in fighting climate change 
progress in the US Senate. Inhofe’s comments underline the function 
that populist as well as academic groups play by tying these issues into a 
solid fabric of ideology: “Those of us gathered here today must be ready 
for the assault against reason and be prepared to stand our ground in 
protection of our free-market economic principles” (James M. Inhofe 
2015). In 2008, AfP leaders, with Koch network funding, founded 
“RightOnline”, an effort to train and motivate rightwing activists to be 
effective in online efforts, including blogs and discussion groups, online 
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journalism, and interacting with politicians and candidates. Annual 
conventions through 2013 have featured senior AfP personnel 
participating, including President Tim Phillips keynoting in 2012 and 
2013, as well as rightwing icons Michele Malkin, Sarah Palin, and James 
O’Keefe (RightOnline 2013). 
In 2009, AfP joined with representatives from several other groups 
in the network to attempt to spark a series of “spontaneous” tea party 
protests in response to Obama’s recent inauguration. These events drew 
a substantial number of tea party activists and involved protesting 
several tea party themes, including climate change. Specifically, they 
targeted the EPA and its right to regulate energy companies, attacked 
legislation aimed at supporting clean energy alternatives to coal and oil, 
and mocking climate science and climate scientists. These events were 
broadcast on Glenn Beck’s show and on Fox News, where commentators 
explained that these were spontaneous events that were not planned by 
any specific groups (Fang 2010). 
Included in this offensive was a huge media buy airing ads arguing 
that “Congress should stop wasting their time and focus on real 
problems” and “Isn’t it time Congress listened to the rest of us and got its 
science and priorities right?” (Johnson 2009). President Tim Phillips 
claimed that the consequences of a cap and trade bill would be a $1.2 
trillion tax increase, falling for the most part on working Americans, 
along with the loss of over a million jobs. As is common with 
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organizations in the Koch network, the source cited by one member 
comes from the research performed by another.30 
In closing its Hot Air tour in 2009, AfP sent a delegation to 
Copenhagen during the international climate accord meetings in 
December. Christopher Monckton spoke out in front of the meeting hall, 
claiming that climate change dollars could be better spent on helping 
dying people in third world countries, and that climate activists were 
therefore heartless. Monckton described climate activists as “Hitler 
Youth” because of their refusal to consider denialist arguments on the 
science, and their “chanting [of] mindless, repetitive slogans” (Monckton 
2009).31 
In 2010, AfP organized its “Regulation Reality” tour, a nationwide 
effort to battle against EPA efforts to combat climate change through the 
Clean Air Act. AfP activists in Arkansas complained that the solutions for 
the problem did not jibe with Americans’ desire for low taxes and less 
government, while in Texas, state AfP leaders attacked the science, 
claiming that “carbon dioxide is not a pollutant. On the contrary it 
makes crops and forests grow faster. We exhale carbon dioxide" (Venable 
2010). It helped create rallies in the Nevada cities of Carson City, Reno, 
                                                          
30 In this case, it was Americans for Prosperity’s Tim Phillips quoting statistics 
generated by research from American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF), which 
describes itself as one of the “most influential organizations operating behind the 
scenes” in Washington DC, and is a major recipient of Koch network dollars. 
 
31 Retired NASA scientist James Hansen is also, according to Monckton, a “fully-paid-
up member” of the “Sturmabteilung and Schutz Staffel wannabes” (Monckton 2009). 
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Las Vegas, and Henderson, as well as in California, in Sacramento, 
Fresno, and Bakersfield, from June 15th to June 17th, 2010.  
In May, 2010, AfP co-sponsored the 4th International Conference 
on Climate Change in Chicago. The conference, a direct denialist 
response to the IPCC conferences, was titled “Reconsidering the Science 
and Economics,” and featured dozens of individuals in the climate 
change denial network, including, Patrick Michaels, Craig Idso, Don 
Easterbrook, Willie Soon, Ben Lieberman, Christopher Horner, Marc 
Morano, James Taylor, Richard Lindzen, US Senator James Inhofe, and 
of course, Lord Christopher Monckton. Virtually every organization in the 
denial network and the many from the wider conservative network were 
in attendance or sponsors of the event (Heartland 2010). 
In 2011, Phillips authored an op-ed with Congressman Fred 
Upton, the House Energy and Commerce Committee chair, on the EPA’s 
new rules aimed at regulating greenhouse gas emissions. They wrote that 
the EPA "presumes that carbon is a problem in need of regulation. We 
are not convinced." They also said the carbon regulation rules are "an 
unconstitutional power grab that will kill millions of jobs." Koch and 
several members of the Koch network were important contributors to 
Upton and other members of that committee in the 2010 election cycle. 
Individual energy companies such as Energy Solutions, CMS Energy, and 
DTE were his top three contributors, and the Electric Utilities industry 
was the top industry contributor in 2010. Before the “tea party” election 
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brought in an influx of the extreme right-wingers, Upton had published 
his belief in global warming, and his feeling that action was needed: "I 
strongly believe that everything must be on the table as we seek to 
reduce carbon emissions," though this statement subsequently 
disappeared from his website, and his views have made an extreme hard 
right turn (Sheppard 2011). In 2011, Upton declared that while the earth 
may be warming, “I do not say that it is man-made” (Youtube 2011). 
Tim Phillips, republican and rightwing network insider, is 
President of both AfP and the AfP Foundation, an allied 503c4 
organization. He explains the importance of AfP’s efforts mainly in terms 
of the organization’s success in planting doubt into Americans’ view of 
the science, and giving politicians cover for claiming that the science is 
still unsettled. He said, “In a broader-movement sense, if [the science] 
argument is won, I do [think we’ve won]. The underpinning for what they 
want to do to us, you know, cap and trade and other big government 
programs, they try to leverage the science” (Frontline 2012b).   
When asked if AfP was responsible for the successful effort to kill 
cap and trade, he replied that “I think we played a part. I think it was a 
broad effort, but I think we played a part…We certainly did TV ads, radio 
ads, social media. We did rallies, events…” (Frontline 2012b).   
Phillips describes the AfP as a rightwing “army,” saying “we can do 
the same kind of calls and emails and letters and rallies, events [that the 
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left has traditionally been able to do, and apply] pressure. I mean that 
word in a good sense. And I think that’s made a big difference. Our side 
didn’t have that five or six years ago on this issue. We do now. I do think 
it’s a new day…” (Frontline 2012b).   
 Americans for Prosperity continues to play an important role in 
conservative battles. For instance, in the recent IRS “scandal” involving 
the agency’s slow handling non-profit applications from groups who 
“sound” like tea party groups, one researcher notes that  “10 out of 11 
Tea Party spokespeople quoted in major news outlets regarding the IRS 
scandal have ties to the Koch funded Americans for Prosperity” (Coleman 
2013). At the same time, with all the above having been said, AfP (and, 
indeed, all of the 501(c)3 organizations studied) contend that they do not 
engage in politics (Lehmann 2011). 
 AfP has been funded by a variety of organizations on the right, 
many headed by billionaires and multimillionaires, including the Kochs 
(see Table 7), Uihlein, Bechtel, the Marshalls, and Art Pope (see Figure 
28). It is also publicly supported by many of the “standard” conservative 
philanthropic foundations, such as Searle Freedom Trust, Randolph, and 
Chase. Also, over the past decade, a new trend of anonymous giving has 
emerged, to the point where in 2010, the grassroots organization which 
bills itself as representing the interests of working Americans received 
over $22 million in anonymous funding—about 58% of its entire total  
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income. Of this amount, AFP received $2.6 million from Donors Capital, 
as well as $1.9 million from the Center to Protect Patients Rights, a 
Koch-connected 501(c)4 that acted (and under a new name—“American 
Encore”—continues to act). CPPR and its successor act as the 
middleman for tens of millions in non-attributable funding distributed to 
nonprofit groups that attacked Democrats in the 2010 elections (Fang 
2012a).  
 
Table 7. Koch Foundations Support for 
Americans for Prosperity, 2005 - 2010   
 
Koch Foundations Charitable Donations to AfP 
   Year 
 
Contributions 
   2005 
 
 $           1,000,000.00  
2006 
 
 $           1,151,000.00  
2007 
 
 $           1,025,000.00  
2008 
 
 $           2,000,000.00  
2009 
 
 $              434,281.00  
2010 
 
 $              150,000.00  
   Total 
 
 $         5,760,281.00  
   Note: Data compiled from IRS 990 filings 
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Figure 28. Sociogram of Board Interlocks between 2009 Directors of 
Philanthropic Foundations in the Policy Network which Funded 
Americans for Prosperity and Its Foundation  
 
 
 
Closely affiliated with the Americans for Prosperity was an 
organization known as the Independent Women’s Forum. In fact, in its 
infancy, it was formally affiliated with AfP, and it shared both its focus on 
“limited government, property rights, free markets, and a powerful and 
effective national defense and foreign policy” as well as a modest 
Washington DC office (Independent Women’s Forum 2003). According to  
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a 10-29-03 press release described the relationship: 
What made this so desirable," Pfotenhauer said, "is that we 
have very similar missions.  Each of us is dedicated to the 
spirit of free enterprise and self reliance and supports the 
principles of political freedom, economic liberty and personal 
responsibility.  While IWF’s focus has been on a woman’s 
perspective on important issues, the partnership allows us to 
leverage each other’s strengths and build on each other's 
successes. Americans for Prosperity’s longstanding strength 
in grassroots mobilization with IWF’s media access and 
marketing is a powerful combination…” (Independent 
Women’s Forum 2003) 
 
After leading the CSE, Pfotenhauer started off as President of both 
AfP and IWF. Each organization had its own board and its own area of 
focus, with IWF seeking to “improve the lives of Americans by increasing 
the number of women who value free markets and personal liberty 
(Independent Women’s Forum 2015).  
Members of the board represented the organization at the 2010 
Koch meeting, and are interlocked into the wider conservative policy 
network (see Figure 29). Not only was the IWF related to several powerful 
entities in the Koch network, they tend to have the same network 
connections. All interlocked organizations had a represented at the 2010 
Koch meeting, for example, and IWF exactly mirrors the relationships 
held by Hoover. CPPR and the Philanthropy Roundtable are both closely 
related to the Koch network, the former as a dark money conduit and the 
latter as a coordinating and organizing entity.  
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Figure 29. Sociogram of Board Interlocks of 2009 Directors of the 
Independent Women’s Forum  
 
 
IWF has been funded by a variety of foundations, several tied 
closely to the Koch denial network, but in fairly small amounts (see Table 
8). The majority of its funding is from anonymous sources. In 2009, for 
example, it reported a total of $4.1 million in contributions received. That 
year, it received over $3 million from Donors Trust along, a s well as 
$250,000  
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   Table 8. Donations to Independent Women's Forum from  
Conservative Policy Network Philanthropic Foundations, 2009 
   Donations to Independent Women's Forum 
   Foundation 
 
Contributions
   
   Hume 
 
$15,000  
Chase 
 
$2,000  
Lambe 
 
$150,000  
Roe 
 
$2,500  
Holman 
 
$10,000  
Randolph 
 
$230,000  
Carthage 
 
$50,000  
Pope 
 
$10,000  
Gleason 
 
$200,000  
Anschutz 
 
$25,000  
Taube 
 
$500  
Windway 
 
$1,000  
DDSF 
 
$3,000  
Center PPR 
 
$250,000  
Donors Trust 
 
$3,045,000  
   
Total 
 
$3,994,000  
   Note: Data compiled from 2009 IRS 990 filings 
 
from Center to Protect Patient Rights, a Koch funding conduit, in 
addition to $150,000 from the Kochs publicly.  
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Donor-Advised Funds 
DonorsTrust (DT), and its sister “big donation” sister-entity Donors 
Capital Fund (DCF), have come to dominate the funding of some 
members of the conservative policy network, and specifically some 
organizations at the forefront of the climate science denial network (see 
Figure 31). “Donors Trust has injected nearly $400 million into free-
market causes, thanks in large part to contributions by dozens of private 
foundations run by wealthy executives or their families” (Abowd 2013). 
For some organization, anonymous funding through DonorsTrust and 
similar mechanisms far outweighs all other funding they receive (see 
Figure 30). 
  
 
Figure 30. Climate Denial Funds from Fossil Fuels Sources 
(ExxonMobil, Kochs, Donors Trust), (Goldenberg 2013) 
 
 
189 
Donations to Donors Trust/Donors Capital Fund have increased 
steeply almost every year. This is a crucial development, as the 
DonorsTrust mechanism allows for both maximum tax advantages to 
donors, as well as contribution anonymity. In fact, the amounts of total 
contributions made to the conservative network, and to the climate 
science network specifically have grown so rapidly that an analysis of 
funding patterns would be incomplete without a focus on its founding 
and growth.  
 Donors Trust was founded in 1999 at the behest of a retired cattle 
rancher and businessman named Bruce H. Jacobs, who was concerned 
about retaining “donor intent” in the contributions made by his 
philanthropic foundation after his death (Sparks 2011). This rightwing 
concern about donor intent has been stoked over the years by entities 
like Capital Research Center, who research board composition and donor 
patterns to pass judgment on whether the philanthropic foundation is 
actually hewing to the wishes of the conservative founder of the 
organization. Some, like Jacobs, or like Robert William “Bill” Daniels, 
announced while still living that they did not want any money being 
donated to liberal causes. Some, like Daniels, were more explicit—no 
money for AIDS, no money for academic research of any kind, no money 
for cultural activities. The Daniels Fund was given some guidelines left 
by the founder, but CRC outlines how “liberal” fund employees twisted 
Daniels’ intent to favor their own choices for funding (Capital Research 
190 
Center 2013). The main problem, according to CRC, was the choice of a 
new Chief Operating Officer who had previously worked at Rockefeller 
Foundation, poster child for everything the Right hated about the loss of 
donor intent, such as oil money funding environmentalists’ challenges to 
oil companies. The main lesson to be learned from the debacle, for 
rightwing donors who are intent on guiding their foundations from the 
grave, was that “liberal philanthropic establishment remains hostile to 
donor intent.” With the advent of DonorsTrust, a donor can give explicit 
directions about giving and rest easy that “Greenpeace won’t get a dime 
from us” (Kroll 2013).  
Donor advised funds had actually been around in the US since the 
1930s, when similar vehicles were used by community foundations, and 
specifically by Jewish philanthropic federations. The advantage of donor 
advised funds is in the simplicity, flexibility, and anonymity.  Such a 
setup allows donors to make a contribution, receive an immediate tax 
benefit, and then to advise the administrator on making the actual 
grants from the fund over time. According to one industry research study 
of the most recent data available (2013), donor advised funds have 
broken records in every area—grants, contributions, charitable assets, 
and the number of individual donor-advised fund accounts. In 2013, 
grants from donor-advised funds totaled nearly $10 billion dollars, 
making up about 5% of all giving in the United States. Assets are over 
$50 billion, an increase of over 20% over 2012. The report claims that 
191 
there are now over 217,000 individual donor-advised fund accounts in 
the US (National Philanthropic Trust 2014). In comparison, 2009 grants 
totaled $6.66 billion and assets were $29.3 billion. 
As the science has become clearer and clearer, some of the more 
publicity conscious foundations and corporations have perhaps become 
reluctant to have their names associated with climate science denial, and 
especially with some of the more combative organizations. At the same 
times, the material interests of the directors of these organizations are 
well served by funding denial and the success they’ve had in delaying 
action on climate change. The Koch brothers themselves have always 
been publicity shy about their foundations’ donation information, and 
have recently become truly Machiavellian.  
Donations outgoing to the entities in the ultraconservative network have 
also skyrocketed in this period. Chart showing contributions to the 
climate denial organizations followed by Brulle (see Table 9). 
Directors of DT and DCF are highly embedded in the Koch climate 
science denial network, and in the conservative policy network (see 
Figure 31). Two directors of DCF and one from DT attended the 2010 
Koch meeting, and their attendance is regular at these and other 
conservative strategy meetings.  
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Table 9. Money Funneled Through Donors Trust  
and Donors Capital Fund 2004 - 2010 
   Donations through Donors Trust and Donors Capital 
   Year 
 
Total Contributed
   2004 
 
$1,671,000  
2005 
 
$2,522,690  
2006 
 
$3,853,487  
2007 
 
$4,992,550  
2008 
 
$10,597,561  
2009 
 
$15,011,742  
2010 
 
$19,537,168  
   
Total 
 
$58,186,198  
   Note: Data compiled from Robert Brulle (2014b) 
 
 
Total contributions to the conservative network examined in this study 
are also substantial. The contributions from the DAF entities examined 
in this study totaled almost $78 million for 2009. Of that amount, 
approximately $49 million (or 63%) were funneled through DT/DCF. 
Vanguard accounted for almost $10 million, NYCT for $7.6 million, NCF 
for $6.7 million, Schwab for $2.3 million and the other 11 accounted for 
the remaining $2.3 million. 
 There were18 organizations in the conservative policy network 
which received contributions totaling $1 million or more from these dark 
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money sources, with the total to these 18 equaling over $49 million (see 
Figure 33). The list of these organizations includes both the more 
moderate organizations, such as Council on Foreign Relations and 
Brookings Institute, as well as organizations far to the right, such as 
 
Figure 31. Sociogram of Interlocks of 2009 Director of Donors Trust 
and Donors Capital Fund with Policy Organizations 
 
Sam Adams Alliance and Heritage Foundation. Also included in 
this list are some of the more activist Christian groups, including Focus 
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on the Family and Family Research Council. Some relatively unknown 
entities are garnering huge money through these channels, for example, 
Americans for a Limited Government, and Foundation for Individual 
Rights in Education. Legal attack organizations included The Federalist 
Society and the Institute for Justice. 
Sometimes the donations made through the dark money entities 
(see Figure 32) dwarf the acknowledged donations, which seems to be a 
 
Red = think tanks           Blue = donor-advised funds 
 
Figure 32. Sociogram of Donor-Assisted Funds Funding the “Denial 
35” 
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statement in itself (see Table 10). For example, Heartland Institute, 
tabbed the “world’s most prominent think tank promoting skepticism 
about man-made climate change” (Economist 2012), has been funded to 
a great degree through dark money channels since ExxonMobil stopped 
their large contributions after 2006. Heartland received a total of grants  
 
 
  Table 10. Major Donors to Heartland Institute, 2009 
   2009 Donations to Heartland Institute 
   Foundation 
 
Total Contributed
   Donors Capital 
 
$2,171,530  
Donors Trust 
 
$516,750  
Mercer 
 
$500,000  
Searle Freedom Trust 
 
$150,000  
Bradley 
 
$125,000  
Schwab Charitable 
 
$103,900  
American Endowment 
 
$50,000  
Gleason 
 
$50,000  
Rupe 
 
$44,000  
Barney 
 
$25,000  
Pope 
 
$25,000  
Vanguard 
 
$25,000  
18 others 
 
$134,100  
   
Total 
 
$3,920,280  
   Note: Data compiled from 2009 IRS 990 filings 
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of $6,499,687 in 2009. Of this amount, $3,920,280 (or about 60%) came 
from foundations situated in the conservative policy network examined in 
this study. 
Similarly, the Committee For A Constructive Tomorrow (CFACT) 
received contributions and grants (see Table 11) from all sources totaling  
  Table 11. Major Donors to Committee for a 
Constructive Tomorrow 2009   
 
Foundation    Total Contributed 
Donors Trust/ Donors Capital Fund  $909,194  
Scaife affiliated funds     $260,000  
Rothschild          $50,000  
Dodge Jones        $12,500  
Challenge          $10,000  
Dunn          $10,000  
Gerrish Milliken         $10,000  
Hilton Family             $1,000  
Fletcher Jones                $8,000  
Armstrong              $5,000  
Charles Johnson            $5,000  
5 smaller contributions        $8,000  
Total                 $1,288,694  
Note: Data compiled from 2009 IRS 990 filings 
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$3,071,053 for 2009. $1,288,694 (almost 42%) came from the 
philanthropic foundations in the conservative policy network examined 
in this study, and over $900,000 of that from DonorsTrust. 
Of particular interest in this regard is the Franklin Center for 
Government and Public Integrity, founded in 2009 (Franklin Center 
2015). In response to a perceived dip in quantity and quality of 
statehouse reporting across the country, Franklin’s mission is to fill the 
void, and “already provides 10 percent of all daily reporting from state 
capitals nationwide…We support an in-house team of state-based 
reporters and act as a capacity-building service provider for 
organizations that sponsor investigative journalism” (Franklin Center 
2015). Grants and contributions received in 2009, the first year of 
Franklin’s life, totaled $2,378,931 on its 2009 990 filing. But 
DonorsTrust, Donors Capital Fund and Vanguard Charitable (another 
DAF) reported a total of $3,679,300 in contributions to Franklin in 2009, 
just from the three organizations. In 2011, DT/DCF provided $6.3 
million (or 95% of Franklin’s reported grants and contributions received 
for the year). Though its donors remain anonymous, the Franklin Center 
touts “transparency, accountability, and fiscal responsibility as its 
watchwords” (SourceWatch 2015).   
This is similar to the approach of the Sam Adams Alliance, 
founded by Eric O’Keefe in 2007. The Sam Adams Alliance seeks to 
address seven capacities necessary to a political movement, “the capacity 
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to generate intellectual ammunition, to pursue investigations, to mobilize 
for elections, to fight media bias, to pursue strategic litigation, to train 
new leaders, and to sustain a presence in the new media (Phillips 2008). 
It is perhaps best known for funding “dirty tricks” training for tea party 
activists through subsidiary American Majority (Monbiot 2010).  
 The Sam Adams Alliance’s 2009 990 reflects a total of $3,948,589 
in grants and contributions received for the year. In addition to a handful 
of grants totaling less than $10,000 from philanthropic foundations 
examined in this study, SAM also received $3,469,500 from the 
DonorsTrust entities, as well as $580,000 funneled through Vanguard 
Charitable. One of the biggest activities of the Alliance seems to be 
setting up other entities, as SAM has its fingerprints on both the 
Franklin Center and on the American Majority. The Sam Adams Alliance 
provides more than 75% of the funding for American Majority, which 
hosted the training session referred to above. In the previous year, 2008, 
the year it was founded, about 90% of its money came from Donors 
Trust, in a single donation of $3,700,000.  
DonorsTrust and Donors Capital Fund dominate this funding for 
2009. Of the $14.8 million donated to Denial 35 organizations by the 
identified DAFs in this study, $10.9 (or 69%) came through DT/DCF, 
while about $1 million each came through Schwab, National Christian 
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Foundation, and Vanguard Charitable. The other eleven entities 
combined for under $1 million.32 
The Koch meetings have been vitally important to the growth of the 
donor advised funds. Whitney Ball, CEO of Donors Trust is a customary 
attendee at Koch events (Abowd 2013) and at all major ultraconservative 
and many conservative events around the country. Members of the board 
of directors of DT and DCF are highly networked in the ultraconservative 
fossil fuels network around the Kochs. “We think they’re great guys,” she 
says of the Kochs, “but if they weren’t around, we’d still be successful” 
(Abowd 2013).  At the 2010 Koch meeting, Donors Trust hosted a private 
cocktail event for what Ball called a “target-rich environment” of wealthy 
donors and foundation directors.  Although, we cannot be sure he 
attended the DonorsTrust event or even spoke to Ball then, Richard T. 
“Dick” Farmer, CEO of Cintas Corporation seems a likely example of the 
kind of “target” Ball described. As of 2009, his Farmer Family 
Foundation had never donated to blatantly political non-profits. It 
focused mainly on education, and other more “typical” charitable causes. 
After attending the Koch meeting in 2010, however, the Foundation took 
a different giving trajectory, including small amounts for the Buckeye 
Institute and for the Thomas B. Fordham Institute. The eye-opening 
difference however, was the annual giving through DonorsTrust, starting 
                                                          
32 The caveat about these as relative amounts is that specific data for Fidelity 
Charitable were not available for 2009, and anecdotal evidence suggests that the total 
from that source could run in the millions of dollars.  
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with $500,000 in 2010, increasing to $1,410,000 in 2011, and going up 
again to $1,750,000 in 2012, the most recent year for which data are 
available.  More and more of the wealthy conservatives in the Koch 
network have opened Donors Trust accounts, including Amway co-
founder and longtime funder of conservative causes Richard DeVos; 
hedge fund billionaire Paul Singer; as well as Philip Anschutz, owner of 
the conservative Examiner newspapers. Many other big conservative 
donors have DT/DCF accounts, including the Lynde and Harry Bradley 
Foundation, the John M. Olin Foundation and the Coors family’s Castle 
Rock Foundation (IRS records and Abowd 2013).  
In recent years, DonorsTrust donors have taken a strong interest 
in fighting political battles in the states, by founding and nurturing state-
level think tanks and the national organizations that help coordinate 
their activities, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), and 
the  State Policy Network (SPN), for example. “Gridlock at the federal level 
of government means donors see a better opportunity to make a 
difference in the states,” says Ball, who sits on the board of the State 
Policy Network (Abowd 2013). SPN has come to rely on Donors Trust 
money, having received at least $10 million in the past five years. In 
2011, Donors Trust passed along donations that made up about 40 
percent of SPN’s revenue for the year. Over the last five years, Donors 
Trust money has gone to virtually every single state-level think tank 
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affiliated with SPN, which are located in nearly every state. (Abowd 
2013).  
With the need for the ability to move enormous sums of money 
outside of public view, the DAFs have started to collect and disperse 
huge sums. Also, dummy organizations have been set up, headed by a 
trusted “dummy” as trustee, and again, huge sums of money transferred 
where needed. This was especially true in the 2010 elections.  
 
Other Secrecy Measures 
The Kochs and other high dollar contributors soon found that shell 
companies could effectively hide donation sources until well after the 
knowledge of who is funding which side in an election is important. 
Beginning with the 2010 election cycle, for example, the Kochs began 
using both real and shell organizations as conduits for vast amounts of 
campaign cash (see Figure 33). A representative example is that of the 
Center to Protect Patient Rights, Inc. (CPPR), a 501(c)4 group with an 
Arizona headquarters, and headed by Sean Noble, an otherwise little-
known former congressional staffer. It describes itself as an organization 
formed to build a “coalition of like-minded organizations and individuals, 
and educating the public on issues related to health care with an 
emphasis on patients [sic] rights’ and “engaging in issue advocacy and 
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activities to influence legislation related to health care” (Center to Protect 
Patient Rights 2009).  
CPPR donated over $55 million to groups on the right to pay for 
ads targeting endangered Democrats in the 2010 elections (Los Angeles 
Times 2012). Recipients included American Future Fund, 60 Plus 
Association, Americans for Limited Government, Americans for Tax 
Reform, Americans for Prosperity, and independent Women’s Voice, as 
well as various tea party groups. Some of these entities seemed to have 
no actual activities on their own, but served mainly as conduits for 
further laundering of the funds involved. In fact, one group listed as a 
recipient, called “Coalition to Protect Patients’ Rights” has the same 
mailing address and a phone number answered by the same PR firm 
employee as CPPR itself (Fang 2009).  
Similarly, Themis Trust, a 501(c)4 organization founded in 2010, 
serves as media buying entity and little else. Themis describes its 
activities in its tax filing as “providing information and assistance to 
nonprofit organizations involved in public education.” It reported $7.7 
million in contributions in 2010, and along with several other groups, 
such as the TC4 Trust and Freedom Partners, both groups which are not 
required to report their donors, received over $182 million in grants from 
CPPR between 2009-2012 (Maguire 2014). Groups receiving CPPR money 
included a committee fighting President Obama’s re-election based on 
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gas prices, a group supporting Scott Walker in Wisconsin, and a legal 
challenge to Arizona’s re-districting (Maguire 2014). But this funding  
 
 
 
Figure 33. “A Maze of Money”, Tracing Contributions Centered on 
the Major Koch Secret Entities (Center to Protect Patient Rights, 
Freedom Partners, TC4 Trust) (Maguire 2014) 
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remained invisible until annual tax filings were made by the entities 
involved, and the strings and knots of contributions were unraveled.  
Sean Noble and The Center to Protect Patient Rights has played its 
part in politics, now renamed “American Encore, and without Koch 
backing (Barker and Meyer 2014). In fact, 2013 tax records indicate a 
drop in contributions from a high in 2012 of over $146 million to 2013’s 
$2.2 million. But Noble operated as the Koch money dispenser for two 
election cycles, becoming personally wealthy in the process. According to 
tax documents, Noble collected about $24 million in 2012 for himself, 
keeping about one of every six Koch dollars to flow through his hands 
(Maguire 2014).  
His efforts in a California proposition battle also fizzled, and ended 
in a million dollar fine. The New York Times reported in 2013 that 
 
records and documents uncovered during the California 
investigation provide a rare glimpse into how such groups 
closely coordinate transfers of money that mask the sources 
of the contributions and skirt state and federal disclosure 
rules. (Confessore 2013) 
 
The investigation by the California Fair Political Practices Commission 
ended in a negotiated civil settlement requiring CPPR to admit 
wrongdoing and pay a fine of $1 million dollars to the California State 
General Fund (Fair Political Practices Commission 2013).  
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The use of various forms of philanthropic organization type as 
philanthropic vehicles allow corporations, foundations, and individuals 
who may be averse to publicity, a means for confidentiality. "That’s 
precisely why we have seen an explosion in 501(c)(4)s, because they are 
not subject to rigorous disclosure laws," said Paul Ryan, from the 
Campaign Legal Center:  
It made them a very convenient conduit for risk-averse 
corporations. They certainly want to buy access and 
influence with lawmakers, but they don't want the public to 
know about it, so they’ll route their money through (c)(4)s to 
hide their own identity. (Lehmann 2011) 
 
Since corporate America, and the upper class it generates , is awash with 
accounting, legal, business and other skilled technicians, it seems 
virtually certain that every possible step will be taken to maximize benefit 
and minimize cost (and publicity), and that we will continue to see an 
extension of form and functions in philanthropic contributions towards 
political and ideological ends.  
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CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has undertaken to map out an instance of 
conservative power. specifically, it sought to outline ways a faction of the 
power elite can use t network position and resources to place its material 
interests at the forefront of the wider conservative policy network. This is 
accomplished through organizing that network in ways that encourages 
the individuals involved to graft those material interests onto existing 
conservative ideologies. The fossil fuels network was successful in 
delaying national and international action on climate change mainly 
through its efforts in the conservative policy network.  
 This policy network that protests and extends the interests of the 
power elite as a whole did not magically appear. It was the product of a 
focused effort on the part of a wide spectrum of political activists, 
wealthy families and individuals and their foundations, and the members 
of the corporate class. Shaken by the liberal resurgence of the 1960s, 
wealthy business leaders such as William Simon, the Kochs, the Coors 
brothers, as well as academics such as Lewis Powell and political 
activists such as Paul Weyrich combined to create a rejuvenated network 
of conservative organizations aimed at controlling the public sphere 
regarding policy production. Whether as a direct result of Powell’s call for 
conservative action or not, the powerful members of the upper class and 
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corporate leaders combined to organize and fund a wide group of think 
tanks, policy groups, and advocacy groups. It is this network of 
organizations that a core group of leaders from the fossil fuels industry 
was able to nestle within to form climate change denial network, funded 
by both its own members and the foundations and funding mechanisms 
from the wider network. These organizations—both single issue and wide 
spectrum groups, multimillion dollar organizations with plush offices 
near the centers of power in Washington DC and the little one person 
organizations with a couple hundred thousand dollar budget—were 
instrumental in adding climate change denial to the very root of 
conservative ideology, perhaps as much or more solidly as the anti-
abortion plank of conservatism ever was.  
 Oil companies have a history in the United States of unrivalled 
power, producing billionaire families and the largest corporations—
corporations that dwarf most of the nation-states of the world. The 
leaders of these corporations wield tremendous political power, and they 
have not been reluctant to use it. Of course this is true of corporate 
power in general, and the political history of the United States offers 
abundant examples of the good of corporations being viewed as the 
priority of the nation. “The business of the nation is business,” one might 
say, and “What’s good for GM is good for the country as well.”  
 Elite power is no conspiracy gimmick. It is merely the expression of 
the natural, inevitable domination of the public sphere by those with 
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money. Those with this kind of power generally prefer to work behind the 
scenes, which makes research on the power elite more like detective 
work.  But processes and organizations leave traces, especially when 
they are mainly aimed at public processes themselves, so it is possible to 
trace material interests to desired political outcome, and such has been 
the goal here.  
In Chapter I, the fossil fuels industry leaders were shown to be 
intimately linked in a private network, mainly organized by the Koch 
brothers, and aimed at promoting industry interests within the wider 
policy network, especially during the first decade of this century, a time 
of great danger for them with the possibility of major climate change 
regulation and treaty agreements. This network, funded by oil money and 
led by those with a life or death interest in maintain the status quo as 
much as possible, developed a coherent leadership model, a means to 
connect with and influence the wider network, and methods of tapping 
into existing funding sources as well as generating new and creative 
funding resources and techniques. Different organizations will have 
different relationships with funding entities in the network and will 
appeal to different funders for different reasons. Meetings such as the 
Koch strategy meetings help policy organizations that fill an important 
role in the denial network to be exposed to prospective funders, and to 
the conservative network at large. The meetings also allow potential 
funders to meet and hear from the organizations. They also function as a 
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forum for educating members of the upper class about climate change as 
political and financial threat that goes well beyond simply the fossil fuels 
industries. 
In Chapter II, the wider conservative network is shown to be highly 
interlocked. The network has an institutional memory, in that tactics 
which were effective in one situation can be recycled for use in another 
policy area. Even specific organizations and people can be used in these 
ways. If the tobacco battle was an enormous battle between science, 
government power, liberal and people-oriented groups, and nonprofits on 
the pone hand against an extremely powerful and profitable industry on 
the other, it served mainly as a prelude to the battle over climate change, 
where the very future of the planet is in the balance on the one hand, 
and where the profits of a large segment of the elites are at risk, not to 
mention the level of impact potential responses to climate change may 
have on the average person. So it should be no surprise that climate 
science deniers have tapped liberally into both the overarching strategic 
approach and the tactics used by the tobacco industry, as well as 
employing some of the same scientists and ideological activists. As in the 
tobacco war, different organizations fulfilled different roles in advancing 
the industry’s objectives, which also generally served to advance the 
ideological and political goals of the elite more generally. I suggest that 
this wider conservative network is subject to domination by a small, 
organized, motivated faction of the elite, using its network positions to 
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advance its own interests, through taking leadership positions, funding 
specific projects and groups, and through key organizing and 
coordinating activities.  
The policy network exists already as an instrument for whatever 
policy needs the elite may employ it to advance, but is also flexible and 
malleable enough to be tweaked for specific uses. In Chapter III, I trace 
how the fossil fuels industry effort to graft climate science denial onto the 
more traditional conservative ideology has required it to extend and 
augment the existing policy network in ways that are specific to the 
needs in the case of climate change. The addition of a populist wing of 
the movement, while not a new idea, has been accomplished to such an 
advanced degree that it may as well be new. Tapping into some level of 
dislocation and unhappiness at a root level (as well as creating that pool 
of disaffected too), the coincidence of the efforts to kill regulatory efforts 
with the rise of the tea party phenomenon requires scrutiny. The degree 
to which the tea party movement was created, funded, directed and to 
the benefit of the elite in general, and the fossil fuels elite f+action in 
particular is enough to suggest the relationship between the two. 
Americans for Prosperity has led the tea party charge both in national 
politics and as an instrument in climate science denial. It has kept its 
grassroots image somehow, in spite of being chaired by David Koch and 
for the most part funded by billionaires. This arms-length relationship in 
plain sight has been effective, but the tenacity of those trying to take 
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climate policy to a new level as an issue has required funding and 
organizing well beyond that necessary or possible in the case of Big 
Tobacco. It has required a new set of institutions, such as donation-
laundering foundations like DonorsTrust and Donors Capital Fund. 
These are multimillion dollar operations offering advantages to the upper 
class, and that certainly push the limits of the laws regulating 
philanthropic foundations, if not make a mockery of them. The use of 
multiple front organizations to hide funding and strategic relationships is 
a staple in corporate strategy, and it has been employed with great 
effectiveness in the climate change denial movement.  
In the end, climate science denial offers a solid case of elite power, 
but I just as easily could have chosen to study worker rights or K-12 
education reform as issues around which the power elite has formed 
interest groups wielding the wider conservative policy network. Many of 
the same techniques are employed. Many of the same foundations are 
involved. Many of the same think tanks denying climate chance are also 
involved in privatizing education and rolling back worker rights, through 
the leadership and specific strategy processes obviously differ. With the 
primacy of money in the political arena now that spending is equated 
with political free speech, the elite have a stranglehold on democracy that 
will not be easy to fight. When the Koch brothers declare their 
willingness to spend a billion dollars to win the 2016 election, even as 
they continue to spend tens of millions on climate change and other 
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regulatory issues, we can clearly see that a different policy terrain exists 
today than a generation ago—though it may be more a matter of visibility 
(for those who want to see) than degree. Really, in the end, how far off is 
bribing a politician for access to federal lands for oil production in the 
1920s from putting handpicked members into the congress or a 
handpicked candidate into the White House in 2016? Both are clear 
perversions of the democracy we tell ourselves we live within. 
 William Domhoff’s theory stands up remarkably well with a real-life 
example such as climate change denial. It is important that we subject 
that theory to constant challenge, and find ways to extend our thinking  
about elite power, such as in the ways that elites can extend their 
existing network structure, for example, as I contend here. Or, as in the 
case of the Eric Bonds’ study of the chemical industry (2010), ways that 
elites may try to dominate an area not explicitly contemplated in 
Domhoff’s theory—a “knowledge-shaping” process. These extensions are 
valuable ways to re-envision the application of elite power.  
I believe it is through case studies, such as the one I present here, 
that the power elite at work can be seen in the best way—as events 
happened—in the real world. A similar study to what I present here could 
be done on the effort to privatize K-12 education the US, or efforts to 
fight unions and worker rights. A one year “snapshot” of these networks, 
as provided in this study, is useful, and provides a description of what 
the network “could” look like at any given time. As directors quit or die, 
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the faces change. Network connections between specific entities change 
over time. But the beauty of the network from a stability point of view is 
just that—its interconnected nature is not due to any one individual or 
organization. The overall “shape” of the network does not drastically 
change with the loss of an individual. However, there are key brokers and 
hubs that add coverage and make paths shorter, for both money and 
information.  
A quantitative network study of both the fossil fuels core network 
and of the wider conservative policy network might uncover important 
attributes of those key brokering and hub nodes.  Network analysis is an 
important part of power elite research, but qualitative work with the 
upper class and the corporate leadership, and with the ideological and 
activist leaders of the right, could bear important information about how 
these networks actually operate in real time. But the possibilities are not 
great for doing more than anecdotal work; members of the upper class 
have always been notorious shy about talking about their money and 
power. Longer term studies could be helpful, too, such as Brulle’s 2014 
study of denial funding, which gives an important overview of funding 
trends. Longer term analyses replicating work done in the past will result 
in more complete understanding as well. For example, Val Burris’s work 
(especially Burris 2008) should be updated to see shifts in the ideological 
stands of the major organizations.  Lastly, a comprehensive study of 
ideological sectors of the “Right” would be helpful. How and where do 
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libertarians intersect with traditional Christian “values voters”? The same 
could be true in analyzing networks around K-12 education or worker 
rights. For my purposes, these overlaps and intersections could perhaps 
suggest fault lines in a seemingly monolithic conservative approach to 
climate change. This seems especially important in climate change today 
as it is the ideological divide that marks off the “sides” to the “debate.” 
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APPENDIX A 
FOUNDATIONS IN THE CONSERVATIVE NETWORK 
Philanthropic foundations in the conservative network. Organizations 
with directors attending 2010 Koch meeting in BOLD. 
Organization        
Ann & Gordon Getty Foundation 
Arie and Ida Crown Memorial 
The Abstraction Fund 
Edward & Wilhelmina Ackerman Foundation 
Dr. Miriam & Sheldon G. Adelson Charitable Trust 
Adler Schermer Foundation 
Aequus Institute 
Ahmanson Foundation 
Allegheny Foundation 
A. Gary Anderson Family Foundation 
Rose-Marie and Jack R. Anderson Foundation 
Anna Paulina Foundation 
Annie E. Casey Foundation 
Anschutz Foundation 
A.P. Kirby Jr. Foundation 
Apex Foundation 
Argyros Family Foundation 
Armstrong Foundation 
Arnold Family Foundation (merging in 2009 with John and Laura Arnold 
Foundation) 
Richard F. Aster Jr. Foundation 
Bachman Foundation 
Banbury Fund 
Barney Family Foundation 
Bay Branch Foundation 
The Beach Foundation 
Beazley Foundation 
Benwood Foundation 
H. N. and Frances C. Berger Foundation 
Bialkin Family Foundation 
Billy Rose Foundation 
Binder Foundation 
BK Simon 
The Blackstone Charitable Foundation 
Bochnowski Foundation 
Bodman Foundation 
Boettcher Foundation 
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Bond Foundation 
Bostock Family Foundation 
The James G. Boswell Foundation 
William K. Bowes Jr. Foundation 
Boyd Foundation 
Charles H. Boyle Foundation 
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation 
Stephen F. & Camilla T. Brauer 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Foundation Inc. 
Eli and Edythe Broad Foundation 
The James and Donnie Brock Foundation 
Brown Foundation 
Louis Calder Foundation 
Capital Group Companies Charitable Foundation 
Carnegie Corporation of New York 
Carthage Foundation 
Stephen Case Foundation 
Castle Rock Foundation 
Castleman Family Foundation 
Catto Charitable Foundation 
Charles & Ann Johnson Foundation 
Challenge Foundation 
Charles G. Koch Charitable Foundation 
Chase Foundation of Virginia 
Chiarascuro Foundation 
Chicago Freedom Trust 
Chisholm Foundation 
Claws Foundation 
Clover Foundation 
Colcom Foundation 
George E. Coleman Jr. Foundation 
Compton Foundation 
Connelly Foundation 
Adolph Coors Foundation 
Copaken Family Foundation 
E. L. Craig Foundation 
Crail Foundation 
Earlane & Sam Croom Foundation 
Donald W. Reynolds Foundation 
Dick and Betty DeVos Family Foundation 
Douglas & Maria DeVos Foundation 
Daniel & Pamela DeVos Foundation 
Charles A. Dana Foundation 
Daniels Fund 
James Deering Danielson Foundation 
Dart Foundation 
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David H. Koch Charitable Foundation 
John R. and Margrite Davis Foundation 
John Dawson Foundation 
Diana Davis Spencer Foundation 
Charles F. de Ganahl Family Foundation 
Raymond Debbane Family Foundation 
The Arthur S. DeMoss Foundation 
Deramus Foundation 
Gladys Dickson Charitable Trust 
Dodge Jones Foundation and Subsidiary 
Dixon and Carol Doll Family Foundation 
Donahue Family Foundation 
William H. Donner Foundation 
Herbert H. and Barbara C. Dow Foundation 
Duke Endowment 
Dunn’s Foundation for the Advancement of Right Thinking 
The George Edward Durell Foundation 
Earhart Foundation 
ED Foundation 
Edison Electric Institute 
Edyth Bush Charitable Foundation 
Egan Family Foundation 
Eisner Foundation 
El Pomar Foundation 
Eli Lilly and Company Foundation 
Engelberg Foundation 
Ettinger Foundation 
Evanstad Family Foundation 
Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation 
Richard M. Fairbanks Foundation 
Fairbanks Family Foundation 
Fairbrook Foundation 
Farrell Family Foundation 
Foundation for Educational Choice fka the Friedman Foundation 
Jerry and Nanette Finger Foundation 
Doris & Donald Fisher Fund 
The Fletcher Jones Foundation 
Wiliam Howard Flowers Jr. Foundation 
Fairchild Martindale Foundation 
Ford Foundation 
Foulke Foundation Trust 
Foundation to Promote Open Society 
Franklin Center for Government and Public Integrity 
Fred C. & Mary R. Koch Foundation 
Foundation for Freedom and Justice 
Neal & Jane Freeman Foundation 
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Friedman Family Foundation 
Lynn & Foster Friess Foundation 
Richard & Barbara Gaby Foundation 
Galashiels Fund 
Galbraith Foundation 
Gardner Grout Foundation 
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation 
George Gund Foundation 
Gerrish H. Milliken Foundation 
Rollin M. Gerstacker Foundation 
GFC Foundation 
Gilder Foundation 
Richard & Leslie Gilliam Foundation 
Gleason Family Foundation 
George L. Ohrstrom Jr. Foundation 
Pierre F. and Enid Goodrich Foundation 
Goodwin Foundation 
Gordon and Llura Gund Foundation 
Goyanes Family Foundation 
Albert M. & Lyda Green Foundation 
Bruce T. Halle Family Foundation 
Henry E. Haller Jr. Foundation 
Hamilton Roddis Foundation 
Robert A. & Marie Hansen Foundation 
Harman Family Foundation 
William A. Haseltine Charitable Foundation 
C. J. Heilig Foundation 
Heinz Endowments 
Helmerich Foundation 
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation 
Grover Hermann Foundation 
Herrick Foundation 
Hertog Foundation 
Albert & Ethel Herzstein Charitable Foundation 
Hess Foundation 
William & Flora Hewlett Foundation 
Hickory Foundation 
Hilton Family Foundation 
Hayne Hipp Foundation 
Holman Foundation 
Houston Endowment 
Howard Charitable Foundation 
Jaqueline Hume Foundation 
J. P. Humphreys Foundation 
Hunt Family Foundation 
Hurst Family Foundation 
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Huston Foundation 
Irving Harris Foundation 
Issa Family Foundation 
It Takes A Family, Inc. 
Jack Miller Family Foundation 
John E. & Sue M. Jackson Charitable Trust 
Robert & Ardis James Foundation 
J M Foundation 
Joyce Foundation 
J. S. Frank Foundation 
Kantner Foundation 
J. M. Kaplan Fund 
Karol Fund 
W. M. Keck Foundation 
Michael L. Keiser and Rosalind C. Keiser Charitable Trust 
W. K. Kellogg Foundation 
Kern Family Foundation 
Kickapoo Springs Foundation 
Walter & Olivia Kiebach Charitable Foundation Trust 
Mark & Anla Cheng Kingdon Foundation 
F. M. Kirby Foundation 
John S. and James L. Knight Foundation 
Knowledge and Progress Fund 
Charlotte & Walter Kohler Charitable Trust 
Koret Foundation 
Kovner Foundation 
Marie-Josee and Henry R. Kravis Foundation 
Vernon K. Krieble Foundation 
Lakeside Foundation 
Claude R. Lambe Charitable Foundation 
Leonard and Evelyn Lauder Foundation 
L. E. Phillips Family Foundation 
Thomas & Dorothy Leavey Foundation 
Fred A. Lennon Charitable Trust 
Lilly Endowment 
The James and Joan Lindsey Family Foundation 
Litwin Foundation 
Longwood Foundation 
Richard Lounsbery Foundation 
Leon Lowenstein Foundation 
Lowndes Foundation 
Lynda M. Goldstein Family Foundation 
Maclellan Foundation 
Mailman Foundation 
Malek Family Foundation 
Malott Family Foundation 
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Marcus Foundation 
Mario Family Foundation 
Marion G. Wells Foundation 
John & Mary R. Markle Foundation 
Marshall Heritage Foundation 
F. Maytag Family Foundation 
Mark C. Pope III Foundation 
Philip M. McKenna Foundation 
John P. and Anne Welsh McNulty Foundation 
McWethy Foundation 
Meadwestvaco Foundation 
Mercer Family Foundation 
Middle East Forum 
Milliken Foundation 
Mississippi Common Trust Fund 
M. J. Murdock Charitable Trust 
Joe and Mary Moeller Foundation 
Dorothy D. and Joseph A. Moller Foundation 
Ambrose Monell Foundation 
Morgan Family Foundation 
E. A. Morris Charitable Foundation 
Charles Stewart Mott Foundation 
Murrill Foundation 
Negaunee Foundation 
Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation 
Frederick E. and Julia G. Nonneman Foundation 
Norman M. Morris Foundation 
Ohrstrom Foundation 
John M. Olin Foundation 
Opportunity Foundation 
Paul F. and Franca G. Oreffice Foundation 
I. A. O’Shaughnessy Foundation 
Dian Graves Owen Foundation 
P & C Collins Fund 
David and Lucile Packard Foundation 
C. N. and Maria Papadopoulos Charitable Foundation 
Charles M. & Gloria E. Parrish Foundation 
Robert S. & Star Pepper Foundation 
Lovett & Ruth Peters Foundation 
Peter G. Peterson Foundation 
Pew Charitable Trusts 
Phillips Foundation 
Ploughshares Fund 
John William Pope Foundation 
Edgar and Elsa Prince Foundation 
Pritzker Family Foundation 
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Richard & Helen DeVos Foundation 
Robert Pritzker Family Foundation 
Randolph Foundation 
Ray Foundation 
Records-Johnston Family Foundation 
Rising Phoenix Foundation 
Roberts Foundation 
Robertson-Finley Foundation 
Robina Foundation 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund 
Rockefeller Foundation 
Rodney Fund 
Roe Foundation 
William Rosenwald Family Foundation 
Robert P. Rotella Foundation 
Rothschild Art Foundation 
Roy A. Hunt Foundation 
Joyce and Donald Rumsfeld Foundation 
Arthur N. Rupe Foundation 
Russell Sage Foundation 
Robert Wood Johnson Foundation 
Ryan Family Charitable Foundation 
Steve & Cindy Van Andel Foundation 
Saban Family Foundation 
Lesly & Pat Sajak Foundation 
Saliba Family Charitable Foundation Inc. 
Same Line Foundation 
Sarah Scaife Foundation 
Satter Foundation 
Stephen Bechtel Fund 
Scaife Family Foundation 
Schiff Foundation 
The John H. Schnatter Family Foundation 
Charles and Helen Schwab Foundation 
S. D. Bechtel Jr. Foundation 
Barbara and Barre Seid Foundation 
Searle Freedom Trust 
Shamrock Foundation 
Shanley Family Foundation 
Shenandoah Foundation 
Sid W. Richardson Foundation 
The Thomas and Stacey Siebel Foundation 
Silverwing Foundation 
Simms/Mann Family Foundation 
William E. Simon Foundation 
Smart Family Foundation 
222 
Donald and Paula Smith Family Foundation 
Smith Richardson Foundation 
Sence Foundation 
Richard Seth Staley Educational Foundation 
Stanton Foundation 
Starr Foundation 
Robert K. Steel Family Foundation 
Stewardship Foundation 
Stiles-Nicholson Foundation 
Hatton W. Sumners Foundation for the Study and Teaching of Self-
Government 
Susquehanna Foundation 
Sidney A. Swensrud Foundation 
Thomas A. & Mary S. James Foundation 
Taube Family Foundation 
Ruth and Vernon Taylor Foundation Montana 
Ruth and Vernon Taylor Foundation Montana 
Thomas B. Fordham Foundation 
John Templeton Foundation 
Tepper Family Foundation 
David J. and Mary L. G. Theroux Foundation 
Timken Foundation of Canton 
The Alice M. & Thomas J. Tisch Foundation 
Triad Foundation 
True Foundation 
Tully and Elise Friedman Fund 
Ed Uihlein Family Foundation 
Von Ehr Foundation 
Vradenburg Foundation 
Walton Family Foundation 
Weiler Foundation 
Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Foundation 
Weismann Foundation 
Lillian S. Wells Foundation 
Wellspring Committee Inc. 
Samuel L. Westerman Foundation 
Whitcomb Charitable Foundation 
Whitehead Foundation 
Robert W. Wilson Charitable Trust 
Windway Foundation 
WinShape Foundation 
Wolfensohn Family Foundation 
Woodford Foundation 
Woodhouse Family Foundation 
William Randolph Hearst Foundation 
Barbara and David Zalaznick Foundation 
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APPENDIX B 
DONOR-ASSISTED FUNDS IN THE CONSERVATIVE NETWORK 
Organization        
 
American Endowment Foundation 
Bank of America Charitable Gift Fund 
Communities Foundation of Texas 
Community Foundation Serving Richmond and Central VA 
Donors Capital Fund 
Donors Trust 
Fidelity Investment Charitable Gift Fund 
Goldman Sachs Charitable Gift Fund 
Greater Kansas City Community Foundation 
Jewish Communal Fund 
Johnson Charitable Gift Fund 
National Christian Charitable Foundation 
National Philanthropic Trust 
New York Community Trust 
San Francisco Foundation 
Schwab Charitable Fund 
Vanguard Charitable Endowment Program 
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APPENDIX C  
CORPORATE FOUNDATIONS IN THE CONSERVATIVE NETWORK 
 
Organization        
 
Aetna Foundation 
Alcoa Foundation 
Assurant Health Foundation 
Bank of America Charitable Foundation 
Briggs and Stratton Corporation Foundation 
Caterpillar Foundation 
Cigna Foundation 
Citi Foundation 
Dr. Scholl Foundation 
ExxonMobil Foundation 
Kirkland & Ellis Foundation 
Pacificorp Foundation 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America 
Prudential Foundation 
Shell Foundation  
225 
APPENDIX D 
POLICY ORGANIZATIONS (THINK TANKS, ADVOCACY ORGANIZATIONS, 
TRADE ASSOCIATIONS, DISCUSSION GROUPS) IN THE 
CONSERVATIVE NETWORK 
 
Organization        
 
Second Amendment Foundation 
60 Plus Association 
American Action Network 
American Council for Capital Formation 
American Center for Democracy 
American Council on Health and Science 
American Civil Rights Union 
American Council of Trustees and Alumni 
Acton Institute for the Study of Religion and  
Liberty 
American Conservative Union 
American Enterprise Institute for Public  
Policy Research 
America’s Future Foundation 
Americans for Prosperity 
American Foreign Policy Council 
Americans for Prosperity Foundation 
Africa Fighting Malaria 
Americans for Fair Taxation 
American Institute for Full Employment 
Accuracy in Media 
Alabama Policy Institute 
Alaska Policy Forum 
American Legislative Exchange Council 
Americans for Limited Government 
American Issues Project 
American Natural Gas Alliance Inc. 
American Majority 
American Policy Center 
American Petroleum Institute 
Arkansas Policy Foundation 
The Aspen Institute 
Alliance for a Sustainable USA 
American Tradition 
Atlantic Legal Foundation 
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Atlas Economic Research Foundation 
Americans for Tax Reform 
The Ayn Rand Institute, The Center  
for the Advancement of Objectivism 
The Business Council 
Tennessee Center for Policy  
Research, aka Beacon Center 
Citizens Committee for the Right to  
Keep and Bear Arms 
The Benjamin Rush Foundation 
American members of the Bilderberg group 2009  
Bluegrass Institute for Public Solutions 
Bill of Rights Institute 
The Business Roundtable 
The Brookings Institute 
Buckeye Institute for Public Policy Solutions 
Caesar Rodney Institute 
Citizens Against Government Waste 
The Conservative Agenda Project 
Cascade Policy Institute 
Cato Institute 
The Conservative Caucus 
The Conference Board 
The Constitutional Coalition 
Center for Competitive Politics 
Committee for Economic Development 
Center for Excellence in Higher Education 
Competitive Enterprise Institute 
Center of the American Experiment 
Center for Equal Opportunity 
Council for America 
Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow 
Club for Growth 
Center for Freedom and Prosperity Foundation 
Council on Foreign Relations 
Claremont Institute for the Study of  
Statesmanship 
Citizens in Charge Foundation 
Center for Immigration Studies 
Center for the National Interest, fka The  
Nixon Center 
Council for National Policy 
Coalitions for America 
Chamber of Commerce of the USA 
Common Sense Institute 
Commonwealth Foundation for Public  
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Policy Alternatives 
Center for Public Justice 
Center to Protect Patient Rights, Inc. 
Capital Research Center 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Center for Security Policy 
Concerned Women for America 
David Horowitz Freedom Center fka Center for the  
Study of Popular Culture 
Defend Democracy Action Fund 
Discovery Institute 
Eagle Forum 
Electricity Advisory Committee, Dept. of Energy 
Ethics and Public Policy Center 
Ethan Allen Institute 
Evergreen Freedom Foundation 
Free to Choose Network 
Faith and Reason Institute 
The Fund for American Studies 
Free Congress Research and Education Foundation 
Foundation for Cultural Review 
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies 
The Federalist Society for Law and Public  
Policy Studies 
Foundation for Economic Education 
Foundation for Free Enterprise Education 
Foundation for Individual Rights in Education 
Focus on the Family 
Frontiers of Freedom  
Thomas B. Fordham Institute 
Family Research Council 
Foundation for Research on Economics  
and the Environment 
Free State Foundation 
Freedom House 
Freedom Foundation of Minnesota 
Future of Freedom Foundation 
FreedomWorks Foundation 
Galen Institute 
Georgia Public Policy Foundation 
The Gloucester Institute 
Goldwater Institute 
Grassroots Institute of Hawaii 
Heritage Action for America 
The Alexander Hamilton Institute for  
the Study of Western Civilization 
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The Heartland Institute 
The Heritage Foundation 
Hoover Institution 
Hudson Institute 
Institute for American Values 
Institute for Contemporary Studies 
Idaho Freedom Foundation 
Institute for Energy Research 
Institute for Justice 
Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis 
International Foundation for Research  
in Experimental Economics 
(The Peter G. Peterson) Institute for  
International Economics 
Institute for International Strategic Studies - US 
Illinois Policy Institute 
Independence Institute 
Indiana Policy Review Foundation 
Institute for Humane Studies 
Institute for Policy Innovation 
International Policy Network US 
Institute for Research on the Economics of Taxation 
Intercollegiate Studies Institute 
Independent Women’s Forum 
The Institute of World Politics 
James Madison Institute - A Foundation  
for Florida’ s Future 
The James Partnership 
Jamestown Foundation 
Just Facts 
Josiah Bartlett Center for Public Policy 
Judicial Watch 
Kansas Policy Institute 
Landmark Legal Foundation 
Let Freedom Ring 
Leadership Institute 
Liberty Institute (fka Free  
Market Foundation) 
Liberty Fund 
Lincoln Institute of Public Opinion Research 
The John Locke Foundation 
John K. MacIver Institute for Public Policy 
Mackinac Center for Public Policy 
Maine Heritage Policy Center 
Manhattan Institute for Policy Research 
George C. Marshall Research Foundation 
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Maryland Public Policy Institute 
Mercatus Center 
Montana Policy Institute 
Moving Picture Institute 
Mont Pelerin Society 
Marijuana Policy Project Foundation 
Media Research Center 
Mountain States Legal Foundation 
North Dakota Policy Council 
National Association of Manufacturers  
of the USA 
National Coal Council 
National Petroleum Council 
National Center for Policy Analysis 
National Center for Public Policy Research 
National Defense Council  
Nevada Policy Research Institute 
National Federation of Independent Business 
National Institute for Labor Relations Research 
National Institute for Public Policy 
National Legal and Policy Center 
National Rifle Association of America 
The National Right to Work Committee 
The National Right to Work Legal Defense and  
Education Foundation 
National Taxpayers Union 
The Objectivist Center 
Oklahoma Council of Public Affairs 
Oregon Institute of Science and Medicine 
Ocean State Policy Research Institute 
Pacific Legal Foundation 
Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy  
Parents in Charge Foundation 
Pelican Institute for Public Policy 
Property and Environment Research Center 
Political Economy Research Institute 
The Philadelphia Society 
Pioneer Institute 
Plants Need CO2 Org 
Platte Institute for Economic Research 
John W. Pope Civitas Institute 
Public Policy Foundation of West Virginia 
Philanthropy Roundtable 
Center for the Study of the Presidency 
Parents Television Council 
Public Interest Institute 
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Reason Foundation 
Rio Grande Foundation 
Sam Adams Alliance 
Statistical Assessment Service 
Small Business and Entrepreneurship Council 
Science and Environmental Policy Project 
Show-Me Institute 
South Carolina Policy Council  
Education Foundation 
State Policy Network 
Social Philosophy and Policy Foundation 
Sutherland Institute 
Tax Foundation 
Taxpayers for Common Sense 
Texas Conservative Coalition  
Research Institute 
Thomas Jefferson Institute for Public Policy 
The Independent Institute 
Texas Public Policy Foundation 
Trilateral Commission (North America) 
Trinity Forum 
United States Energy Association 
Virginia Institute for Public Policy 
Ludwig von Mises Institute for  
Austrian Economics 
Wisconsin Policy Research Institute 
Witherspoon Institute 
Washington Legal Foundation 
Washington Policy Center 
We the People Foundation for  
Constitutional Education 
Wyoming Liberty Group 
Yankee Institute for Public Policy Studies 
Young America's Foundation 
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Appendix E 
KOCH MEETING ATTENDANCE LIST 
(DOES NOT INCLUDE INACTIVE SPOUSES AND GUESTS) 
 
Jack R. Anderson 
Neil Anderson 
Rose-Marie Anderson 
Philip Anschutz 
Nancy P. Anschutz 
Clifford S. Asness 
Nathan Dulaney Bachman IV 
Lynda A. Bachman 
Whitney L. Ball 
Michael Barone 
Frank E. Baxter 
Stephen D. Bechtel Jr. 
Elizabeth H. Bechtel 
Glenn Beck 
Earl Benard Blasingame 
Alan Boeckmann 
Donald T. “Boysie” Bollinger 
Patrick D. “Pat” Broe 
Arthur Brooks 
Ann Noble Brown 
David R. Brown 
John D. Bryan 
Robert J. Buford 
Tim Busch 
Shelby Bush 
Timothy P. “Tim” Carney 
Charlie Chandler 
David Chavern 
John Childs 
Paul T. Clifton 
Susan Lea Clifton 
Susie Coelho 
Bill Cooper 
Dino CortoPassi 
Joe Craft 
Alex Cranberg 
Jeff Crank 
Karl Crow 
Eric Crown    
Kevin Crutchfield 
Ravenel B. Curry 
Jim Dannenbaum 
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Veronique de Rugy 
Richard M. DeVos 
Helen J. DeVos 
Annie Dickerson 
Edward L. “Ned” Diefenthal 
Dixon Doll 
Carol Ann Doll 
Karl Eller 
Ronald A. Erickson 
Melvyn Estrin 
Dick Farmer 
Peter Ferrell 
Jim Ferrell 
Steve Fettig 
Dave Fettig 
Bob Fettig 
Jerry Finger 
Richard H. Fink 
Warren F. “Budd” Florkiewicz 
Charlie Fote 
Randy A. Foutch 
Foster S. Friess 
Steve Friess 
Jerome Fullinwider 
Richard Gilliam 
Leslie F. Gilliam 
Susan Gore 
Oliver Grace Jr. 
Judson C. Green 
Ken Griffin 
Gretchen Hamel 
Frederic C. Hamilton 
Robert C. "Bob" Hawk 
Richard G. Haworth 
Robert “Robin” Hayes 
Dan Heard 
Diane Hendricks 
Steve Hennessy 
Heather R. Higgins 
James E. Higgins  
Paul Hill 
John Hotchkis 
Stanley Hubbard 
Allan B. Hubbard  
Ethelmae C. Humphreys 
Manuel Johnson 
Merritt Johnson 
Marshall Johnson 
Kyle Johnstone 
I. Michael “Mike” Kasser 
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Randy Parris Kendrick 
Ken Kendrick 
Phil  Kerpen 
Gerry Kingen 
Scott Howell Kirkpatrick 
Charles G. Koch 
David H. Koch 
Elizabeth R. Koch 
Chase Koch 
Bob Koch 
Robert J. “Bob” Kohlhepp 
Charles Krauthammer 
Dennis J. Kuester 
Andrew Kupersmith 
Andre Lacy 
Kenneth Langone 
James M. “Jay” LaPeyre Jr. 
Frayda Levin 
Kenneth N. “Ken” Levy 
Tom & Judy Love 
Robert L. Luddy 
Frederic V. Malek 
Marlene Malek 
Preston L. Marshall 
Elaine T. Marshall 
E. Pierce Marshall 
Bill Mayer 
Glen Meakem 
Edwin Meese III 
Lew Meibergen 
Don Meyers 
Jeremiah “Jerry” Milbank III 
Jack Miller 
Mark Mix 
Joseph W. “Joe” Moeller 
Mary F. Moeller 
Steve G. Moore 
David L. Murfin 
W. Walter Negley 
Mina Nguyen 
J. Larry Nichols 
Sean Noble 
Teresa Oelke 
Eric S. O'Keefe 
Michael W. O'Shaughnessy 
Timothy J. “Tim” O'Shaughnessy 
Gerald E. “Gerry” O'Shaughnessy 
James A. “Jim” Patterson 
Daniel S. Peters 
Tom Petrie 
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Nancy Mitchell Pfotenhauer 
Tim Phillips 
Ramesh Ponnuru 
J. Arthur Pope 
Tom Rastin 
Russell D. “Russ” Roberts 
Corbin James Robertson Jr. 
Richard Roder 
Kathleen “Cab” Rogers 
Gary Rogers 
Durwood G. “Durk” Rorie Jr. 
Chris Rufer 
Peter Schiff  
Stephen A. Schwarzman 
Rick Sharp 
Mike Simmonds 
Peter Smith 
Dick Strong 
Michael Sullivan 
Ray Thompson 
Lynn Tilton 
Dave True 
Steve Twist 
Gayla von Ehr 
Jim Von Ehr 
Rick Waller 
Debra Steigerwaldt Waller 
Peter Wallison 
Bill Walton 
L. O. “Lew” Ward 
Dick Weekley 
Fred Wehba 
Nestor Weigand  
Richard Trent “Dick” Weiss 
C. Howard Wilkins Jr. 
Don Wills 
Larry Winnerman 
Joseph C. “Joe” Woodford 
Karen Buchwald Wright 
Earl Wright 
Clifford Miller Yonce 
Fred Young 
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Appendix F 
KOCH MEETING PROGRAM 
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Appendix G 
“CLIMATE DENIAL 35” ORGANIZATIONS 
Organization Abbreviation 
American Council on Health and Science ACHS 
Acton Institute for the Study of Religion & Liberty Acton 
Americans for Prosperity AfP 
Americans for Prosperity Foundation AfPFound 
American Legislative Exchange Council ALEC 
American Policy Center APC 
Competitive Enterprise Institute CEI 
Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow CFACT 
Center for Public Justice CPJ 
Capital Research Center CRC 
Discovery Institute DI 
Frontiers of Freedom FoF 
Foundation for Research on Economics  
           and the Environment FREE 
FreedomWorks Foundation FWFound 
Heritage Action for America HAA 
The Heartland Institute Heartland 
The Heritage Foundation Heritage 
Hudson Institute Hudson 
Institute for Research on Economics of Taxation IRET 
Just Facts JF 
George C. Marshall Research Foundation Marshall 
Mountain States Legal Foundation MSLF 
National Center for Policy Analysis NCPA 
National Center for Public Policy Research NCPPR 
Ocean State Policy Research Institute OSPRI 
Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy  Pacific 
Property and Environment Research Center PERC 
Philanthropy Roundtable PR 
Reason Foundation Reason 
Rio Grande Foundation RGF 
Statistical Assessment Service SAS 
Science and Environmental Policy Project SEPP 
State Policy Network SPN 
The Independent Institute TII 
Washington Policy Center WPC 
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SOURCE ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR URLS 
 
Organization URL 
 
ALEC Exposed http://www.alecexposed.org/wiki/ALEC_Exposed 
Conservative http://bridgeproject.com/  
transparency 
 
DeSmog Blog http://www.desmogblog.com/ 
Exxon Secrets http://www.exxonsecrets.org/maps.php 
Greenpeace  http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/ 
Lexis-nexis  https://www.lexisnexis.com/ 
Muckety  http://www.muckety.com/ 
NNDB  http://www.nndb.com/ 
Open secrets.org https://www.opensecrets.org/ 
Rightwing Watch http://www.rightwingwatch.org/ 
Sourcewatch http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/SourceWatch  
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